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This dissertation presents a theory describing the components of a cognitive 
architecture supporting intelligent behavior in spatial tasks. In this theory, an abstract 
symbolic representation serves as the basis for decisions. As a means to support 
abstract decision-making, imagery processes are also present. Here, a concrete (highly 
detailed) representation of the state of the problem is maintained in parallel with the 
abstract representation. Perceptual and action systems are decomposed into parts that 
operate between the environment and the concrete representation, and parts that 
operate between the concrete and abstract representations. Control processes can 
issue actions as a continuous function of information in the concrete representation, 
and actions can be simulated (imagined) in terms of it. The agent can then derive useful 
abstract information by applying perceptual processes to the resulting concrete state. 
This theory addresses two challenges in architecture design that arise due to the 
diversity and complexity of spatial tasks that an intelligent agent must address. The 
perceptual abstraction problem results from the difficulty of creating a single perception 
system able to induce appropriate abstract representations in each of the many tasks an 
agent might encounter, and the irreducibility problem arises because some tasks are 
resistant to being abstracted at all.  Imagery works to mitigate the perceptual 
abstraction problem by allowing a given perception system to work in more tasks, as 
perception can be dynamically combined with imagery. Continuous control, and the 
simulation thereof via imagery, works to mitigate the irreducibility problem. The use of 
imagery to address these challenges differs from other approaches in AI, where imagery 
is considered as an alternative to abstract representation, rather than as a means to it. 
A detailed implementation of the theory is described, which is an extension of the Soar 
cognitive architecture. Agents instantiated in this architecture are demonstrated, 
xi 
 
including agents that use reinforcement learning and imagery to play arcade games, and 
an agent that performs sampling-based motion planning for a car-like vehicle. The 
performance of these agents is discussed in the context of the underlying architectural 
theory. Connections between this work and psychological theories of mental imagery 
are also discussed. 
1 
Chapter I - Introduction 
People are confronted with a range of situations in their everyday lives that are 
characterized by a need for precise interaction with the spatial aspects of their 
surroundings. As a few extreme examples, consider catching a ball, solving a jigsaw 
puzzle, or parallel parking. To catch a ball, a person must position their hand in a place 
where the ball will arrive; whether or not a given position meets this criterion depends 
upon the exact velocity of the ball and the influence of gravity. To solve a puzzle, a 
person must find which pieces fit together, which is a property that depends on the 
precise details of the shapes of both pieces. And to parallel park a car, the complex 
relationship between the controls of the car and its position on the street determines 
whether or not a given action sequence will result in successful parking. 
Of course, the fact that a person can act as if all of this information has been considered 
does not imply that it is explicitly represented within their mind and reasoned over. 
However, to build machines capable of human-level intelligence, or to create detailed 
models of human cognition, hypotheses about what is represented and how it is 
processed to generate this sort of behavior are needed. 
In this thesis, work developing such a theory is presented. The problems I focus on are 
spatial control problems. In these problems, based on the spatial state of the world, an 
agent must make decisions about actions that will (possibly) change that state. This 
category includes tasks like those mentioned above, along with simpler tasks like the 
stacking blocks on a table. It does not include tasks where the perceptions provided to 
the agent are not spatial, like language understanding, or tasks where the result of 
reasoning is not the selection of an action that will have spatial effects, like solving a 
physics homework problem. However, those tasks do involve spatial information, and 
humans address all of these tasks (seemingly using the same basic machinery), so it is a 
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long-term goal of the theory to eventually address them. Spatial control problems are 
some of the most basic problems any agent must solve, though, so they will be the focus 
here.  
In spatial control tasks, as in most tasks, an agent can benefit from using an abstract 
internal representation of the structure of the task, where unnecessary detail is 
removed, allowing for more efficient processing. However, as will be explained in detail 
in the next chapter, there are two problems inherent in designing an architecture 
capable of abstract representation in spatial control tasks. First, the diversity of tasks an 
intelligent agent must address is large, and it is difficult to create a single perception 
system to create appropriate abstract representations in all such tasks. This difficulty is 
the perceptual abstraction problem. Second, some tasks are resistant to being 
abstracted at all, as is the case when the appropriate action outputs vary continuously 
as a precise function of the details of the environment: this is the irreducibility problem. 
The use of continuous controllers can partially remediate the irreducibility problem, but 
difficulties are encountered integrating these into a general-purpose cognitive 
architecture when the diversity and complexity of different spatial tasks is taken into 
account. 
In this thesis, I present a theory of basic architectural mechanisms that can work to 
mitigate the perceptual abstraction and irreducibility problems. By mitigating these 
problems, the central claim of this thesis is that this theory represents progress towards 
the goal of a cognitive architecture capable of general intelligence in spatial tasks. The 
crucial aspects of the theory include the use of both abstract and concrete (highly 
detailed) representations of the state of world, continuous action controllers which 
access the concrete representation, and simulative imagery capability, where internal 
simulations based on concrete representation are used to derive abstract information 
about the consequences of potential actions. 
As will be explained, the theory leads to a set of functional benefits, which act both to 
improve performance in individual tasks and to increase the number of tasks that can be 
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addressed by the architecture (its generality). The theory has been implemented, by 
augmenting the Soar cognitive architecture (Laird, 2008; Newell, 1990) with memories 
and processes for handling spatial information. Agents instantiated in the implemented 
architecture presented here provide demonstrations of both the operation of the 
architecture itself and the functional benefits of the underlying theory. 
An inspiration for the theory has been psychological research in mental imagery. This 
research has provided strong evidence that people maintain and manipulate visual and 
spatial information at a level close to that of perception, reusing the same systems that 
process perceptual data to process internally generated (imaginary) data (Kosslyn et al., 
2006). This work in this thesis builds on existing work on computational imagery 
systems, particularly that of Lathrop (2008), who created a pilot implementation of a 
mental imagery extension for Soar, but also drawing on other theories and systems 
(e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Glasgow & Papadias, 1992; Grush, 2004; Huffman & Laird, 1992; 
Kosslyn et al., 2006; Kurup & Chandrasekaran, 2006).  
However, as outlined above, here, I start with the assumption that abstract 
representation is used, and examine issues that arise in creating an architecture to 
support abstract representation in arbitrary problems. Concrete, perceptual-level 
representation and imagery are incorporated in the theory as a means to this end. In 
contrast, in other theories and systems, these aspects are instead presented as a means 
to model psychological phenomena, or to allow the agent to exploit differences in 
processing efficiency that different representations allow.  
To elaborate on this, prior functionality-based examinations of imagery have assumed 
that since, in principle, abstract propositional representations and concrete perceptual 
representations can encode the same information, the primary functional role for 
imagery is to allow more efficient inference. However, the analysis here reveals that, in 
a general-purpose architecture, these representations will likely not be informationally 
equivalent. Particularly, the abstract representation alone cannot capture all relevant 
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details of the problem, while these details can be represented at the concrete level. A 
functional role for imagery is then to compensate for this informational inequivalence. 
This concept leads to a difference in the broad way perceptual-level representation and 
imagery are understood in the context of a cognitive system. Rather than viewing these 
aspects primarily as a more efficient means for addressing particular tasks, like solving 
geometry problems, or as a means to model human imagination, here, they are viewed 
as essential parts of the basic process of capturing the right details of the state of the 
outside world in order to choose an action. 
This view is reflected in the types of tasks addressed. Spatial control tasks are studied, 
rather than tasks where the goal itself is to imagine something. The use of imagery in a 
particular task emerges from the need to construct appropriate abstract properties for 
that task given the architectural means available, not due to the task being “about” 
imagery. The same basic architectural mechanisms that allow an agent to perform 
mental rotation or solve geometry problems might also allow this, but the tasks 
examined here are more basic, involving the immediate interaction between the agent 
and its environment. 
In order to make traction in these tasks, in this work, it is assumed that a concrete 
representation encoding spatial properties is available, and that this representation, 
combined with the agent’s background knowledge, contains all of the relevant 
information necessary for the agent to act intelligently (where imagery processing may 
be necessary to make some of this information explicit). General-purpose perception in 
AI and robotics is an unsolved problem, so in this work the tasks studied will use either 
simulated environments or limited environments where perception is possible. 
Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated, interesting tasks can still be addressed, and 
progress can be made towards the overall goal of a general-purpose cognitive 
architecture for spatial tasks. 
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The plan for the rest of this document is as follows: 
Chapter II outlines the basic assumptions behind this research, and then motivates the 
perceptual abstraction and irreducibility problems through a few detailed examples. 
In Chapter III, the basic architectural theory is introduced, and mapped to particular 
functional benefits. The approach for evaluating the theory is also explained in this 
chapter. 
In Chapter IV, the Soar/SVS architecture which instantiates the theory is presented. As a 
complete, functional system, this architecture includes many important details that are 
not part of the general theory, including mechanisms for several different types of 
imagery operations. These details are described here. 
Chapter V presents a set of reinforcement learning agents instantiated in Soar/SVS. A 
simple technique is presented, where imagery is used as a means to infer abstract state 
information in a reinforcement learning agent, and a new algorithm, ReLAI, is 
introduced that more tightly integrates imagery and reinforcement learning. Some basic 
theoretical analysis of ReLAI is presented, and related to the benefits of the theory. An 
interface connecting Soar/SVS to an emulator for the Atari 2600 game system is briefly 
discussed, and agents that address tasks based in three different arcade games are 
presented. These agents are analyzed with respect to the ReLAI algorithm and with 
respect to the broader architectural theory. 
In Chapter VI, an agent in Soar/SVS that performs motion planning for a car-like vehicle 
is presented. This agent is an instantiation of an existing algorithm for motion planning 
within the architecture. The algorithm, RRT (LaValle & Kuffner Jr., 2001) was developed 
by others not working in the context of a cognitive architecture, but maps easily onto 
the system here, and demonstrates the benefits of the theory. 
Chapter VII presents related work, including discussions of AI research in cognitive 
architecture, robotics, and qualitative reasoning, along with psychological research in 
cognitive modeling and theories of grounded cognition. 
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Chapter VIII reviews the claims made and the demonstrations thereof in implemented 
agents. A brief discussion is presented, covering how insights uncovered here might 
apply to cognitive models and the imagery debate in psychology. Some contributions of 
the thesis are enumerated, future work is discussed, and the main body of the 
dissertation is concluded. 
At the end of the document, an appendix is presented where issues involving the 
representation of quantities in Soar’s working memory are discussed, as many concerns 
in that area overlap with the work on SVS presented in the main part of the thesis. 
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Chapter II -  Motivation 
In this chapter, issues behind representing and solving spatial problems in a task-
independent architecture are introduced through a few simple examples, and some 
basic problems in cognitive architecture design are laid out. 
2.1 Using Symbolic Representation for Decision-Making 
At a high level, any agent can be viewed as a system that takes in sensations and 
produces actions. The central goal of this work is to investigate cognitive architectural 
structures to support intelligence in spatial tasks; that is, to investigate common 
computational representations and mechanisms to allow an agent to efficiently process 
its sensations and produce action choices that an external evaluator might judge as 
intelligent. 
The space of all theories is huge, and not all possibilities can be addressed here. Instead, 
this analysis takes discrete decision-making as a starting point: we assume that the 
agent’s reasoning process is a series of steps where potential action choices are 
weighed, and one action is chosen. In addition, we assume that this decision-making is 
contingent upon symbolic information. To keep the discussion as general as possible, 
the definition of “symbolic information” will remain purposefully vague. Here, the only 
important property of this information is that, from the perspective of the decision 
procedure, symbols are discrete entities that have no intrinsic similarity to one another. 
Essentially, this means that properties influencing the decision (for example, learned 
action values) cannot be a continuous function of components of the agent’s internal 
state. 
As will be explained in detail shortly, there are two basic implications of these 
assumptions: an agent needs to derive symbolic information that distinguishes between 
situations where one decision should be made versus another (so the correct decisions 
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can be made), and this symbolic information should distinguish between as few 
situations as possible (so minimal knowledge is required to make decisions). 
These assumptions are fulfilled by decision making in Soar and other symbolic cognitive 
architectures, along with table-based reinforcement learning systems and symbolic 
planning systems. They do not cover reinforcement learning with continuous function 
approximation, nor systems where the agent’s entire behavior is described by a 
continuous function from input to output (e.g., a feedback rule or neural network), and 
there is no notion of discrete decisions between actions. 
It should be noted that these assumptions do not mean that actions must be a function 
of symbolic perceptions alone. Previous perceptions and arbitrary background 
knowledge can influence decision making. In addition, non-symbolic processes can 
operate over symbolic information and effect decision making. For example, 
reinforcement learning adjusting control biases (Sutton & Barto, 1998), memory 
activation influencing knowledge retrieval (Anderson et al., 2004), or Bayesian reasoning 
to infer properties from evidence (Tenenbaum et al., 2006) can all fit in this framework.  
In addition, the assumption that discrete decision-making is present is not intended to 
mean that every aspect of the agent’s external behavior—every detail of its motor 
vector—must be the direct result of a decision. As will be discussed, hierarchical control 
is necessary in many spatial problems, and symbolic decision-making at the upper 
level(s) of the hierarchy is sufficient to meet these assumptions. 
2.2 Motivating Tasks 
To better understand what is necessary to represent and solve spatial tasks, three 
example tasks are introduced in this section. 
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2.2.1 The Blocks World 
In the blocks world (Figure 1), an agent is presented with some blocks on a table, and 
has a simple task of stacking them in some specific configuration, such as block A on 
block B on block C. At any time, the agent can move any block that has nothing on top of 
it. Blocks can be moved to the top of another block or to the table. 
A straightforward way of addressing this task in a symbolic agent is to use a planning 
language such as STRIPS. The state is described in terms of abstract predicates
1
, as 
shown on the right of the figure, and rules encode possible actions available to the 
agent. For example, a rule might encode that if a block X is on another block Y 
(on(X,Y) is true), and X moved to the table, block Y is now clear and block X is now on 
the table (on(X,Y) is no longer true, on(X,table) is true, and clear(Y) is true). In 
the simplest case, the initial state and the goal of the problem are expressed in similar 
terms, and the problem space can be searched through using a standard algorithm (e.g., 
iterative deepening), finding a sequence of actions that lead to the goal. 
An alternative approach is to use a reinforcement learning algorithm to gradually learn a 
policy through interaction with the environment (Sutton & Barto, 1998). In this 
approach, the state could again be represented in terms of abstract predicates
2
, but the 
goal is instead mapped onto a reward signal. With enough trials, the agent can learn a 
policy to maximize its reward, effectively solving the problem. 
                                                      
1
 Throughout this work, predicate representations will be used as notational shorthand for generic 
symbolic representations. The use of predicates is not meant to imply anything about the symbolic 
processing that could be used, but merely to illustrate what data is encoded in terms of symbols. 
2
 In line with the symbolic decision-making assumption, when discussing reinforcement learning here, I 
am referring to table-based RL, and not RL with function approximation. Connections between the issues 
discussed here and RL function approximation will be discussed in Section 7.4. 
Figure 1: A simple blocks world task. 
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These agents share the general characteristic that the end result (after planning has 
occurred, or a policy has been learned) is a mapping from states to actions. In the blocks 
world, for both of these agents, the on and clear predicates capture the right aspects 
of the task such that an optimal plan or policy can easily be found by an appropriate 
planner or learning algorithm.  
One of these agents might exist in a world where it is repeatedly presented with blocks 
world situations, and must solve each one. In that case, the agent is solving multiple 
instances of the same task. In realistic environments, any given instance of a task might 
vary in its details. For example, in different instances, the blocks might be in slightly 
different positions, they might be different colors, or be slightly larger or smaller.  
However, the representation of the task used here is good enough that it covers all of 
these variations of the task. This is the benefit of using an abstract description of the 
world. If an abstraction correctly summarizes the important properties of the task, as it 
does in this case, lower-level details can be ignored so that many underlying problem 
instances are mapped to a single internal task representation. Any instance of the task 
where the initial state encodes that all blocks are on the table can be solved with the 
same action sequence, regardless of the exact location of the blocks on the table, their 
size, color, etc.  
In opposition to the abstract agents described above, consider an agent using a more 
detailed representation, such as continuous coordinates describing the shapes of blocks, 
without a higher-level interpretation (we will call this detailed representation concrete). 
As these coordinates would be treated symbolically, any variation in the blocks 
(however minor) would cause the agent to perceive a completely different state. An 
agent using concrete information for a symbolic representation would have very little 
generalization ability: it would be extremely unlikely that two blocks in different 
problem instances would ever appear in the same precise position, so the agent would 
never be able to transfer knowledge between instances of the task, no matter how 
similar they may appear to an observer. 
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2.2.2 The Pedestal Blocks World 
Now, consider a slightly modified version of the environment (Figure 2). Here, the agent 
is presented with a table and three blocks. There are some pedestals fixed to the table 
upon which the blocks can be placed. The goal is to place the blocks on the pedestals in 
the correct order (A to the left, then B, then C to the right). The agent moves each block 
to a pedestal, first A then B then C. 
Rather than having a single goal, this agent receives a numerical reward proportional to 
the quality of its solution. A reward of 100 is received for placing the blocks in the 
correct order. It is better to place the blocks as far to the left as possible: 10 points are 
deducted from the reward for each empty platform to the left of C. However, the blocks 
can only be placed centered on the pedestals (otherwise they fall off), and the pedestals 
may be positioned such that a certain block cannot be placed on a certain pedestal, as a 
neighboring pedestal is in the way, or that two blocks cannot fit on adjacent pedestals. If 
the agent places a block where it cannot fit, it receives a reward of -100 and the task 
ends. If the agent places the blocks on the pedestals without a collision, but the ordering 
is wrong, a -10 reward is received. 
This task is not as straightforward for a symbolic agent to address, as it is not as clear 
how to represent the state of the task in terms of abstract symbols. If symbols simply 
describe the same basic aspects of the state as was necessary in the unmodified blocks 
world (on and clear predicates), these symbols are insufficient to distinguish between 
cases where the best action is, for example, moving A to pedestal1 from cases where 
the best action is to instead move A to pedestal2. This is because the crucial aspect of 
the problem that affects which choice is better is not captured by the given symbols: 
whether or not the given action would cause a collision.  
Figure 2: A pedestal blocks world problem and its optimal solution state. 
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Instead, more complex predicates are needed. For example, a predicate encoding 
exactly the relevant property would suffice: for example 
collision_if_moved(A,pedestal1) might be true if moving block A to 
pedestal1 would cause a collision. However, note that this predicate is not a simple 
property describing the state of the world, like the fact that a block is on the table, but 
rather encodes a much more complicated, task-specific relationship. For example, 
Figure 3 shows a situation where, to infer collision_if_moved(C,pedestal2), the 
exact sizes and positions of three blocks and three pedestals need to be accounted for, 
and one of those blocks (C) is located spatially far from the other objects. Overall, the 
symbolic information necessary in this task is not a simple, local property of the world 
that one might expect a generic perception system to calculate. 
2.2.3 Motion Planning for a Nonholonomic Car 
One final task is needed to introduce a relevant aspect of intelligent spatial behavior 
that is not apparent in blocks world examples: precise control. As a representative task 
of this sort, the problem of motion planning for a nonholonomic car will be considered. 
Even in the blocks world, if a real robot is used, precise control is necessary. In such a 
system, the final output of the agent is a set of motor voltages. Since real blocks can 
vary in size and shape, the actual voltages output might need to be sensitive to those 
variations. If the motor voltages are continuous, as are the positions of the blocks, the 
problem likely cannot be solved by symbolically mapping abstract symbolic perceptions 
to actions.  
However, in simple domains, this aspect can be ignored. A complete system would 
Figure 3: A situation in pedestal blocks world where nonlocal interactions are important if the 
agent is considering moving block C to pedestal 2. 
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include low-level controllers in the architecture that continuously transform the 
perceived state to output voltages. For example, for a motor that causes a translation of 
a gripper arm, the output voltage could be set to Δ, where Δ is the distance from the 
arm to the block and  is a negative constant factor, in order to move the gripper to the 
block. This is a partially nonsymbolic approach to the problem, but fits within a system 
using symbolic representations for decision making: controllers can be encapsulated in 
modules isolated from the rest of cognition, and the actions of the agent can simply be 
viewed as selecting between controllers (e.g., Laird et al., 1991). 
For this encapsulated controller approach to work, though, to make intelligent 
decisions, the controllers typically must have symbolic characterizations: the behavior of 
the controllers must result in consistent transitions between symbolic states. This 
essentially means that the controllers must have performance guarantees.  
For example, a robotic blocks world agent might have a controller to move a gripper 
arm to a block and grasp it. If every time clear(A) is true, invoking the controller 
results simply results in the agent picking up block A, the agent can act intelligently. If in 
some circumstances reaching for a block might also knock down towers of nearby 
blocks, the agent needs to have symbolic information that allows it to distinguish those 
circumstances if it is to make intelligent decisions. 
Motion planning, as it is considered here, is the problem of determining a sequence of 
control outputs that causes a robot to move through space to reach a goal position.
3
 In 
Figure 4, the task is to drive the car object to the goal region while avoiding the grey 
obstacles. A line outlining the optimal path to follow is shown. Some approaches to 
motion planning use encapsulated controllers, where low-level controllers are designed 
such that the problem can be reduced to a search through the symbolic states those 
controllers reliably traverse (e.g., Beeson et al., 2010). This works well for particular 
                                                      
3
 The problem is posed slightly more generally in the motion planning literature, but the distinction is 
unimportant here. 
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classes of robots, such as polygonal robots 
that can move in any direction, and for 
more complicated robots when tight 
maneuvering is less important. 
However, in other situations, the 
encapsulated controller approach does 
not work as well. One reason for this 
difficulty is that certain kinds of 
constraints on motion are infeasible to capture in abstract representations, and creating 
an abstract representation is necessary for the encapsulated controller approach to 
work well. Nonholonomic constraints result from systems where the number of 
controllable dimensions is less than the total number of degrees of freedom. For 
instance, a car is nonholonomic, since its position can be described by three parameters 
(its position on the surface of the earth and the direction it is facing), but it is only 
controllable in two dimensions (driving forward and reverse, and steering left and right). 
Where it is relatively straightforward to abstractly characterize the relevant parts of the 
reachable space of a robot that can turn in place, this is not as simple with a car-like 
robot when precise details matter. This difficulty is familiar to most drivers: it is 
relatively easy to determine a sequence of roads to travel on to reach a destination 
(where precise details beyond the specific roads traveled on do not matter), but it is 
much more difficult to parallel park (where the details do matter). The figure shows an 
example problem where the nonholonomic constraints matter. It is difficult to come up 
with an abstraction of the problem where the path shown could have been composed 
by searching through an abstract state space. 
This situation, where precise control cannot be reduced to transitions between symbolic 
states, presents a challenge to symbolic agents, which will be addressed shortly. 
Figure 4: A nonholonomic car motion 
planning problem. 
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2.3 Meta-Problems in Architecture Design 
These domains provide insight into some fundamental issues in cognitive architecture 
design. These issues will be presented as meta-problems: problems that the design of 
the architecture must support solving. 
First, in order behave intelligently in any task, the agent needs to use its perception 
system to infer information about the outside world, which leads to the first meta-
problem: 
Veridical Perception Problem: An agent must have means to use its perceptual input to 
determine sufficient information about the true state of the world in order to 
intelligently select actions. 
The notion of “intelligently” selecting actions will be discussed shortly.  
This problem is posed mainly to clarify what this research is not about. Much research in 
AI and related fields is working towards addressing veridical perception, including 
research in robotic perception and in computer vision. However, the focus here is 
instead on problems that arise even when the complete state of the world is known to 
the agent, such as it is in virtual environments. The previous section described 
difficulties related to perception in both the pedestal blocks world and nonholonomic 
motion planning tasks, however, these difficulties had nothing to do with inferring the 
true state of the world: they had to do with representing that information in a form 
such that actions can be chosen. 
Another meta-problem is then present, related to the need for an agent to construct 
appropriate abstract symbols to choose actions. Any agent that performs symbolic 
decision-making needs to derive symbols from its perceptual input that it can use to 
distinguish between situations where one action should be chosen versus another. If 
two situations cannot be distinguished in terms of the available symbolic information, 
the agent will make the same action choice in both, regardless of what non-symbolic 
processes are operating in terms of the symbolic representation. For example, an agent 
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in the pedestal blocks world using only on predicates cannot distinguish between states 
where moving block A to pedestal1 will and will not cause a collision. 
In addition, these symbols should distinguish as few states as possible—they should be 
abstract. If, instead of using on predicates, the pedestal blocks world agent encoded 
every detail of the problem in its symbolic representation (a concrete symbolic 
representation), planning or learning would be extremely difficult, especially if multiple 
instances of the problem were addressed. 
Any agent architecture following the symbolic assumption must then solve a problem of 
perceptual abstraction: 
Perceptual Abstraction Problem: An agent must have a means to create abstract 
symbolic structures from perceptual input that can serve as the basis for intelligent 
action choices. 
The discussion of control in the previous section motivates another meta-problem. If all 
behavior is simply viewed as mapping primitive perceptions to symbolic information, 
and selecting primitive actions based on that symbolic information, there may be no 
possible symbolic representation of the problem that makes all of the necessary 
distinctions between situations and yet is abstract enough that efficient planning or 
general learning is possible. 
Irreducibility problem: An agent must have the means to intelligently act in tasks where 
abstract, purely-symbolic representation is not possible.
4
 
In many cases, the irreducibility problem can be handled by including encapsulated 
controllers in the architecture, as can be done in the blocks world. In that case, at the 
                                                      
4
 The word “irreducibility” here makes the most sense when the task is viewed as an MDP (as will be 
discussed in Chapter V). The size of an MDP may be reduced by identifying equivalent states and/or 
actions and combining them (Givan et al., 2003). However, at some point the MDP will reach a minimal 
size. If the minimal MDP is still very large, we call the problem irreducible. In general, though the term can 
be used in the context of any symbolic representation scheme, not just MDPs. 
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symbolic level, the actions are to choose among controllers rather than to issue raw 
motor commands. However, in other tasks, such as motion planning for a nonholonomic 
vehicle, this simple reduction may not be possible, as there is no apparent way to 
effectively divide the problem between low-level controllers and symbolic reasoning to 
choose between controllers. 
The word “intelligence” is prominent in all three of these problems. The broad goal of 
this work is to work towards an implemented cognitive architecture capable of human-
level intelligence in spatial problems. Towards this goal, intelligence should be judged 
based on matching human behavior. While it is possible that the definitions of these 
problems can vary based on differences in what it means to “match” human behavior, 
and differences in the details of the agent, for the level of analysis presented here these 
differences should be minor. Moreover, in the tasks examined here, matching human 
behavior and achieving optimal performance will not be differentiated—progress 
toward optimal performance will be used as a substitute for progress toward human-
level performance. The goal of matching human behavior here serves only as a very 
rough guide to what tasks should be addressed and what level of performance should 
be achieved, rather than as a direct objective to evaluate. 
Another important aspect that affects the difficulty of solving these meta-problems is 
the number of tasks the agent is to address. Solving the problems and creating an 
architecture capable of supporting human-level performance in a single task is much 
simpler than doing the same for a general-purpose architecture. Accordingly, the 
general veridical perception, perceptual abstraction, and irreducibility problems are 
defined to be the versions of these problems faced that must be addressed by an 
architecture capable of supporting intelligent behavior in the same breadth of tasks as 
humans. 
2.4 Imagery for Spatial Tasks 
In this thesis, cognitive architecture structures are introduced which are proposed to 
work towards solving the general perceptual abstraction and general irreducibility 
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problems. These structures support what is called simulative imagery. Here, simulative 
imagery is explained at a high level in the context of two of the tasks introduced in 
Section 2.2. 
In the pedestal blocks world, an issue with symbolic representation was that some 
important information—the circumstances under which a given action will cause a 
collision or not—is difficult to capture in terms of symbols. A predicate to capture this 
information was proposed (collision_if_moved), however, calculating this 
predicate involves many factors, and it is not obvious how a task-independent agent 
could infer it. That is, it is one of the difficult cases that make general perceptual 
abstraction a problem. 
In this thesis, the proposed solution to the difficulty of perceptual abstraction in cases 
like these is to use imagery. An imagery agent has both an internal abstract problem 
representation, along with a more precise internal concrete representation: a 
representation that makes as many distinctions as possible between states of the world. 
That is, it has internal representations akin to both pictures and predicates. System 
design is covered later, but for this discussion, it is sufficient to say that the agent can 
simulate its actions in terms of the concrete representation, and derive the resulting 
abstract state. In the pedestal blocks world, the agent can imagine what would happen 
if it were to move a given block on to a given pedestal, and detect whether a collision 
would result (Figure 5). Essentially, imagery here allows a complex, task-specific 
predicate to be inferred by using a combination of simple, task-independent 
mechanisms. 
Figure 5: Imagery in pedestal blocks world. 
The agent has imagined block b on pedestal2 (creating an imagined copy, B’) and inferred 
the abstract predicates at right. 
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In nonholonomic motion planning, the issue discussed above is that the selection of 
complex control sequences cannot easily be reduced to a search through abstract 
symbolic states. That is, the problem is irreducible, and this irreducibility cannot be 
handled by encapsulated controllers. In response to this difficulty, a common approach 
used is sampling-based motion planning (Lindemann & LaValle, 2003). These techniques 
determine the reachable locations for a robot by simulating motion from its current 
position. This simulation process can be considered a form of imagery (Wintermute, 
2009a). Sampling-based motion planning is often used in conjunction with low-level 
controllers. For a car planning problem, a controller can be created to steer the car 
toward a point in space, and the algorithm samples possible inputs to this controller 
(intermediate goal points, or waypoints) through simulation to find a sequence that 
results in a short, collision-free path reaching the goal. Leaving aside (for now) the issue 
of how candidate waypoints are generated, the relevant aspect of this technique is that 
imagery operations simulating the behavior of the agent’s low-level controllers are an 
essential part of this motion planning technique. In many cases, the actual controllers 
used for external action can be run on simulated data to allow this  (e.g., Leonard et al., 
2008). 
In using imagery, the problem is then divided between a high-level search over possible 
sequences of waypoints, and low-level simulations over concrete states that determine 
which further waypoints are reachable from a known state. This differs from the 
encapsulated controller approach: while the technique still has aspects of a search 
through abstract states, the problem is not reduced to such a search. Abstract states 
encoding information like “reached waypoint 12” or “collided with an obstacle” are 
used, but the agent has no way of knowing what future abstract state transitions will 
happen without using simulative imagery. Put another way, the agent can use low-level 
controllers whose behavior cannot be reliably characterized with simple abstract state 
transitions. Through the use of simulative imagery, though, the irreducibility problem is 
mitigated in these agents. A complete motion planning agent will be discussed in 
Chapter VI. 
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Chapter III -  A Theoretical Architecture for Spatial Problems 
The examples in the previous chapter informally present some aspects of an 
architecture for spatial tasks and why they are useful, but there are still many 
unanswered questions. In this chapter, a theory for an architecture incorporating these 
aspects is described, and specific functional benefits afforded by the theory are 
described. In Chapter IV, details of a computational instantiation of the theory are 
described. 
3.1 Theory Description 
Many types of AI systems fit the basic pattern that perceptions are mapped to an 
abstract problem state, and abstract decision-making occurs in terms of that problem 
state. This is shown in Figure 6(a). In the figure, the decision system could be a symbolic 
planner or a reinforcement learning system, or something less constrained such as 
Soar’s symbolic processing. 
Details of perception are often ignored when discussing these systems and only the 
Figure 6: A basic non-imagery architecture (left) and an imagery architecture 
(right). 
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internal problem representation is addressed, but a perception algorithm is still at least 
implicitly part of the system. For example, in the blocks world, the internal 
representation could consists of predicates like on(A,B) and clear(C), and in an 
embodied agent, some sort of vision system would build those predicates during 
perception. 
Figure 6(a) labels the different parts of this generic architecture. Call the direct output of 
the agent’s sensors Pr, for raw perception. This signal is transformed by the perception 
system to create an abstract perception signal, called Pa. The system maintains an 
internal abstract representation of the problem state, R, calculated as a function Pa, 
possibly taking into account past observations and background knowledge. Agents of 
this sort also typically use a high-level representation of actions: it is rare that actions 
are considered in terms like “set motor voltage to .236”, even though that may be the 
final output of an embodied agent. So, even in a simple system, there are typically 
distinct abstract and raw action signals, Aa and Ar, and a motor system that creates Ar 
from Aa. 
An architecture with imagery is shown in Figure 6(b). A concrete representation, Rc, is 
present, in addition to Ra (in the abstract decision system). An additional level of 
perceptual and action processing has also been added. The output of low-level 
perception is now provided to Rc, so it is called Pc, for concrete perception. Rc is chiefly 
derived from this signal. However, Rc is not strictly a reflection of Pc, but can also be 
locally manipulated. In particular, it can be manipulated based on the high-level action 
signal Aa from the abstract decision system. High-level perception processes transform 
Rc into Pa, which is the perception signal provided to the abstract decision system. Note 
that this happens independently of whether the contents of Rc are real or imagined: the 
form of Pa is the same, just possibly annotated as real or imagined.  
Imagery actions share common mechanisms with external actions. Agents can thus 
simulate the results of external actions in the imagery system. Moreover, the system 
can now use actions that cause changes to the imagery system, but do not have a 
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corresponding external action. These imagery actions can be used for many different 
things, for example, memories could be retrieved, or geometric reasoning could be 
performed. For this discussion, though, we will focus on simulative imagery: using 
imagery actions to predict the value of Pa a given action would cause if it were to be 
executed in the environment. Through simulative imagery, the abstract decision system 
can get information about the state of the world not just via Pa directly, but via 
predictions about future values of Pa. Both these predictions and the execution of the 
external actions themselves can be based upon information not present in the current 
value of Pa itself, but present in Pc.  
The properties of an architecture following this theory can be divided into nine 
important aspects, as outlined below. Each of these aspects (excluding the first) can 
depend on others being present (as indicated), otherwise they are independent of one 
another. This theory is being described with a sort of open world assumption: other 
aspects not described here may also be present, unless they are specifically ruled out. 
A1. Bimodality 
- Two representations of information derived from perception are present, Ra and 
Rc. 
- Representation Rc contains more perceptual information than Ra—it makes more 
distinctions between states of the world. If Rc encodes spatial locations of 
objects in the world, it is a concrete spatial representation.
5
 
- Processes can encode information in Ra based on Rc (through high-level 
perception processes). 
A2. Concrete routines 
 Requires A1. 
                                                      
5
 While the focus here is on spatial information, this theory could potentially also apply to non-spatial 
(e.g., auditory) modalities, although that possibility will not be covered here. In addition, other 
information can be present in the concrete representation that may not be considered “spatial”. The 
implemented system discussed in Chapter IV includes object shape, velocity, and identity information in 
the concrete spatial representation, and other systems could include information like the mass or 
acceleration of objects. 
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- Processes can cause changes to representation Rc based on its existing contents 
(they can locally manipulate it). 
A3. Imagery 
 Requires A1, A2. 
- Concrete routines can be invoked by processing in Ra, and result in persistent 
changes to Rc. These are imagery processes. 
- Via high-level perception, results of imagery are reflected in Ra. 
A4. Simulative imagery 
 Requires A1, A2, A3. 
- Some imagery operations simulate future states of the world in terms of Rc: they 
manipulate Rc such that its resulting state is similar to a situation that might be 
perceived in the future.   
A5. Concrete controllers  
 Requires A1. 
- External actions can be contingent on information in Rc but not in Ra. Modules 
that generate these actions are called concrete controllers. 
A6. Simulative imagery of concrete control 
 Requires A1, A2, A3, A4, A5. 
- Some simulative imagery operations simulate the effects of concrete controllers. 
A7. Architectural representation conversion 
 Requires A1. 
- High-level perception and imagery are supported by specialized architectural 
mechanisms.  
A8. Perception/action reuse 
 Requires A1, A7. 
- Some types of perceptual information6 arrive in Ra only via Rc. 
                                                      
6
 For example, if the concrete representation encodes spatial information, spatial information may only 
arrive in the decision system via that representation. This is not all perceptual information, though, since 
the agent might have different modalities of perception (e.g., visual and auditory) that might vary in their 
imagery capability. 
24 
- Common high-level perception mechanisms operate over structures created by 
imagery and low-level perception in Rc. 
- Some imagery processes share mechanisms with those used to generate external 
actions. 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, each of these aspects maps in a different ways 
to functional benefits. To clarify what how each aspect affects the overall architecture, 
alternative systems can be described that lack that aspect. Some of these systems are 
shown in Figure 7 The implications of leaving out these aspects, however, are not 
discussed here, as that will be covered in the next section. 
Figure 7(a) shows a system including all of the aspects. Figure 7(b) demonstrates a 
system lacking in bimodality. This system only represents information at one level of 
abstraction.  
 
Figure 7: Alternative architecture designs lacking aspects of the imagery theory. 
25 
Figure 7(c) shows an example of a bimodal system without imagery or concrete 
routines. Here, the high-level action system has no connection to Rc. This is a simple 
hierarchical control system, where the only role of the concrete representation is to 
provide more state information for controllers in the action system.  
A bimodal system can have imagery capability without simulative imagery. Many 
previous computational imagery systems address tasks that are more about high-level 
reasoning than detailed interaction with a spatial environment, such as solving 
geometry problems (e.g., Gelernter, 1963) or geographic reasoning (e.g., Barkowsky, 
2002) and hence lack this aspect. 
Figure 7(d) shows an example of a bimodal system with concrete routines, but not 
imagery. In such a system, high-level perception uses concrete routines as a means to 
derive abstract properties. Hence, there is an arrow from that system to Rc rather than 
from the action system. Such a system can include concrete routines that simulate 
actions. Concrete routines are a generalization
7
 of Ullman’s concept of visual routines 
(Ullman, 1984). These are local processes within a concrete visual representation that 
are used as means to compute more abstract properties, such as edges or connectivity 
between objects. In the pedestal blocks world example in Figure 5, the agent imagines 
the movement of the blocks, creating a persistent state in the imagery system to which 
it applies high-level perception to infer that moving B to pedestal2 will cause a 
collision. However, one could create a similar system where the same information 
(future collisions) is calculated via the same concrete routines (geometric operations in 
the concrete representation), but where the abstract decision system does not access it 
by applying perception to an imagined state. In that case, a predicate such as 
collision_if_moved(A,peg1) might simply be provided by high-level perception, 
which happens to use concrete routines to determine it.  
                                                      
7
 Concrete routines are a concept that can apply to any concrete representation, not just visual. Another 
difference from Ullman’s theory is that here, imagery is a specialization of concrete routines, where 
Ullman proposed visual routines as a means to perception of abstract properties, not as imagery 
operations. Pinker, however, posited a commonality between visual routines and imagery (Pinker, 1984). 
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Figure 7(e) shows a system that encodes both concrete and abstract representations, 
but does not use architectural mechanisms to convert between them. That is, the 
process of converting between one format and another is left to knowledge, or the 
system may not differentiate between knowledge and architecture. For example, an 
agent mixing quantitative and abstract information in a common architectural memory 
with knowledge that converts between the formats meets this description. This system 
might have all of the other aspects in it, but they cannot be seen in the diagram because 
they are not supported by architecture. 
Finally, Figure 7(f) shows an architecture where the imagery system is encapsulated in a 
module, and not connected to perception and action. Again, this architecture might 
have every other aspect in it, but imagery processing here is distinct from perception 
and action as it relates to the external world.  
Reasons for preferring the proposed architecture over these alternatives will be more 
fully discussed in Section 3.3, which covers the functional benefits of the theory. 
3.2 High-level Claims and Evaluation Approach 
As has been stated, the central goal of this work is to investigate cognitive architectural 
mechanisms to support intelligence in spatial tasks. The central claim is that the theory 
outlined in the previous section makes progress towards this goal. This progress can be 
captured by three high-level claims:  
- The theory allows for improved performance in individual spatial tasks. 
- The theory allows for improved generality: more tasks can be covered. 
- The theory is practically useful: an architecture following the theory can be 
implemented and used. 
To show evidence for these claims, in the next section, specific benefits afforded by the 
architecture are introduced. Each of these benefits relies on a certain subset of the 
architectural aspects outlined in the previous section, and each supports one or more of 
the high-level claims. For those benefits supporting the first two claims, the 
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performance or generality of an architecture following the theory can be compared to 
that of an architecture that is otherwise the same, but lacking the theoretical aspect(s) 
supporting the benefit. This comparison is the basis for arguing “improvement” as 
stated in the claims. 
In later chapters, a comprehensive implemented architecture is presented, and agents 
instantiated in that architecture are demonstrated. These demonstrations serve to 
directly evaluate the third claim. While evaluation of the first two claims is supported by 
evidence from these demonstrations and experiments, it is important to note that those 
claims cannot be directly evaluated with experimental data. There are many free 
parameters in the design of an architecture and agent if the only constraints on it are 
that it is symbolic and lacks a particular aspect. This makes it extremely difficult to 
develop alternative agents that can be used in truly fair experimental comparisons to 
agents following the complete theory. Instead, while implemented agents and empirical 
data are presented to demonstrate the benefits, the evaluation of the first two claims is 
primarily based on analysis as opposed to empirical results. 
3.3 Benefits of the Theory 
In this section, specific functional benefits of the theory are described. Outside of the 
implementation of the architecture itself (as described in the next chapter), a thorough 
exploration of the functional benefits of simulative imagery and the other architectural 
aspects is a major contribution of this work.  
As discussed in the previous section, the three main claims here are that the 
architecture allows the agent to solve particular tasks better compared to alternatives 
(task performance is improved), that the architecture can address more tasks compared 
to alternatives (generality is improved), and that the architecture can be usefully 
implemented. Broadly speaking, the particular benefits outlined here can be categorized 
based on which of these goals they further the most: they are task performance, 
generality, or design benefits (those which simplify the implementation). 
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Improved generality and task performance are tightly intertwined goals: improving task 
performance can aid generality if the task improvement moves the architecture from 
being unable to address a problem (by meeting some minimal standard of behavior) to 
being able to address it. In addition, an improvement in generality is also an 
improvement in task performance, if one simply defines the “task” being addressed as 
solving some set of primitive tasks. Here, we restrict generality benefits to those that 
are most applicable to what are conventionally called task-independent systems. 
At a higher level, for some benefits, the means by which task performance or generality 
is improved is by directly addressing the perceptual abstraction or irreducibility 
problems. When a benefit can be understood in these terms, it is noted. 
The individual benefits are described in detail below. Each is supported by particular 
theoretical aspects, as is described. For task performance and generality benefits, the 
improvement claimed is compared to a similar architecture, but lacking the necessary 
aspect(s) supporting the benefit. 
For convenience, Tables 1 and 2, located at the end of the chapter, summarize the 
theoretical aspects of the architecture, the benefits, and the associations between 
them. Table 2 also references agents that are introduced in later chapters that 
demonstrate the benefits. 
B1. Concrete routines allow movement and nonlocal interaction to be captured in 
terms of abstract symbolic information, mitigating the perceptual abstraction 
problem. 
In order to choose an action, an agent may need to take into account the precise 
movement of objects. For example, when parking in a parking garage, one needs to 
consider whether the car will collide with a pillar when turning into a tight spot. 
Similarly, it can be necessary to take into account object interactions that, from the 
perspective of the current state, are non-local. The pedestal blocks world again provides 
an example of this: when considering moving a block from the bin to a pedestal, it must 
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be determined whether a collision will occur in the future. In the current state (when 
the block is on the table), this determination involves both properties of the moving 
block and properties of objects that are spatially distal from it. 
To represent these problems at an abstract level, the perception system must 
distinguish between the relevant states. Even if the agent has a perception system 
specifically built for the task, though, this is a difficult perceptual abstraction problem if 
concrete routines are not present. The distinctions cannot be easily detected by 
composing simple “features” of the current visual scene detected in a bottom-up 
manner, or by matching the scene to memories.  
However, if actions can be simulated based on concrete information, properties that 
were difficult to compute in the original state might be simpler to compute in the 
simulated state. In the pedestal blocks world example, once the block is imagined in its 
new position, the agent need only infer a basic property: whether or not the block 
collides with any other object. Using simulation, the necessary properties can be 
inferred, improving task performance.  
The minimal aspect of the architecture necessary for this benefit is concrete routines 
(A2). Note that imagery is not necessary; a system could leverage this benefit without 
having the decision system deliberately invoke simulations, and without having 
persistent resulting concrete states. For example, to address pedestal blocks world, the 
perception system of an imagery-less architecture like that in Figure 7(d) could provide a 
predicate like collision-if-moved(A,pedestal2) as a result of an automatic 
concrete simulation, capturing a non-local interaction. The next benefit explains why 
imagery might be a preferable approach, though. 
Concrete routines also allow for a system to encode useful properties beyond 
movement and nonlocal interaction, such as object connectivity (Ullman, 1984). 
Concrete routines supporting these properties may not simulate actions, as the routines 
that have been discussed so far do. 
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Since relevant properties can be easily detected by a system with concrete routines that 
cannot be easily detected by a system without, aspect A2 supports improved task 
performance via this benefit. 
B2. Imagery allows task-specific abstract properties to be encoded by a fixed, task-
independent high-level perception system, mitigating the general perceptual 
abstraction problem.   
This benefit addresses the general perceptual abstraction problem. How can a task-
independent agent construct abstract perceptual properties in arbitrary tasks? This is a 
hard problem, since deriving abstract properties from concrete information is a difficult 
process. The simplest approach to this would be to come up with a set of universal 
abstract properties, which are calculated by architectural means. 
However, for spatial problems, this approach does not seem viable. Researchers in 
qualitative spatial reasoning have attempted to describe such a set of universal 
properties, but no such set has been found. This has led to the poverty conjecture of 
Forbus et al. (1991):  
"We claim there is no purely qualitative, general-purpose, representation of 
spatial properties. That is, while qualitative descriptions are useful in spatial 
reasoning, they are not sufficient to describe a situation in a task-independent 
and problem-independent fashion."  
Task-independent qualitative properties are precisely the sort of abstract symbolic 
representation of perceptual information that allow an agent to compactly represent 
the state of a problem while retaining enough information to choose appropriate 
actions. Assuming the poverty conjecture is true, something more is needed to solve the 
general perceptual abstraction problem. 
For solving qualitative reasoning problems, Forbus et al. propose augmenting qualitative 
information with a quantitative representation, which is similar to the approach taken 
here. If imagery is present, the overall process of perceptual abstraction can involve 
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both concrete manipulation and high-level perception. From an architectural point of 
view, the same high-level perceptual processes allow different symbolic information to 
be encoded depending on how the concrete representation has been manipulated. In 
this way, if the set of concrete manipulation processes change or are applied in different 
ways in different tasks, the process of perceptual abstraction is more flexible. Not only 
can more relevant properties in particular tasks be generated (as the previous benefit 
covered), but this flexibility allows the architecture to encode different task-specific 
properties in different tasks, improving generality. 
As in the pegged blocks world example, in this work we focus on using simulative 
imagery (A4) to generate these task-specific properties. In that example, the fact that a 
collision results from a particular action is a (task-specific) property of the current state. 
Non-simulative imagery could be used for the same purpose, though. For example, an 
agent could use geometric imagery operations such as creating a line between two 
objects to determine if a third object is between them. However, it is important to note 
that imagery (A3), and not concrete routines alone (A2), provide this benefit. That is, it is 
important that the concrete routines are selected and controlled by the abstract 
decision system, and that the resulting state is persistent. To allow the agent to adapt to 
new tasks, the full reasoning power of the agent must be brought to bear to select 
which concrete routines to apply and how to interpret or further manipulate the results. 
An architecture like that in Figure 7(d) cannot support this, as the process of selecting 
routines and interpreting results is isolated within the perception system and 
disconnected from the agent’s general-purpose knowledge, which, we are assuming, 
resides in the abstract decision system.  
Since imagery (A3) allows an agent to encode task-specific properties with a task-
independent perception system (and the poverty conjecture appears true), this aspect 
can result in improved architectural generality.  
  
32 
B3. Simulative imagery provides the agent with the ability to abstractly model actions 
that are non-deterministic at the abstract level. 
Action models have often been used in AI systems as a means to inform action choices 
and improve task performance. For example, using an action model, an agent can 
internally search through a problem space to determine an action sequence that leads 
to a goal (Newell, 1990). Similarly, a model-based RL agent uses an action model to 
internally simulate experience in order to learn a policy (Sutton & Barto, 1997). 
Essentially, both of these techniques are processes of taking knowledge of how actions 
affect state transitions and “unrolling it” to make explicit knowledge about which 
actions to take. As simulative imagery supports action modeling, it similarly allows this 
benefit. 
However, while simulative imagery can be used for action modeling, due to its use of 
multiple levels of abstraction, an imagery system is not simply equivalent to a set of 
action models. A standard action model produces predictions of future states (or state 
changes) based on the current state and proposed action. Importantly, both the states 
that the predictions are based on and the states the predictions produce are from the 
same state space. This is not the case with imagery, as predictions are based on 
concrete states, but produce both concrete states (in the imagery system) and abstract 
states (in the decision system). This difference is clear in the pedestal blocks world 
example (Figure 5). Given a single abstract state and action, the system could predict 
different successor states (collision or non-collision states) depending on details that are 
not encoded in the original abstract state. From the perspective of the decision system, 
the predictions are non-deterministic.  
Predictions of this sort can be viewed as both action models and inferences about the 
current state. A prediction that a collision will occur given a particular action both 
distinguishes the state from one in which the collision will not occur (as discussed in B1) 
and predicts a future state. However, action models can be “unrolled” to achieve 
performance benefits above and beyond what is possible if the prediction is simply 
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assumed to be an inference about the current state, which sets this benefit apart from 
B1. 
Due to abstract non-determinism, difficulties may be encountered using techniques like 
problem space search or model-based RL with simulative imagery action models. If the 
predictions of imagery are non-deterministic in terms of abstract states (as in the 
pedestal blocks world), dynamic programming techniques, including chunking in Soar, 
cannot be used. If the agent encounters an abstract state it has previously examined, 
that state does not contain sufficient information for the agent to know whether the 
result of previous processing still applies. Nevertheless, simulative imagery can still 
provide a benefit of action modeling, even in situations where dynamic programming is 
impossible, as will be demonstrated in later sections. 
Simulative imagery (A4), rather than concrete routines (A3), are necessary for this 
benefit. If an agent is to model its actions, the decision system needs to be able to 
choose which action to model, and the state must be persistent in case further actions 
are to be simulated. With concrete routines alone, these capabilities would not be 
present. Since simulative imagery can allow action modeling even when abstract state 
transitions may appear nondeterministic, improved task performance is possible. 
B4. Simulative imagery allows decisions to be made using an abstract representation 
while predictions are made using a concrete representation, allowing each process to 
use the representation that allows the most efficiency. 
When making decisions, abstraction can be a great benefit. The level of abstraction in a 
reinforcement learning agent’s state space affects the speed at which it will learn, and 
for any agent that uses symbolic knowledge to choose actions, the degree of state 
abstraction influences the amount of knowledge necessary to solve a problem. 
Conversely, when making predictions, abstraction is not always beneficial. The 
movement of objects in the physical world can often be characterized with simple 
equations that operate over quantitative, concrete information. Over long time scales, 
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this form of prediction is increasingly difficult and inaccurate, and qualitative prediction 
(e.g., Forbus, 1983) may be a better approach, but over short time scales, quantitative 
prediction can be very simple and accurate.  
Similarly, in problems like the blocks world, the consequences of a movement can be 
easily described and simulated in concrete geometric terms—the block will be 
positioned such that it will be centered on top of the object below. Action modeling in 
problems like the blocks world can be performed either concretely or abstractly, but 
concrete simulation eliminates such difficulties as encoding the relevant frame axioms 
for the transition, as has been argued by others (Huffman & Laird, 1992; Glasgow, 1995; 
Kurup & Chandrasekaran, 2006). 
Allowing this flexibility in the means of implementing action models can improve task 
performance, and is supported by simulative imagery (A4) for the same reasons B3 is. 
B5. Concrete control allows continuous control processes to be used in conjunction 
with abstract symbolic reasoning, mitigating the irreducibility problem. 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that irreducibility is a problem even in simple 
tasks like those in the blocks world. An agent must be able to adapt its outputs to tiny 
variations in the state of the world in order to perform an action like grasping a block. In 
many problems, this issue can be addressed by incorporating low-level controllers in the 
system, and dividing the task between a decision system that chooses between which 
controller to invoke, and the controllers themselves, which actually execute the action. 
The controllers have access to much more precise state information than is used to 
make decisions. In that way, a blocks world problem can be abstractly solved by a robot 
through reasoning about grasping a block, moving a grasped block, etc., and the 
controllers to perform those actions can vary their output to exactly conform to the 
state of the world (Laird et al., 1991). 
From the perspective of the decision system, concrete controllers change the action 
space of the task: where raw motor outputs would be selected before, now the agent 
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can select between controllers or parameterizations of controllers (e.g., “reach for block 
A” or “reach for block B” rather than “set motor 2 to .02 volts”). Given the transformed 
action space, perceptions can also be transformed and made more abstract, since the 
number of states the decision system needs to distinguish between to select a controller 
is likely to be smaller than the number of states it would need to distinguish between to 
select a raw motor output.  
This division of labor is supported in the proposed architecture via aspect A5, concrete 
control. It should be noted that the theory implies that all controllers base their actions 
on a common concrete representation. It remains to be seen whether a common set of 
concrete information can encapsulate everything any controller in a human-level system 
may need to know to determine its output, or if individual controllers will need 
perceptual information beyond what is in the concrete representation. 
Since concrete control can reduce the effective state space of a problem, allowing for 
more efficient decision making, task performance can be improved. 
B6. Simulative imagery of concrete control allows symbolic reasoning over continuous 
processes, eliminating the need for symbolic characterization of controller 
performance, further mitigating the irreducibility problem. 
While irreducibility in some problems can be handled entirely by encapsulating 
appropriate behaviors in concrete controllers, this is not always the case. As with the 
motion planning example in the last chapter, sometimes controllers cannot be built such 
that the problem can be reduced to an abstract state space. However, if simulative 
imagery of concrete control (A6) is present, abstract symbolic processing in the agent 
can reason over controllers without having a characterization of their behavior in terms 
of abstract states. The simulation allows the agent to derive the abstract outcome of a 
proposed action in the particular situation, even though that outcome might depend on 
details of the situation that the agent cannot capture in terms of abstract symbols. 
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This allows for much less constraint on the kinds of controllers that can be used in the 
system. Performance is then improved in tasks like nonholonomic motion planning, 
where the problem cannot be otherwise addressed without some loss of solution 
quality. 
B7. Architectural representation conversion encapsulates complex, common 
processes, rather than requiring task-specific knowledge. 
As an alternative to the theory proposed here, a system could be constructed that does 
not include fixed architectural processes to support representation conversion (Figure 
7(e)). Conversions between representational formats (high-level perception and 
imagery) would be performed by task knowledge. This results in an alternative way of 
approaching the general perceptual abstraction problem—if no fixed processes are 
present to build abstract representations, the problem of building appropriate task-
specific representations is left up to the agent designer (or the agent itself), rather than 
the architecture designer. 
However, this alternative seems infeasible. Converting between representational 
formats can be very difficult, and it is not clear what sort of system would be needed to 
learn to do this conversion. In addition, many forms of representation conversion are 
useful across many tasks. For example, high-level perception in both the pegged blocks 
world and motion planning examples detects collisions between objects, so a generic 
high-level perception system that can encode abstract information about object 
collisions in the concrete representation is useful in both tasks. 
This commonality across tasks is present in the action system, but to a lesser degree. It 
is reasonable to assume that an intelligent agent must learn new low-level controllers to 
address new tasks throughout its life, so at least some knowledge must go in the action 
system. All controllers can use the same architectural interface to the decision system, 
despite their low-level differences, however.  
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Since complex, common processes are in the architecture, rather than encoded as 
knowledge, they need not be learned or re-engineered in new tasks, improving 
generality. However, it is an open question as to what set of high-level perception and 
action processes exists that can be implemented to support human-level cognition. In 
the next chapter, a rough proposal for these architectural mechanisms will be put forth. 
In addition, architectural processes can be much more efficient than equivalent 
processes encoded in as task-independent knowledge (Lathrop, 2008). For this reason, 
this is a task performance benefit in addition to a generality benefit. 
B8. Perception/action reuse provides for a parsimonious set of architectural 
processes. 
The final architectural aspect, perception and action reuse, has a straightforward 
associated benefit. In an architecture where perception and action systems are not 
reused for imagery (Figure 7(d)), agent performance may not be substantially affected, 
but the design of the architecture itself would be complicated. In general, the abstract 
information that is useful to extract from imagined states is similar to that which is 
useful to extract from direct perception, so the same mechanisms can be used. A 
concrete representation is useful as an intermediate construct during perception 
(Ullman, 1984), so there is no compelling reason to use an isolated imagery 
representation. And the same low-level controllers useful for external actions can be 
used internally to simulate those actions (e.g., Leonard et al., 2008), so again, there is no 
reason for isolated systems. 
Since there does not seem to be a functional benefit for separate imagery and 
perception/action processing, there is a strong functional benefit to be gained in terms 
of architectural simplicity by unifying them. 
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Tables 1 and 2 summarize the theoretical aspects of the architecture, the benefits, and 
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Chapter IV - The Soar/SVS architecture 
In this chapter, I outline the design and capabilities of the Spatial/Visual System, or SVS, 
which together with the existing Soar architecture (Laird, 2008) constitutes an 
implementation of the theory presented in Chapter III. SVS inherits from two previously-
separate projects, Spatial Reasoning for Soar (SRS), which I developed (Wintermute & 
Laird, 2007, 2008), and Soar Visual Imagery (SVI), which Scott Lathrop developed 
(Lathrop, 2008; Lathrop & Laird, 2007, 2009). The relationship of SVS to these prior 
systems is discussed in detail in Section 7.2. 
In general, the discussion here is at a more detailed level than in the previous chapters. 
Planning, reinforcement learning, simulative imagery, etc., are different techniques that 
an agent instantiated in Soar/SVS can use to solve problems, but the architecture itself 
can support many other techniques. More specifically, SVS contains parts that can be 
composed together to support simulative imagery, it is not simply a simulative imagery 
module—the parts can be alternatively used to support very different methods. This is 
part of the overall goal of working towards an architecture capable of supporting 
general spatial intelligence. Simulative imagery is one important method that can 
enhance spatial capabilities in many problems, but it is important that the architecture 
itself be posed in as general terms as possible, so that other methods can also be used.  
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4.1 Overview  
The overall design of SVS is shown in Figure 8. This diagram is decomposed in a similar 
way to Figure 6(b), in terms of a decision and imagery system, and the connections 
between them. Soar is the decision system in this case
8
. Agents in Soar can be 
instantiated to use many different techniques to make decisions, including planning and 
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 SVS is an extension to the Soar architecture, however, in this document I use “Soar” to refer to the 
previously existing components of Soar, and “Soar/SVS” to refer to the combined system. 
Figure 8: SVS System design. Boxes are short-term memories, circles are processes. 
Grey circles involve access to information in long-term memory (knowledge). There are 
implicit control lines (not shown as arrows) between working memory and all of the 
processes shown.  
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reinforcement learning. Soar contains a symbolic working memory, through which 
different processes in memories in Soar communicate. This is where SVS connects to the 
existing Soar system, high-level perception (via Pa) adds elements to a special area of 
working memory, and high-level actions (issued via Aa) are similarly formulated in a 
special area of working memory. The Pa and Aa signals have many meaningful 
components (there are many “forms” of perception and action), as shown in the 
diagram, and is explained later. Other cognitive architectures, such as ACT-R (Anderson 
et al., 2004), similarly use symbolic structures to connect to the outside world, and the 
concepts behind SVS (if not the software itself) could be adapted to any system with 
such an interface. 
As an imagery system, SVS sits between symbolic processing in Soar and the outside 
world. A complete embodied agent also requires lower-level perception and action 
systems to handle the actual output of sensors and input to effectors. These systems are 
the source of the Pc signals and receiver of the Ac signals, respectively.  
The memories inside SVS are influenced by Kosslyn’s theory of visual imagery (Kosslyn et 
al., 2006). There are two short-term memories in the system, for spatial and visual 
information. The visual buffer represents information in 2D arrays of pixels, analogous 
to the part of the human visual system active during classical imagery tasks. This 
represents strictly visual information, including precise shapes and colors. In contrast, 
the spatial scene contains 3D information that is (theoretically) derived from multiple 




Both of these representations are concrete representations—they make as many 
distinctions between external states of the world as possible. In this work, however, the 
visual system is not be used, although it is a part of the architecture and its components 
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 This is the equivalent of the Object Map in (Kosslyn et al., 2006), and in (Lathrop, 2008), which inherits 
the terminology. 
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will be briefly discussed in this chapter. Lathrop (2008) focused on usage of the visual 
system in his work on a predecessor of this architecture. 
In addition to the two short-term memories, there is a long-term memory in SVS for 
visual, spatial, and motion data, called perceptual LTM. To simplify the diagram, this 
memory is not explicitly shown, but is accessed by the object retrieval and motion 
processes. While these memories contain chiefly non-symbolic information, they also 
are partly symbolic—unique objects are given identifying symbols, through which the 
symbolic aspects of the system can refer to them. These identifying symbols, here called 
perceptual pointers, are similar to the visual indexes described by Pylyshyn (2001) for 
short-term visual memory, in that the system “... picks out a small number of 
individuals, keeps track of them, and provides a means by which the cognitive system 
can further examine them in order to encode their properties ... or to carry out a motor 
command in relation to them”.  
For real-world agents, perception is a major challenge. Theoretically, the perceptions 
provided to SVS (Pc) should be raw pixels from a camera, or something analogous to the 
lowest cohesive representation in the human visual system. This is the component of Pc 
that feeds directly to the visual buffer. Theoretically, memories and processes inside 
SVS, with influence from symbolic processing in Soar, should segment and recognize 
objects and estimate 3D spatial structure based on 2D visual information. As we do not 
address the veridical perception problem, the system does not attempt this. However, 
limited capabilities are present to recognize objects in the visual system, carried over 
from SVI’s ability to manipulate the visual representation to identify new objects or 
object features (e.g., the enclosed space in the letter A). 
However, for many virtual environments (and some limited problems in real 
environments), it is possible for a separate perception system to provide information at 
a high-enough level that SVS can be used without a complete visual system. Many 
simulated environments directly represent the world as labeled 3D polyhedrons; in that 
case, those objects and labels can be directly fed into the spatial scene via Pc. In the 
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current implementation, the Pc component to the visual buffer is not used, only the 
component to the spatial scene. 
From the point of view of the decision system, the only aspects of the underlying visual 
and spatial state available are what are encoded in Pa. Here, that includes the 
perceptual pointers, along with information available through spatial and visual 
predicate extraction
10
 processes. These processes, outlined fully in the next section, 
extract qualitative symbolic information from the underlying quantitative state. For 
example, the agent can detect whether or not two objects intersect. Note that these 
processes do not involve access to knowledge: there is a fixed, architectural library of 
predicates that the system can extract. The exact visual and spatial details of the objects 
in the world (their coordinates in 3D space) are not provided in Pa. 
Since the information available to the symbolic system is limited to object identities and 
simple qualitative properties, for complex reasoning tasks, imagery must be used. To 
perform imagery, the system needs mechanisms through which visual and spatial 
images can be created and manipulated. In SVS, there are four such mechanisms, which 
will be outlined in the following sections. These mechanisms include memory retrieval, 
which instantiates objects from long-term memory into either the visual or spatial STM, 
motion simulation, which moves images in the spatial scene in the same way a motor 
action or other motion in the world would, and predicate projection, which creates 
spatial objects based on qualitative descriptions created by Soar (such as “a line 
between A and B”).  
4.2 Perceptual Pointers 
The most basic form of information passed between SVS and symbolic processing in 
Soar is the perceptual pointer. A perceptual pointer is a unique token, which refers to a 
                                                      
10
 This terminology is inherited from work in diagrammatic reasoning (Chandrasekaran, 1997). The term 
“predicate” is perhaps overly formal, since it might imply that predicate logic is being used for inference in 
the system, which is not the case, but it has the correct implication that we are dealing with symbolic 
properties of objects. 
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specific underlying visual or spatial structure. A pointer appears as an id attribute in 
Soar's working memory. In addition, if a structure is recognized as an instantiation of a 
structure in perceptual LTM, it is augmented with a class-id.  
The types of structures that use this identifier system are spatial objects, spatial 
transformations, visual textures, and motion models, all of which are discussed below. 
The perceptual pointer provides a simple means by which a symbolic working memory 
structure can refer to an underlying perceptual structure: the pointer id is generated by 
SVS, and every time symbolic processing in Soar uses that id in a context SVS 
understands (e.g., an imagery specification to “imagine car23 to the right of 
house12”), SVS uses that id to access the underlying perceptual structure (e.g., the 
polyhedron describing the car) from its internal memories. 
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Figure 9 shows blocks world information represented in Soar/SVS. Soar’s working 
memory is shown on the left. Structures in working memory are represented by a 
directed graph of symbols that are matched and manipulated by rules. A portion of this 
graph is shown in the figure. Working memory structures can also be represented with 
text, as shown. 
Dotted arrows in the figure show perceptual pointers, represented in working memory 
as symbols. Only those created by SVS have arrows in the figure, but other instances of 
the same symbols are also pointers to the same objects.  
Figure 9: Top, blocks world information in Working Memory, Perceptual LTM, and Spatial 
Scene. Bottom, equivalent text representation of the extract-predicate structure. Working 
memory structures in red italics are created by SVS. 
 
Working Memory as Text 
intersection.object-id blockB:i1 
            .object-id blockC:i1 
            .value true 
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4.3 Spatial Scene Encoding 
The spatial scene is SVS’s short-term memory for spatial information. It normally 
contains the structure of the world around the agent (including parts it cannot 
immediately see), or the structure of an imagined situation, or, more commonly, a 
mixture of both. Internally, the scene is a set of 3D polyhedrons grounded in continuous 
coordinates. This information is presented to Soar’s working memory as a hierarchically-
organized tree of objects, with the tree structure indicating part-of relationships. Each 
object node includes a perceptual pointer by which Soar can refer to it. Between each 
object node, a transformation node is present. Each transformation node contains a 
perceptual pointer to the relationship between the two objects. 
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Objects in pegged blocks world lack hierarchical structure as would be present in more 
complicated environments, so, for simplicity, Figure 9 shows only the object nodes at 
one level of the hierarchy. Figure 10 shows a scene with richer structure, and the full 
detail of how the spatial scene is encoded (with the exception of class-ids). Only the 
leaves of the tree in working memory correspond to primitive polyhedrons (which are 
labeled in the Figure), but nodes at every level are considered objects. Everything in the 
scene is part of one scene object (the root of the tree), and the scene object has 
children for its parts, the tree and house (connected via their transformations), which 
are further decomposed to primitive parts. Much of the processing in SVS (e.g., 
detecting an intersection between two objects) relies on the assumption that objects 
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are convex, so when objects are referred to, what is actually used is the convex hull of 
all of the parts below that object. If non-convex objects are to be used, the environment 
must encode them as a set of convex parts, each of which the system can reason with 
independently. Automating this convex decomposition is an area for future work. 
Transformation nodes exist between each object node in the hierarchy. Each object has 
some intrinsic reference frame, and the transformation node refers to the relationship 
between those frames. The figure shows one of those transformations, tree-
transform, which relates the reference frame of the scene object to that of the tree 
object. 
It should be emphasized that the perceptual pointers that make up the scene graph in 
Soar’s working memory refer to the actual objects and transformations in the spatial 
scene. If the agent refers to the id of a transformation in the spatial scene, it is referring 
to a specific quantitative transformation in 3D space, not a generic qualitative 
relationship like “towards the upper right” of “northeast of”. If the agent retrieves a 
transformation from perceptual long-term memory (by referring to its class-id), that 
transformation is similarly quantitative. In general, everything in perceptual LTM and in 
the STMs of SVS is quantitative. However, symbolic processing in Soar can only refer to 
quantitative perceptual information, it cannot directly access the actual quantities 
involved. Rather, it accesses that information only indirectly, by querying the scene for 
qualitative information through the predicate extraction process (to be covered shortly). 
4.4 Predicate Extraction 
The predicate extraction processes serve to provide symbolic processing in Soar with 
qualitative properties of the contents of the spatial short-term memory in SVS. These 
processes are fixed parts of the architecture; there are no plans to enable new forms of 
predicate extraction to be learned by the agent itself. In contrast to perceptual pointers, 
qualitative predicates are created in working memory only when requested by 
processing in Soar. There is a great deal of qualitative information implicit in the 
memories of SVS, each piece of which can take substantial calculation to derive, so 
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some attention mechanism is needed to make the system computationally tractable. 
The process of requesting predicate extraction from working memory is called querying 
SVS. Figure 9 shows an example of predicate extraction in working memory. First, 
symbolic processing in Soar creates a structure describing the query (in the example, 
whether or not two blocks intersect) in the proper area of working memory. SVS then 
recognizes the query structure, calculates the desired property (in this case, detecting 
the collision), and builds a result structure in working memory. Further symbolic 
processing in Soar can recognize this result, and reasoning will continue. 
For the spatial system, there are three important kinds of relationships between objects 
that might be queried for: topology, direction, and distance. An example of each of 
these relationships is illustrated in Figure 11. Topological relationships describe how the 
surfaces of objects relate to one another. Work in qualitative spatial reasoning has 
explored these relationships (Cohn et al., 1997). While schemes exist that represent 
several possible cases of topological interaction (e.g., discrete, partially overlapping, 
proper part), the only topological information currently available in SVS is whether or 
not two objects are intersecting or not (that is, colliding). More relationships might be 
added in the future, but no tasks have yet been addressed that require more detailed 
topological information. 
Distance is similarly simple, currently the system is able to query for the distance 
between any two objects in the scene, along the closest line connecting them. In the 
Figure 11: Information derivable through spatial predicate extraction.  
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makes the information arguably non-qualitative, although it is certainly “less 
quantitative” than the contents of the spatial scene, as it reduces complex three-
dimensional information to a scalar quantity. However, it is extremely useful in practice. 
The common use for distance information is simple distance comparison, which can be 
done easily with Soar’s existing number-comparison functionality. The closest obstacle 
to the agent might be detected by extracting the distance from the agent to all of the 
obstacles, and comparing the distances to determine the closest. If we wanted to strictly 
evict all continuous numbers from Soar’s symbolic processing, this could be replaced 
with a “closest” extractor, but that approach seems to be unnecessarily complicated
11
.  
To support orientation relationships between objects, and determine information such 
as “object A is to the left of object B”, a final class of orientation queries is implemented. 
Following the approach of Hernandez (1994), for each object, a set of surrounding 
acceptance areas is defined. An acceptance area corresponds to a region of the world 
where all points in that region share a common orientation with the object in question. 
These regions roughly correspond to concepts like left, right, front, back, above, below, 
etc. An example of an acceptance region is shown in Figure 11, where the region 
considered to be in front of the house is indicated. All acceptance areas are calculated 
relative to a bounding box around the object, queries for relationships inside of that box 
are undefined. Three different methods of constructing acceptance areas are possible. 
As shown in the figure, standard orientation queries construct the acceptance area with 
bounding rays emanating at 45-degree angles from the corners of the object. In 
contrast, a strict orientation query would project the rays in the figure directly to the 
right, making the “front” region of the house smaller, and a general orientation query 
would project the rays up and down, making the region larger. 
All objects have an intrinsic frame of reference, and orientation queries are often 
performed relative to that frame. However, orientation queries can be performed in the 
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 The use of continuous numbers as part of Soar’s working memory does not have strong theoretical 
support, but as implemented, they provide practical benefits. Issues related to SVS and the role of 
numbers in Soar’s working memory are discussed in the Appendix. 
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frame of reference of any object in the scene
12
: that is, the frame of reference of a 
different object can be used to define the acceptance areas. In this way, allocentric 
orientations can be extracted by using the frame of reference of the entire scene (or of 
a compass object in the scene), and interpreting the results as cardinal directions 
(North, South, East, West, up, down). 
For some spatial queries, the 3D nature of the spatial scene can result in undesirable 
consequences when the problem is inherently two-dimensional. For example, an agent 
might want to determine how long it would take to move beneath an object that is in 
front of and above itself. In this case, simply extracting the distance will not work, since 
the vertical dimension must be ignored. In addition, if the agent is attempting to 
determine the closest obstacle to itself, it might be best to calculate the point-to-point 
distance from its centroid to the centroid of each obstacle, which can be done much 
more quickly than calculating the distance between polyhedrons. For these reasons, SVS 
supports spatial object interpretations. For most queries, the agent can specify that each 
object should be interpreted as a convex polyhedron (the default), a bounding box, a 
centroid, or two-dimensional versions of each of those types, where the projection of 
the object into its intrinsic xy-plane is used. Making shape interpretations available can 
increase the functionality of the system, and greatly speed it up when precise 
calculation over complex 3D objects is unnecessary. 
4.5 Imagery 
The information provided to Soar through perceptual item pointers and predicate 
extraction about objects that the agent can currently perceive is often not enough to 
allow general-purpose problem solving. Often, imagery must be employed. To use this 
capability, the symbolic system invokes a command which causes imagery processes to 
manipulate a concrete representation, and the results of the manipulation are 
symbolically inferred through predicate extraction. While imagery has been proposed in 
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 In the current implementation, this must be done through a multiple-step process (generating an image 
of the desired object with a new reference frame, and then extracting the relationship), but it should be 
eventually handled entirely in the predicate extraction system. 
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the past as a means for problem solving, the exact means by which images can be 
created in a task-independent manner have rarely been specified. One of the 
contributions of this work is exploring this problem. The current implementation of SVS 
inherits much of its functionality from a prior system, SRS. Two of the image creation 
processes in SVS, predicate projection and motion simulation, were previously explored 
in detail using that system (Wintermute & Laird, 2007, 2008).  
Images, once created in the spatial scene or visual buffer, are thereafter treated 
identically to structures in those memories built by perception. In the discussion below, 
the term ‘image’ will refer to the structure being created, as in “the image is placed 
adjacent to the object”, but it should be noted that once the image is placed, it becomes 
an object itself.  
4.5.1 Predicate Projection 
Creating a new spatial image often involves translating a qualitative representation of 
the image (present in symbolic working memory) to a quantitative representation in the 
scene. This problem has not been as well studied as predicate extraction 
(Chandrasekaran, 1997). We call the qualitative representation of a new image the 
description of that image. Our goal is to create a system with broad applicability, which 
requires a qualitative language for describing new images that is as expressive and 
general as possible. Broadly, there are two kinds of possible descriptions: direct and 
indirect. 
An image created with an indirect description inherits its shape from an existing object, 
in the scene or in LTM. This shape is placed in the scene based on a set of abstract 
predicates describing the position of the object. 
In SVS, the predicates currently are ‘on’, ‘at’, ‘adjacent’, and ‘facing’.  There is not a 
strong commitment to this particular set of predicates, but it is representative of the 
types of predicates than might be supported. Placing an image ‘on’ another object 
positions the image above and adjacent to that object, in the z-direction. This z-direction 
is currently that defined in the coordinate frame of the scene root, but the system could 
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be improved to allow the coordinate frame to be specified. Placing an image ‘at’ 
another object results in the image being centered at the center of that object. Placing 
an image ‘adjacent’ to another object is similar to ‘on’, but does not constrain the 
direction of adjacency. An image can be specified ‘facing’ another object. In that case, 
the intrinsic frame of reference of the image is aligned to point towards that object. 
An indirectly described object is not guaranteed to have a valid position (an image 
cannot be both ‘at’ and ‘on’ the same object, for example). Underlying processing in SVS 
attempts to interpret the set of predicates, and adds the image to the scene if it can find 
a suitable position (or report an error otherwise). In many cases, indirect descriptions 
are underspecified, and the system arbitrarily chooses one of many images meeting the 
description. A previous implementation (Wintermute & Laird, 2007) included a much 
more comprehensive scheme for indirect imagery, but used a two-dimensional spatial 
representation. The underlying processing in that system solved complicated 
computational geometry problems in order to place the image, but this approach could 
not be easily extended to the three-dimensional case. Instead of extending SVS’s 
indirect imagery power, alternative approaches are being explored to allow similar 
capabilities in the system through alternative means: the memory retrieval and motion 
simulation mechanisms (which will be covered shortly). 
In addition to indirect descriptions, SVS also supports direct descriptions. In contrast to 
indirect descriptions, a direct description is always unambiguous – it describes only one 
possible image. An example is ‘the image is the convex hull of objects A and B. For any 
diagram that has objects A and B, there is exactly one such shape. Other descriptions 
are those such as ‘the image is the intersection of objects A and B’. For any objects A 
and B in the scene, the image may or may not exist, depending on their positions in the 
diagram, but if it does exist, there is only one. Thus, a direct description describes 
exactly one image, not a category of images. 
The predicate projection processing described above is considered to be a fixed part of 
the architecture. There are currently no plans to allow new kinds of predicate projection 
54 
commands to be learned by the agent or provided as knowledge. However, there is not 
a strong commitment that the current library of available operations is appropriate or 
complete. It has served well for the tasks that have been addressed, but may change as 
the architecture evolves. From a theoretical point of view, the important aspect is that 
the system has this capability at all. 
4.5.2 Memory Retrieval and Image Composition 
Often, spatial images must be created based on objects in perceptual long-term 
memory. This involves the agent telling SVS to instantiate an object of a known type, at 
a known location. This is different than predicate projection—predicate projection 
works by the symbolic system describing the general required qualitative properties of 
the image, memory retrieval works by the symbolic system referring to specific items in 
long-term memory. 
Using this capability, an agent can compose a new scene out of known parts (objects 
and transformations). In addition, memory retrieval can be easily combined with 
predicate projection to create images where the shape is based on a memory, but the 
location is qualitatively described. In Figure 9, the agent is generating an image based on 
this combination. The class-id of the imagined block is provided, which implicitly 
indicates a memory retrieval. A complete predicate projection command for the 
location of the new block is not shown, but the full command would indicate that the 
new block is on the table located adjacent to block A. 
4.5.3 Motion Processing 
While the previous approaches to image creation are powerful, it is difficult to see how 
they can encode the knowledge to solve spatial problems involving motion. For 
example, consider an agent that must predict the path of a bouncing ball. It is not 
obvious how the previously-discussed imagery components can achieve this. 
Anticipating the next location of a bouncing ball cannot be easily mapped onto 
retrieving a memory of a quantitative transformation, since that would require the 
agent to have previously observed a ball with similar horizontal and vertical velocities at 
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a similar place in its bounce, and the agent would have to somehow know to retrieve 
exactly that memory. Predicate projection will not work either, as it may be necessary to 
make a prediction that is more accurate than what can be described with the available 
qualitative predicates. 
In SVS, this information can instead be encoded in the form of a continuous motion 
model. Motion models are stored in perceptual LTM, and are represented by the 
Motion Processing component in Figure 8. They can be applied to any object in the 
spatial scene, and are invoked with a step size. The model then creates an image of the 
object projected into the future for that amount of time, following its specific motion 
pattern. If the agent has a bouncing-ball motion model in its LTM, the model can track 
the ball and allow its motion to be projected into the future in imagery. Motion models 
have complete access to the contents of the spatial scene, and so can access the 
quantitative details necessary for precise simulation, and also have internal memory, 
allowing, for example, speeds of objects to be tracked based on observations over time. 
In general, motion models can transform the scene in arbitrary ways: there are currently 
no constraints on their implementation (adding more structure to the motion 
processing system is an area for future work). 
Note that motion models have much in common with the concept of concrete 
controllers discussed in Chapter II (aspect A5), as they control simulation processes 
based on information that is in Rc (the spatial scene) but not Ra (Soar working memory). 
In the previous example, the agent reasons about the movement of an object that is not 
under its direct control. However, in SVS, the same basic motion processing system is 
used to control the agent’s own low-level movement. That is, motion models can be 
concrete controllers in SVS. Those motion models that can be used as controllers are 
called motion controllers. Since motion controllers are motion models, it is necessary 
that they can be used to predict their own behavior—simulative imagery of concrete 
control (aspect A6) must be present for all motion controllers. 
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For example, a car motion controller can be used in SVS. When Soar uses the controller, 
it provides a perceptual pointer to the car object in the scene, and a pointer to a goal 
object, along with an indication of whether the motion is to be imagined or executed, 
and a time step in the imagined case. Based on the spatial scene, the controller can 
determine the body angle and position of the car. This information can be used to 
calculate a desired steering angle to set. To do this, the controller can determine the 
angle between the front of the car and the goal object, and steer in that direction, 
proportional to that difference, saturating at some maximum steering angle. When used 
in imagery mode, this angle, along with the time step, can be fed back in to a set of 
equations modeling the response of the car to the steering control, and the position and 
angle of the imagined car object can be determined. When used in execution mode, it 
can instead be output to the low-level action system. Even in execution mode, it may be 
useful to simulate the motion in parallel with execution, as this simulation can be used 
as part of a Kalman filter to assist in the control process (Grush, 2004). While this car 
controller is hypothetical, as the implemented system has not been used in real robots, 
the imagery aspects of it have been implemented and used (Wintermute, 2009a). 
In many cases, the agent uses motion models not just for single-step prediction, but for 
longer simulations. Motion simulation can occur as a sequence of steps, executed by the 
symbolic level. Between steps, qualitative information can be queried from the scene 
and reasoned over. For example, an agent might need to determine how long it will take 
for a given obstacle to reach its current location. To do this, the movement could be 
stepped forward multiple times, with predicate extraction processes monitoring the 
scene for collisions between each step. 
The motion processing system presents a broad framework for the representation of 
motion. With appropriate motion models, an agent can control and internally simulate 
its own movement. Using the same basic mechanisms, it can also simulate the 
movement of objects in the world, such as a moving obstacle in the example above, or a 
bouncing ball in another task. In certain circumstances, it might even use its own motion 
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controllers to simulate the movement of another agent. Motion simulation can even be 
used to solve problems that are not about motion in the world. Some of these 
applications are examined in detail in other work (Wintermute & Laird, 2008). 
4.6 Aspects of the Theory in Soar/SVS 
SVS, combined with the existing Soar architecture, forms an instantiation of the theory 
put forth in Chapter II. Here, the aspects of that theory are reviewed, and mapped to 
the implementation in Soar/SVS. As SVS was developed with a broader focus than this 
work, it also implements aspects that are not covered by the theory here, most 
prominently, visual processing and long-term memory. Lathrop (2008) argued for the 
utility of visual processing, but an analysis of the utility of perceptual long-term memory 
(especially in contrast with Soar’s symbolic memories) must be left to future work. 
A1. Bimodality 
- Two representations of information derived from perception are present, Ra and 
Rc. 
- Representation Rc contains more perceptual information than Ra—it makes more 
distinctions between states of the world. If Rc encodes spatial locations of 
objects in the world, it is a concrete spatial representation. 
- Processes can encode information in Ra based on Rc (through high-level 
perception processes). 
In Soar/SVS, Soar’s working memory encodes an abstract representation, and the 
spatial scene encodes a concrete spatial representation (the visual buffer encodes a 
separate concrete representation, but it is outside the scope of this work). High-level 
perception in SVS is implemented by the perceptual pointers that identify objects in 
the scene and the predicate extraction processes. 
A2. Concrete routines 
- Processes can cause changes to representation Rc based on its existing contents 
(they can locally manipulate it). 




- Concrete routines can be invoked by processing in Ra, and result in persistent 
changes to Rc. These are imagery processes. 
- Via high-level perception, results of imagery will be reflected in Ra. 
The imagery mechanisms in Soar/SVS all satisfy this description. It should be noted 
that all concrete routines in the system are imagery processes, none are initiated 
outside of Soar or cause transient results. 
A4. Simulative imagery 
- Some imagery operations simulate future states of the world in terms of Rc.  
The imagery mechanisms in Soar/SVS are expressive enough that simulation is 
possible, as will be demonstrated in later chapters. 
A5. Concrete controllers  
- External actions can be contingent on information in Rc but not in Ra. Modules 
that generate these actions are called concrete controllers. 
Motion controllers in SVS are proposed to meet this requirement, although external 
actions of this sort remain unimplemented. 
A6. Simulative imagery of concrete control 
- Some simulative imagery operations simulate the effects of concrete controllers. 
All motion controllers in SVS must have simulation capability. 
A7. Architectural representation conversion 
- High-level perception and imagery are supported by fixed (although possibly 
parameterized) mechanisms. 
Fixed mechanisms underlie the high-level perception system—no knowledge is 
involved in predicate extraction, other than to parameterize the process (determine 
the queries). Hypothetically, knowledge is involved in object recognition, as the 
agent must be able to learn to recognize new objects. However, if recognition were 
to be implemented, the process would likely be supported by architectural 
mechanisms. Similarly, in the action system, predicate projection is a fixed process 
where the only role of knowledge is to parameterize the commands in Soar, while 
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memory retrieval and motion simulation involve access to more forms of 
knowledge, but are still supported by architectural mechanisms. 
A8. Perception/action reuse 
- Some types of perceptual information arrive in Ra only via Rc. 
- Common high-level perception mechanisms operate over structures created by 
imagery and low-level perception in Rc.  
- Some imagery processes share mechanisms with those used to generate external 
actions. 
In Soar/SVS, spatial information does not enter Soar without being processed by 
SVS. All high-level perception processes apply to both imagined and perceived 
objects, and motion controllers that execute external actions can be re-used 
internally for imagery. 
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Chapter V - Reinforcement Learning Agents in Soar/SVS 
To aid in evaluating the architecture and its underlying theory, implemented agents are 
necessary. In order to reduce the factor of hand-programmed knowledge in this 
evaluation, an integration between imagery and reinforcement learning in Soar/SVS is 
described in this chapter, so that all control knowledge is learned as opposed to 
programmed. The aims of this discussion are threefold: to provide further explanation 
and evaluation of the architecture through demonstrations of implemented agents, to 
provide evidence of the benefits outlined in Chapter III, and to connect this work with 
concepts and related work in the area of reinforcement learning. 
5.1 State Abstraction and Imagery in Reinforcement Learning 
Work in reinforcement learning typically models the task being addressed as a Markov 
Decision Process (MDP). An MDP consists of a set of states, a set of actions, a function 
encoding transition probabilities from one state to another (given an action), and a 
function encoding the expected immediate reward for each transition. 

 indicates the 
probability of transitioning from a state  to another state ’ with action 
, and ℛ
 
indicates the expected immediate reward for action 
 in state .13 Here, we will assume 
that an agent is actively engaged in the problem, and has no initial knowledge of the 
transition probabilities or reward distribution. At every time step, the agent observes a 
state s, and selects an action a. The environment then transitions and provides the 
agent with a reward r at the next time step. 
Essentially, an MDP describes a large state space, where actions probabilistically cause 
an agent to move between states and receive rewards. Each transition in an MDP must 
be conditionally independent of previous transitions, given the state the agent is 
                                                      
13
 This notation follows Sutton & Barto (1998). The notation ℛ
  for immediate reward is used more often 
in that book, but the two forms are equivalent: ℛ




  (p. 84). 
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transitioning from and the action; this is the Markov property. A reinforcement learning 
agent learns a policy (a mapping of states to action choices) to maximize its expected 
future reward. Often, a discount rate will be used, causing the agent to value earlier 
rewards more than later rewards, and the agent will instead learn to maximize expected 
future discounted reward. More detail about reinforcement learning can be found 
elsewhere (e.g., Sutton & Barto, 1998). 
The MDP formalism can provide an objective measurement of what it means to have a 
“good” state representation for a task: a good state representation makes the transition 
probabilities Markovian (they have the Markov property), and allows for policies to be 
represented with an expected future reward that is as large as possible, meaning that it 
captures all details of the world necessary to select the best action. However, it is also 
important that this state representation be compact: learning can quickly become 
intractable if the state space is large. 
These points can be seen in simple domains like the blocks world, as was touched upon 
in Section 2.2. If the agent encodes the complete spatial state of the blocks (their 
bounding coordinates in continuous numbers), the representation is Markovian and 
allows for optimal policies to be encoded. However, if the agent is solving multiple 
instances of blocks world problems where the block dimensions very minutely between 
instances, encoding the complete spatial state results in a situation such that the agent 
rarely experiences repeated states. Repeated experience is necessary for learning, so 
this agent would perform very poorly. Compact state representations lead to repeated 
experience in terms of those states, and hence faster learning. 
To make a more compact learning problem, allowing faster learning, state aggregation 
can be used
14
. Formal techniques exist for determining equivalent states in an MDP, and 
the size of a given MDP can be reduced by checking for these equivalencies and 
                                                      
14
 Function approximation is another technique used in reinforcement learning to deal with large 
continuous state spaces. Given the symbolic assumption discussed in Section 2.1, it will not be considered 
here, however, the subject will be discussed in Section 7.4. 
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aggregating equivalent states into abstract states (Ravindran & Barto, 2002; Givan et al., 
2003; Li et al., 2006). Alternatively, it is possible to take an architectural view of the 
issue, and define a perception system that implicitly aggregates states together as it 
builds an internal abstract representation. In the case of blocks world, the perception 
system can build predicates such as on(A,B) that form a state representation that is 
Markovian, allows for maximum reward to be achieved, and is minimal.  
If state abstraction results from perception in this way, in order to create an agent able 
to induce compact MDP representations in arbitrary problems, the general perceptual 
abstraction problem must be solved. As was discussed in Chapter III, the imagery 
architecture proposed here provides benefits that help mitigate the perceptual 
abstraction problem. Specifically, the architecture provides mechanisms that allow an 
agent to encode abstract properties that capture movement and nonlocal interaction 
(B1), and to allow task-specific abstract properties to be encoded by a task-independent 
perception system (B2). 
5.1.1 The Pedestal Blocks World 
To provide a concrete example of these benefits in a reinforcement learning setting, the 
pedestal blocks world task (Figure 12) outlined in Section 2.2 will be used. Here, the 
agent is presented with a table and three blocks. There are six pedestals fixed to the 
table upon which the blocks can be placed. The goal is to place the blocks on the 
pedestals in the correct order (A to the left, then B, then C to the right). The agent 
moves each block to a pedestal, first A then B then C, and then receives some reward. 




Figure 12: A Pedestal Blocks World task instance and its optimal solution. 
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points are deducted from the reward for each empty platform to the left of C. If the 
agent places a block where it cannot fit, it receives a reward of -100 and the task ends. If 
the agent places the blocks on the pedestals without a collision, but the ordering is 
wrong, a -10 reward is received. 
An optimal policy for solving the problem is apparent: place block A on the leftmost 
pedestal where it will fit, place B on the leftmost pedestal right of A where it will fit, and 
place C similarly. However, an agent solves many instances of this task. In each instance, 
the positions and heights of the pedestals, along with the dimensions of the blocks, 
differ. Because of this, the actual moves needed to optimally solve the problem differ 
from instance to instance. Assume that the agent views the task on a computer screen, 
and interacts by pressing buttons to indicate the pedestal where each block should be 
placed. The display updates after each block is moved. This problem then has a simple 
formalization: given pixels, button choices must be output. 
5.1.2 Perceptual Abstraction in Pedestal Blocks World 
Taken at its basic definition, the problem is an MDP where each set of pixels constitutes 
an individual state. Of course, state aggregation would be very valuable here, since 
otherwise too many states would be present for learning to be tractable. 
As with the pegged blocks world task in Chapter II, a perception system providing a 
standard blocks world encoding of the state in terms of abstract predicates like 
on(A,table) or on(B,pedestal1) is inadequate, since collisions cannot be 
predicted, and the best policy would have a low expected future reward. The nonlocal 
interaction of the block with the surrounding objects at its new location is critical to 
capture in order to induce a correct state aggregation. 
Soar/SVS can use its task-independent high-level perception system to encode the 
standard blocks world on predicates by composing them out of the primitive available in 
the predicate extraction system. Details of this composition can be found elsewhere 
(Wintermute, 2009b). Predicate projection in the system can also be used to imagine 
the blocks at their new locations, and high-level perception can be applied to the 
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imagined scene to determine whether actions result in collisions. These collision 
predictions are task-specific properties of the current state. Through these means, the 
Soar/SVS agent can infer task-specific symbolic information capturing non-local 
interaction using its task-independent high-level perception system, demonstrating 
benefits B1 and B2. 
An agent has been built to use this abstract state information with reinforcement 
learning in this task. The abstract state consists of on predicates describing the current 
scene, along with predicates encoding whether or not each action will result in a 
collision (e.g., collision_if_moved(B,pedestal2)). As imagery is used to add 
information to the abstract state, this agent will be called an imagery-augmented state 
abstraction agent. 
State abstraction here is used in conjunction with a table-based Q-learning algorithm to 
learn a policy. For each state-action pair that a table-based Q-learning agent encounters, 
it learns the expected discounted future reward for taking that action and following the 
optimal policy—this is called the Q value of the action. Soar’s existing reinforcement 
learning system implements the learning algorithm (Nason & Laird, 2005).  
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To verify that the overall system works as described, experiments were run to compare 
the performance of an agent using imagery-augmented state abstraction versus an 
agent that can only encode the on predicates describing the current scene (non-imagery 
state abstraction) and an agent that takes random actions, mimicking one that learns in 
terms of the raw (unabstracted) pixel states
15
. Figure 13 shows the results of this 
experiment. 25 trials were run of 10,000 episodes each. The sizes of the blocks and 
positions of the pedestals were randomized for each episode, each was a spatially-
unique instance (both the imagery and non-imagery conditions used the same 
instances). Epsilon-greedy exploration was used, with parameters of  = 0.3,  = 0.1, 
and   = 0.9. Total reward per episode was collected, bins of 500 adjacent episodes 
were grouped together, and reward was averaged across all trials and all episodes in the 
bin and across all trials 
As can be seen in the figure, in this case, learning using task-specific abstract 
information derived from imagery results in better performance, both in terms of 
learning speed and the quality of the final policy, when compared to similar states 
                                                      
15
 Since the task has no state repetition within an instance, and at the pixel level, each instance tested has 
a unique set of states, no learning would ever occur in a non-aggregating agent, resulting in random 
performance. 
Figure 13: Results of learning in pedestal blocks world showing advantage of 


























abstracted without using imagery augmentation. Both of these approaches outperform 
learning directly in terms of concrete (pixel-based) states. Since imagery allows the 
agent to encode useful task-specific abstract properties that capture non-local 
interaction, these data demonstrate benefits B1 and B2 and provide evidence that the 
relevant aspects of the architecture are working to mitigate the perceptual abstraction 
problem. 
5.2 State Abstraction, Action Modeling, and Imagery in Reinforcement 
Learning 
The previous section demonstrated the use of the architecture in aiding reinforcement 
learning by allowing a more compact MDP representation of the problem to be induced. 
A benefit of the architecture that the previous demonstration does not cover is that 
simulative imagery allows for abstract action modeling (B3). As discussed in Section 3.3, 
the sort of action modeling imagery allows may be difficult to integrate with existing 
model-based RL techniques, as imagery predictions are often nondeterministic in terms 
of abstract states. However, the action modeling capability simulative imagery allows 
can be integrated with reinforcement learning in other ways. 
Motivation for this integration can come from the previous example in pedestal blocks 
world. The imagery agent in this task infers an abstract state by imagining the potential 
actions, and determining if collisions would occur, encoding predicates like 
collision_if_moved(B,pedestal2). These predicates were used as a means of 
describing the current state. However, they can also be interpreted as predictions about 
future states—the results of an action model. The action modeling knowledge implicit in 
these predicates is not leveraged by the agent in that section, however. 
The insight for the approach that will be taken here is that, with the above state 
representation, the agent is conditioning the value of each particular action on the 
predictions for all actions. However, a predicate like 
collision_if_moved(B,pedestal2) is much more relevant for determining the 
value of moving B to pedestal2 than it is for determining the value of another action, 
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like moving B to pedestal5. In addition, if the agent has knowledge about the state 
that will result from an action, that information can be much more relevant than 
information about the current state when considering the value of an action.  
Based on these insights, a new technique for integrating reinforcement learning with 
imagery was developed, ReLAI (Reinforcement Learning with Abstraction and Imagery; 
Wintermute, 2010). In a ReLAI agent, the value of an action is determined solely by the 
next abstract state predicted to result from that action. Technically speaking, ReLAI 
involves an aggregation of state-action pairs, rather than an aggregation of states. That 
is, individual entries in the table of values learned by Q-learning are aggregated, rather 
than states of the MDP. The aggregate (or category) that a state-action pair belongs to is 
determined by the predicted next abstract state that will result from it.  
To prevent confusion, the standard state abstraction approach used above, where Q-
learning occurs as normal but within an abstract state space, will be called direct state 
abstraction. Direct state abstraction agents may or may not use imagery augmentation 
to construct the state. State abstraction is used within ReLAI agents, but interacts 
differently with the learning algorithm.  
To see the difference between imagery-augmented direct state abstraction and ReLAI, 
consider the following circumstance: block A is on pedestal1, and blocks B and C are 
on the table, so B will be moved next. The agent predicts that moving B to pedestal2, 
pedestal3, or pedestal6 will not cause a collision, but moving to pedestal4 or 
pedestal5 will. The best action here is to move B to pedestal2. To find the learned 
value of that action, the imagery-augmented direct state abstraction agent in the 
previous section would add the imagery predictions to its current state, and look up an 
entry in its table using the complete state-action pair:  
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state=[on(A,pedestal1) on(B,table) on(C,table) 
 no_collision_if_moved(B,pedestal2)  
 no_collision_if_moved(B,pedestal3)  
 collision_if_moved(B,pedestal4)  
 collision_if_moved(B,pedestal5)  
 no_collision_if_moved(B,pedestal6)]  
action=[move(B,pedestal2)]  
A ReLAI agent, on the other hand, would look up a learned value based only on the 
predicted next abstract state for the action, or: 
[on(A,pedestal1) on(B,pedestal2) on(C,table) collision(false)]  
As is apparent, the ReLAI agent takes into account less information when looking up 
(and learning) Q values: it has a more compact learning problem. If the right information 
is captured by the predictions ReLAI uses (as will be discussed), the algorithm can learn 
the optimal policy faster than the direct state abstraction agent.  The ReLAI algorithm as 
instantiated in Soar/SVS is shown in Figure 14. 
 
for each episode 
   
  for each step in the episode 
     
    perceive the concrete state  and any reward,  
    store  in the spatial scene 
     
    for each action 
 
       
      use imagery to simulate a in the spatial scene  
       
      apply high-level perception to the imagined  
      scene, derive the next abstract state (’)  
       
      lookup the learned value of 
 in  based on 
      the category of (, 
), which is () 
     
    given the current action values and the  
    reward, apply a Q-learning update to the   
    category of the previous action (if any) 
     
    choose an action using epsilon-greedy policy 
   
  repeat until  is terminal 
 
repeat for all episodes 
Figure 14: The ReLAI algorithm as instantiated in Soar/SVS. 
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Figure 15 demonstrates the performance of a ReLAI agent in pedestal blocks world 
compared to the agents introduced in the previous section. Experimental details are the 
same as in the previous section. These data demonstrate that ReLAI can learn much 
faster than using the same prediction information as part of a state representation and 
using direct state abstraction. This is because ReLAI is able to leverage the benefit of 
simulative imagery to model actions (B3). Since the agent knows that prediction 
information is information about a particular action in the current state, rather than just 
a generic property of the current state, the size of the learning problem can be greatly 
reduced, resulting in faster learning. 
5.2.1 Correctness in ReLAI 
While the previous example provides empirical evidence that ReLAI allows an agent to 
learn good policies, theoretical analysis can reveal general principles about the 
technique that can move the evaluation of the technique (and the architecture that 
supports it) beyond what is possible with demonstrations alone. 
To better understand ReLAI, an analysis has been carried out to show under what 
conditions Q-learning using ReLAI will be guaranteed to converge to the optimal policy. 



























This analysis will be outlined here, but more detail is provided in a separate paper 
(Wintermute, 2010). 
ReLAI is a special case of Q-learning using a state-action aggregation. In a standard Q-
learning agent, assuming the problem is an MDP, given enough experience and an 
appropriate exploration policy, the agent will learn the optimal value function !∗(, 
), 
which is defined as ℛ




) . Previous work has shown that Q-
learning with state-action aggregation converges to the optimal !∗ function under the 
same conditions when all (, 
) pairs in the same category have the same !∗ value 
(Goetschalckx, 2009). 
Properties of a function that assigns categories to state-action pairs will be examined 
here. This function, &(, 
), returns a symbol representing the category of (, 
). An 
appropriate function only assigns two (, 
) pairs to the same category if their 
respective !∗ values are the same, and will hence allow Q-learning to converge. 
Sufficient conditions such that a function &  is appropriate have been shown elsewhere 
(Wintermute, 2010). These conditions are that, for all states and actions, the reward 
received for a transition is independent of (, 
), given &(, 
), and that categories of 
actions in a given state are independent of the (, 
) pair that led to that state, given 
the category of that pair. That is, Q-learning with state-action aggregation will converge 
to the correct policy if these equations are always true: 
'()(* = (|*, 
*, &(*, 
*), = '()(* = (|&(*, 
*),                                               (1) 
'()&(*, 
) = %|*, 
*, &(*, 
*), =  '()&(*, 
) = %|&(*, 
*),                       (2)  
Now, the special case of ReLAI can be considered: where the category of an (, 
) pair is 
determined by the predicted next abstract state resulting from action 
 in concrete 
state . How, then, should these abstract states relate to the underlying concrete 
states? Since Equations 1 and 2 are sufficient for appropriate (, 
) aggregation, and 
thereby allow Q-learning to converge, we re-examine them in the situation where the 
category of (, 
) is a correct prediction of the abstract state that will follow from it. 
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An abstraction function () returns the abstract state corresponding to concrete 
state . In the examples here, this function is high-level perception applied to the 
contents of the spatial scene in SVS—it is the process that converts the concrete 
representation to an abstract representation. 
Assume that predictions are correct: in all cases &(*, 
) is what  (*) would equal if 
action 
 were to be taken.16 Under this assumption, Equation 1 holds if and only if the 
reward received for a transition is always independent of (, 
), given the next abstract 
state: 
'()(* = (|*, 
*, (*), =  '()(* = (|(*),                                               (3) 
Similarly, under this assumption Equation 2 holds if and only if the abstract state that 
would result from taking some action 
 in * (which is &(*, 
)) is independent of the 
previous state and action (*-, 
*-), given (*). This implies that the next abstract 
state must be independent of the previous (, 
) pair, given the current abstract state 
and action: 
'()(*) = %|*-, 
*-, (*), 
*,='()(*) = %|(*), 
*,                         (4) 
Equations 3 and 4, along with prediction correctness, can then be regarded as sufficient 
conditions for convergence with ReLAI
17
. This means that ReLAI can use abstraction 
functions where (*) is not independent of * given (*), but is independent of 
*-. This stands in contrast to direct state abstraction techniques, where (*) must 
typically be independent of * given (*) for guaranteed convergence (e.g., Ravindran 
& Barto, 2002; Givan et al., 2003). The ability to use state abstractions where (’) is 
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 This means that the agent correctly predicts all actions it takes, and &(* , 
*) = (*) at all times, but 
also that the agent correctly predicts actions it does not actually take. 
17
 Note, however, that Equation 4 does not strictly imply Equation 2. Equation 4 only covers actions the 
agent actually takes, not all possible actions as Equation 2 requires. There might be some abstraction 
function that, when used with a particular policy, meets Equation 4 for the actions taken, but would not 
have for other actions. However, that possibility will not be considered here. 
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not independent of  given () allows for less constraint on the high-level perception 
system used to induce the abstraction function. 
Even so, these assumptions can be difficult to match. In the example pedestal blocks 
world problem as presented above, equation 3 is met, since the reward for a transition 
is completely determined by the resulting abstract state. However, equation 4 is not 
met: since the problem is deterministic, all information necessary to exactly predict 
future states is implicit in the initial state, but is not captured by the abstraction. Future 
abstract states are then never independent of any previous concrete state. A simple 
manipulation of the domain, however, reveals that ReLAI will still work in this task, as 
the data indicate. 
Consider an alternate version of the domain, where after each block is placed, the agent 
is transported to a random instance of the task sharing the same abstract state (on and 
collision predicates).  That is, after each action, the spatial details of the problems 
are randomly changed without changing the abstract state. In this alternate domain, the 
reward for a transition is still determined by the resulting abstract state, so equation 3 
still holds. In contrast to the original domain, though, the next abstract state resulting 
from a transition here is independent of the previous concrete state, given the current 
abstract state, so equation 4 is met. 
In this alternate version of the task, the optimal policy is the same: greedily place the 
blocks as far to the left as possible without collisions. In addition, viewed in terms of the 
inputs to the learning algorithm (rewards and abstract states), the experience of the 
agent in the actual domain is virtually identical to what it would experience in the 
alternate domain
18
. Since the agent would learn the optimal policy in the alternate 
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 The exception is that, in the real domain, there is some correlation between potential collisions for one 
block and for another, since pedestal dimensions effect both calculations. For example, assume the agent 
infers that moving blockA to pedestal2 causes a collision, and moves it to pedestal1 instead. The 
agent next considers blockB. Since the blockA/pedestal2 collision is known, it is now more likely that 
moving blockB to pedestal2 will also cause a collision, as it could be that the pedestals are very close 
together. In the alternate problem, since pedestal dimensions change after each move, this correlation is 
not present. It will be assumed that this minor difference does not substantially affect convergence. 
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domain, the optimal policies are the same, and the agent’s experiences are consistent 
with the alternate domain, the optimal policy can be learned in the actual domain. 
5.2.2 ReLAI and Perceptual Abstraction 
In addition to benefiting from action modeling (B3), ReLAI agents retain the perceptual 
abstraction-related benefits (B1 and B2) demonstrated by the imagery-augmented 
direct state abstraction agent in Section 5.1. Beyond what is demonstrated in that 
section, though, the theoretical analysis here can add to the understanding of the 
benefit of task-specific abstract property generation (B2). 
As demonstrated by both the direct state abstraction and ReLAI agents, using imagery in 
pedestal blocks world can allow the task-independent high-level perceptual system in 
SVS to infer task-specific properties (collisions in future states), resulting in better 
performance, and demonstrating benefit B2. 
Generalizing this result beyond that particular task, if state abstraction is supported by 
high-level perception, an agent architecture might have some fixed library of perceptual 
processes, for example, SVS’s predicate extraction system. Since these processes can be 
used in any task, they are task-independent. This library won’t work well in all tasks 
when used with direct state abstraction, assuming the poverty conjecture is true. 
However, when used with simulative imagery, that same library can provide further 
useful properties. Since these properties are calculated via simulations of the actions 
specific to that particular task, they can be considered task-specific properties. 
In this scheme, by encoding different properties into an abstract state, an agent induces 
an abstraction function (). To solve a particular task, an agent’s architecture must 
support creating an abstraction function for that task. Both imagery augmentation and 
ReLAI share a common benefit of allowing an agent with a fixed library of perceptual 
processes to address more problems than would otherwise be possible; however, 
further discussion will focus on ReLAI, since it also incorporates action modeling benefits 
(B3), and has been theoretically analyzed in more detail. 
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The theoretical results for ReLAI reveal that it can increase the usefulness of a given set 
of abstraction functions. Compared with what is needed for direct state abstraction, 
equation 4 shows that ReLAI allows an agent to use abstract states that relate in a 
fundamentally different way to the concrete states of the problem, with guaranteed 
convergence of learning to the optimal policy. Because of this, abstraction functions 
that do not meet the requirements for correct direct state abstraction in a given 
problem may meet the requirements for correct ReLAI state abstraction. 
For instance, Li et al. (2006) recently presented a comprehensive theory of methods for 
direct state abstraction, describing five abstraction classes of increasing generality, and 
grouping abstraction techniques into those classes. Of those classes, the most general 
for which Q-learning convergence is guaranteed is called !∗-irrelevant. Here, the only 
requirement is that all concrete states in the same abstract state have the same !∗ 
value for all actions. However, ReLAI allows convergence with abstraction functions that 
are not !∗-irrelevant. For example, the abstraction function used in pedestal blocks 
world is in not !∗-irrelevant. All initial states of the problem are grouped together, 
regardless of whether moving A to pedestal1 will or will not cause a collision, 
situations that clearly effect the Q* value of the action move(A,pedestal1). This is an 
example of how the different relationship between concrete and abstract state spaces 
with ReLAI compared to direct abstraction allows different abstraction functions to be 
successfully used. 
While theoretically interesting, taken at face value, the formal requirements for ReLAI 
do not appear to be very practical. Even for the simple pedestal blocks world task, as 
examined above, the requirements are not strictly met
19
. However, rather than treating 
these requirements as an objective to meet, they may have more practical value as an 
ideal to approximate. While exactly satisfying the equations guarantees convergence to 
the optimal policy, a reasonable hypothesis is that, to the degree the equations are 
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 A simple task where the requirements for ReLAI are more straightforwardly met is presented elsewhere 
(Wintermute 2010). This task also uses a non-!∗-irrelevant abstraction function, supporting the argument 
in the previous paragraph. 
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approximated, performance will approach the optimal ideal. Further theoretical work 
may produce formal measures of approximation, but, as will be demonstrated, use of 
the equations as an informal guide to constructing state representations can lead to 
empirical gains. Roughly, a good state abstraction for use with ReLAI should capture as 
many of the details possible which determine immediate rewards leading into a state 
(for equation 3), but need not capture all information necessary to choose an action, as 
long as a one-step lookahead in abstract state space provides the necessary information 
(as equation 4 allows, since the consequences of actions can be dependent on details in 
the concrete state but missing from the abstract state). 
From these reasons, then, a given set of abstraction functions can be more useful with 
ReLAI than with direct state abstraction. Abstraction functions that do not meet the 
formal requirements for correct direct state abstraction in a given task may meet the 
requirements for ReLAI, and empirically, abstraction functions that do not work well 
with direct state abstraction may work well with ReLAI. The architectural structures 
necessary for direct state abstraction are a subset of those necessary for ReLAI, so any 
agent capable of ReLAI is also capable of direct abstraction. This means that ReLAI 
increases the breadth of tasks an agent will be able to address with a task-independent 
perception system. The reason ReLAI has this advantage over direct abstraction is that it 
captures additional task-specific abstract properties through imagery (even though 
these properties are not explicitly used in a state representation, as they are with 
imagery-augmented direct abstraction). Overall, this amounts to strong support for 
benefit B2, that imagery can mitigate the perceptual abstraction problem by allowing 
task-specific abstract properties to be encoded by a fixed perception system, increasing 
the generality of the architecture. 
There is some cost to using ReLAI compared to direct abstraction, since low-level 
imagery knowledge is necessary to simulate actions, and since imagery processing takes 
time. However, in many tasks, the benefit to be gained in terms of achieving better 
performance with a fixed perception system clearly outweighs these costs. 
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5.3 ReLAI in Complex Problems 
In this section, ReLAI in Soar/SVS is applied to complex arcade game tasks. In addition to 
providing further demonstrations of applications of ReLAI, these examples also 
demonstrate the comprehensive capabilities of the implemented architecture. 
Inspired by other work using arcade games as a source of AI problems (e.g. Agre & 
Chapman, 1987; Diuk et al., 2008), three tasks are demonstrated using games for the 
Atari 2600 system. The original Atari games are used (run in an emulator) – they have 
not been reimplemented.  
For each task, an abstract state representation computable by the high-level perception 
system in SVS has been chosen. A ReLAI agent and a direct state abstraction agent have 
been created for each task using the given representation, and their performance is 
compared. Each of these comparisons show an advantage for ReLAI, demonstrating that 
a given state abstraction can provide better performance with ReLAI than with direct 
state abstraction, even if it does not meet the formal convergence requirements of 
either technique. In addition, all ReLAI agents perform much better than random, 
providing simple demonstrations that imagery in Soar/SVS can be productively used to 
address these tasks.  
These tasks work well as demonstration domains for several reasons. First, each is much 
more complex than a blocks world task: each involves many objects, which are in 
constant motion, and which interact with the reward function in different ways (e.g., a 
player icon to be controlled, a prize to collect, or an enemy to avoid). Second, each task 
has different interesting spatial interactions from the others, so the set captures some 
of the diversity of spatial tasks, posing a challenge to address all of them using a 
common architecture. Finally, the tasks are nonarbitrary, they were invented by others 
who were not concerned with demonstrating the claims made here.  
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Additionally, viewed as demonstrations of the architecture in general, the use of 
reinforcement learning in these agents eliminates the parameter of policy knowledge 
from those demonstrations.  
All games are run in an Atari 2600 emulator. A low-level perception system has been 
constructed which segments, identifies, and tracks relevant objects based on the pixels 
output by the emulator. The recognized objects are input to SVS, where they are added 
to the spatial scene. The perception system is not completely general-purpose: human 
tuning is needed to provide game-specific parameters (including object labels), and 
some game-specific perceptual code is needed to augment what is provided by the 
generic interface. Outside of this low-level perceptual interface; however, the 
architecture is unchanged from what is presented in Chapter IV.  
The action interface is customizable, but here, all agents are allowed to choose an 
action once every 15 game frames (four per second). This value was chosen as a (very) 
rough estimate of human reaction time. The experiments here examine the quality of 
learning that the agents achieve (and not reaction speed), so the emulator is paused 
while the agent processes the perceptions and chooses an action. 
Following the algorithm in Figure 14, each ReLAI agent simulates all of its (game-
specific) action choices, and applies the (game-specific) abstraction function to each 
resulting imagined state, which is then used in the learning algorithm as the category of 
the action. In many cases, though, the imagery process can be decomposed to increase 
efficiency. The changes to the state of the game at each step can be divided into two 
categories: those changes that are caused by the agent, and those that occur 
independently of the action choice (environmental changes). Rather than inferring the 
imagery state for each action independently, an agent can first simulate the 
environmental changes, and then successively overlay that simulation with simulations 
of each of the agent’s own actions. 
To perform imagery, all of these agents rely heavily (but not exclusively) on simulating 
linear motion of objects. A linear translation motion model in SVS supports this, which 
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can be instantiated to track and project forward the motion of each relevant object
20
. By 
tracking the movement of a single object, the instantiated motion model learns its 
velocity, knowledge that it uses when a simulation of future movement is requested.  
5.3.1 Frogger II Agent 
Figure 16 shows the perceptual information provided by the emulator for the first game 
that will be addressed, Frogger II
21
 (Parker Bros., 1984). In the figure, the perceptions 
are overlaid with object outlines and category names are provided by the generic low-
level perception system. 
The agent has a simple goal of navigating the frog (bottom center of the figure) to the 
area below the raft objects at the top of the screen, without colliding with any of the 
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 Each such instance of the motion model is independent of the others. This is similar to a situation 
where an agent imagines two instances of the same long-term memory object. While the objects are 
based on the same LTM prototype, they are independent as instantiated in the spatial scene. 
21
 All images are copyright of their respective owners. 
Figure 16: Perceptual information in the game Frogger II, including object labels. 
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moving obstacles or leaving the play area. This is a simplification of the complete game, 
which would involve solving multiple screens, playing through multiple lives, collecting 
bonuses, etc. Without considering the rest of the game, though, this task is still very 
difficult. The frog has five actions: move in four directions, or do nothing. There is a slow 
current in the water pulling the frog to the right, so inaction still results in motion.  
The position of the frog is discrete in the vertical direction (there are 9 rows to move 
through), but many horizontal positions are possible due to the current. Most of the 
obstacles move continuously at uniform speed to the right or the left, although some 
move vertically or diagonally. Obstacles are constantly appearing and disappearing at 
the edges of the screen. This is an episodic task, and the initial state of the game differs 
across episodes (the obstacles start in different positions), so memorization of an action 
sequence will not work. Rather, a general policy must be learned. 
A reward function similar to that of the game score has been implemented: there is a 
reward of 1000 for winning (reaching the top row), and -1000 for losing (colliding with 
an obstacle or leaving the area). There is a reward of 10 for moving up, and -10 for 
moving down. At every time step, there is also a reward of -1 to encourage short 
solutions. 
To apply ReLAI in this task, imagery must be capable of simulating future states of the 
game. Motion models in SVS support this capability. All of the objects in the game can 
be assumed to be moving linearly at a constant velocity, and, as mentioned above, a 
motion model has been implemented to track and project forward such movement. For 
the movement of the frog itself, the agent has been provided with background 
knowledge in the motion model about how the frog’s controls change its position (for 
example, that an “up” action moves it 12 units in the +y direction). 





 encoding the vertical position of the frog: one of the 9 rows that define 
the legal play area 
- a predicate encoding the horizontal position of the frog: a left, middle or right region 
- a predicate encoding whether or not the frog currently intersects an obstacle 
- a predicate encoding whether or not an obstacle (or screen edge) is adjacent to the 
frog in each of the four directions. 
As implemented, horizontal and vertical discretizations are achieved by augmenting the 
perceptual information in Figure 16 with objects outlining the relevant regions, and 
using predicate extraction to determine what regions the frog intersects. Collisions are 
simply detected through predicate extraction. Directional obstacle adjacency is 
determined by first using predicate extraction to determine which obstacles are located 
in the appropriate direction of the frog, and then extracting the distance from the frog 
to any matching obstacles. If the distance is less than a threshold (10 pixels, about the 
same as the inter-row distance), the obstacle is deemed adjacent in that direction. 
As a state representation, this abstraction loses potentially useful information, and is 
not Markovian (since the agent could make better decisions by remembering where it 
has seen obstacles in the past). However, it is compact, and just as important, it can be 
composed from the simple perceptual operations available in the architecture. 
The same perceptual abstraction function is used in both a direct state abstraction 
agent and a ReLAI agent. At each step, the ReLAI agent uses imagery to project forward 
the motion of the obstacles near the frog, along with the effect of each action on the 
frog. The abstract state information above is then inferred for each imagined state. In 
addition to abstract perceptions, in this task the ReLAI agent also encodes the proposed 
action as part of the abstract state. This is because perceptions about the next state 
alone cannot capture the immediate reward for the transition, as Equation 3 requires, 
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 As in the rest of this thesis, the term “predicate” here is simply shorthand for “symbolic structure”. 
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since moving up or down a row effects reward (not just being in a particular row). 
However, the last action taken is not useful as part of the other agent’s state, so it is not 
included there. 
For ReLAI, the requirement that the abstraction captures immediate reward (Equation 
3) is met, and the requirement that predictions are accurate comes close to being met, 
only missing a few cases where moving objects do not follow a constant velocity or 
disappear unexpectedly. The requirement on state independence (Equation 4) is not 
met: (*) is not strictly independent of *-, given (*), so convergence to !
∗ isn’t 
guaranteed. However, unlike state aggregation, ReLAI is robust to abstractions where 
(*) is dependent on * given (*), which can be beneficial. 
For example, the ReLAI agent can base its action choice on a precise prediction of 
whether or not it will collide with an obstacle in the new state (*),  where the other 
agent can only base its decisions on (*), which includes information (obstacle 
adjacency) that can only roughly predict future collisions between moving objects. The 
concrete state * contains enough information to predict collisions in the next state 
almost exactly, but this information is only useful to the ReLAI agent.  
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Experiments were run using the actual (emulated) game. Q-learning with epsilon-greedy 
exploration was used (parameters were  = 0.3,  = 0.1,  = 0.9). 30 trials of 6,000 
episodes each were run in each condition. Figure 17 shows the results. Here, groups of 
400 adjacent episodes were binned together; the results are averaged across all 
episodes in the bin and across all trials (each point represents 12,000 games).  
As a baseline, the graph shows the estimated performance of a random agent. Random 
performance is generalized from data collected in 1,000 task instances, not exactly the 
same instances the learning agents experience. Both of the learning agents initially 
perform randomly, however, since they learn quickly within the first bin of 400 
episodes, the graph does not reflect this.  
The graphed results do not show the ability of the agents to play the game well: epsilon-
greedy exploration means that the agent acted randomly 10% of the time (often with 
fatal results), and some of the randomly-chosen start states were unwinnable. These 
factors contributed to high variability in the data, necessitating the averaging of many 
games per data point. 
To examine the final policy, 700 games were run in each condition using the final 
policies, but without exploration and with unwinnable games filtered out. Of these, the 













































direct abstraction agent received an average reward of -66 and won 45% of the games, 
while the ReLAI agent received an average reward of 439 and won 70% of the games. 
The ReLAI agent clearly outperforms the direct abstraction agent: it learns a better 
policy, and learns it faster. In addition, both agents perform much better than random. 
5.3.2 Space Invaders Agent 
The second game addressed is Space Invaders (Atari, 1980). Figure 18 shows an example 
of the perceptual data provided by the emulator, overlaid with object labels provided by 
the low-level perception system. 
In Space Invaders, the player controls a ship (located at the bottom of the figure), which 
can move left and right on the ground. The ship is being attacked by aliens, which drop 
bombs while moving left and right and (gradually) downward in a regular pattern. The 
ship explodes if hit by a bomb, and the player loses a life. The player can shoot missiles 
upward toward the aliens; its goal is to kill all of the aliens by hitting them with missiles. 
Figure 18: Perceptual information in the game Space Invaders, including object labels. 
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All bombs and missiles take time to travel while the aliens and ship are moving – they do 
not arrive instantly, and the player cannot fire a missile if one is already in the air. Three 
static shields are located between the ship and aliens, which block bombs and missiles, 
but these gradually disintegrate when they are hit by missiles or bombs. 
The state of the world here is continuous, since the missiles and bombs move 
continuously, and each instance of the game is unique, since the positions of the aliens 
and the timing of their bombing is different in each case. 
The task addressed by the agents here is a slightly simplified version of the game, where 
it aims to kill all of the aliens on the initial screen (it does not progress through levels, 
have multiple lives, or try to kill the mothership, which is a high-value target in the full 
game). The agent receives a reward of 50 for killing an alien and -50 for losing a life (and 
ending the instance). 
The state representation used encodes the following information: 
-a predicate encoding a discretized horizontal position for the ship (15 possible values) 
-a predicate encoding whether or not there is a "clear shot" (a missile would hit an alien 
if the alien stays in place) 
-a predicate encoding whether or not there is an unshielded bomb (a bomb that will hit 
the ship if it does not move) 
-a predicate encoding whether or not there a missile (shot by the ship) is in the air 
-if a missile is in the air, a predicate encoding whether or not it aligns with an alien 
-a predicate encoding whether or not there is a falling bomb adjacent to the ships left or 
right 
-a predicate encoding whether or not the ship intersects a bomb 
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Similar to the Frogger II agents, spatial discretization is supported by augmenting low-
level perception with objects representing the regions, and checking for intersections 
with predicate extraction. For the state variable encoding clear shots, a series of 
predicate extractions are necessary. For each alien, the agent queries whether or not 
the centroid of the ship is strictly below the alien, and whether the centroid of the ship 
is strictly below a shield
23
. The ship’s centroid is used since the missile is fired from the 
center. If there is an alien above, and the shot is not blocked, a clear shot is present. 
Unshielded bombs and aligned missiles are similarly encoded with multiple direction 
queries. Adjacent falling bombs are calculated similar to adjacent objects in Frogger II, 
the bomb must be within approximately two ship-widths in the relevant direction to be 
considered adjacent. 
As with the previous tasks, linear motion projection is the primary form of imagery used 
in this task. All aliens, missiles, and bombs can be tracked and projected forward, and 
the agent has been provided with motion model knowledge about how actions move 
the ship. However, there is one aspect of the state that cannot easily be predicted with 
imagery: if an agent issues a “fire” action, in the next state, a missile will be in the air 
(possibly aligned with an alien). This is not a simple spatial consequence of the action, 
since it involves a completely new object appearing. In order to simulate the effects of 
this action, the agent has a partially-symbolic action model for this action: it knows that 
issuing a fire action will cause a missile to be in the air in the next state, and assumes 
that missile will be aligned with an alien if there is currently a clear shot (it also knows 
that this will not happen if there is already a missile in the air). The use of a 
comprehensive architecture such as Soar easily allows this sort of integration, where 
symbolic action models can be used in conjunction with imagery (Laird et al., 2010). 
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 As the game progresses and the shields disintegrate, the low-level perception system can lose the 
ability to recognize them, as they degrade into randomly shaped objects and split into parts. The agents 
simply ignore shields at this point. 
86 
Experiments were run with the same parameters as in the previous section. 12 trials of 
5,000 episodes each were run, groups of 500 adjacent episodes were binned together, 
and average reward was calculated across all trials and episodes in each bin. A random 
baseline was calculated by averaging the performance of a random agent in 1,000 
episodes. Figure 19 shows the results.  
The final policy was tested similarly to Frogger II. 720 episodes were run using the final 
policies, but without exploration. The ReLAI achieved an average reward of 683 (killing 
13 or 14 aliens out of 36), while the direct abstraction agent achieved an average 
reward of 465 (killing 9 or 10 aliens). In 6 episodes, the ReLAI agent killed all of the 
aliens, while the direct abstraction agent never achieved that level of performance. 
The performance here reflects the fact that the state representation loses relevant 
information from the concrete state of the problem, for both direct abstraction and 
ReLAI. In particular, it does not well capture the long-term motion of the objects. A 
direct state abstraction agent only has access to enough state information to line up its 
shot with the assumption that nothing will move, which does not work well here. ReLAI 
can do better, since it can take into account the short-term movement of objects. 
However, the architecture does support simulation of the complete path of missiles the 
agent fires, potentially allowing an imagery agent to line up its shots much more 
























accurately. The ReLAI algorithm, however, is constrained to use imagery only for the 
immediately following state. More work is needed to determine how long-term ballistic 
predictions that can have effects many time steps into the future can be integrated with 
learning. 
That said, the data show a substantial advantage to using ReLAI rather than direct 
abstraction with the given representation, and both agents do much better than 
random.  
5.3.3 Fast Eddie Agent 
The final game addressed is called Fast Eddie (20
th
 Century Fox, 1982). In this game 
(Figure 20), the player controls a character (Eddie) who navigates a two-dimensional 
platform world. The actions available are to walk Eddie to the left or right, jump in place, 
leap to the left or right (which moves Eddie roughly ¼ of the screen in that direction), 
climb up or down a ladder, or do nothing. There are a number of monsters in the game, 
which either stand still or move quickly to the left and right (“bouncing” at the edges of 
Figure 20: Perceptual information in the game Fast Eddie, including object labels. 
88 
the screen), and a number of heart objects that move continuously to the left or right. 
Eddie must jump or leap to avoid the monsters and to collect hearts. In the version of 
the game used for a task here, the game terminates when Eddie collects nine hearts or 
loses a life by colliding with a monster. Like the other games, the state space here is 
continuous, and each instance is slightly different. 
The agent receives a reward of 50 whenever it collects a heart and -100 whenever it 
loses a life. For this game, the environment interface was customized to provide the 
agent with a set of actions available at each step, simplifying the problem so the agent 
does not consider moving up or down when not at a ladder or issuing actions that would 
cause Eddie to hit the edge of the screen.  
The abstract state used for this task is as follows: 
- a predicate encoding whether or not Eddie intersects a monster 
-a predicate encoding whether or not Eddie is near a monster 
-a predicate encoding whether or not the last action reduced the distance from Eddie to 
the closest heart 
-a predicate encoding whether or not a heart collected was collected in the last action. 
Intersections are calculated via simple predicate extraction. To determine whether 
Eddie is “near” a monster, distance is used. For stationary monsters, anything closer 
than 10 pixels (about the width of Eddie) is considered near, and for moving monsters, 
the distance is 35 pixels, allowing Eddie to keep a wider berth. The last two predicates 
are more complicated to determine and require multiple predicate extraction 
operations, in addition to some internal history maintenance.  
To determine whether the closest heart distance was reduced, it is first necessary to 
find the closest heart and the distance to it. To do this, the agent determines which level 
of the board Eddie is currently located at, and which level each heart is located at. 
Rather than using special region objects as in the other games, here, predicate 
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extraction is used. Since the floors are objects, the agent can determine which floors a 
given object is above, and which floors are closest to the top of the screen. This is 
sufficient information to infer what floor each object is on. If there is a heart on the 
same floor as Eddie, the distance to that heart is used. Otherwise, the agent first infers 
which heart is closest in floors to Eddie’s floor, and then determines the distance to the 
closest ladder adjacent to the current floor that would move Eddie towards that floor, 
and uses that distance. For example, in Figure 20, the closest heart is on the second 
floor and Eddie is on the first floor. The closest ladder to Eddie leading up is to the left of 
him, so the distance to that ladder is considered the distance to the closest heart. Once 
this distance is determined, it can be compared to that in the distance in the previous 
state to determine the value of the predicate. State transitions where Eddie moves 
between levels are handled slightly differently, but the agent is still able to accurately 
encode the predicate. 
The direct abstraction agent can simply remember whether it has collected a heart in 
the last step, as that information is provided in its perceptions. However, in the ReLAI 
case, determining whether a heart was collected in the “last” action (which is the action 
being imagined) involves a series of steps. To do so, first, the agent assumes that no 
heart was collected unless the last action was a jump or a leap. If the last action was a 
leap, the agent constructs an image of the convex hull of the agent at its previous 
location and at its current location (using predicate projection). The agent then uses 
predicate extraction to check if any heart on the same floor as Eddie lies above this hull 
object. If the last action was a jump, the agent simply checks if a heart in the same row 
lies above Eddie. This process is not entirely accurate, but works in most cases. The 
process could be made more accurate if the detailed motion of Eddie’s leaps were 
simulated, rather than the agent simply imagining the final state.  
Both of these predicates were formulated to stretch the definition of what can be 
encoded in a state predicate with ReLAI. They are backward-looking predicates, as they 
encode information about the agent’s recent history. These predicates can be 
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considered as maximally exploiting the fact that ReLAI works with state representations 
where the next abstract state resulting from a transition can depend on details not in 
the current abstract state (but in the current concrete state). Predicting future values of 
the predicates depends almost entirely on information completely missing from the 
abstract state: the locations of Eddie and the hearts. As the data (to be presented 
shortly) shows, ReLAI can greatly benefit from these predicates, where direct state 
abstraction cannot. 
Compared to the other domains, the state predicates here are more complex, leading to 
a much smaller state space. Learning is still necessary to determine a policy; however, 
compared to the other domains, in this case more task knowledge is captured by the 
state representation. Using this representation implicitly indicates that collecting a 
heart, or moving closer to one, is a relevant event that should influence the agent’s 
action choice. This property is more task-specific than simply encoding, for example, 
discretized locations for all of the objects.
24
 However, any agent that uses an abstract 
representation implicitly captures properties of the task in the choice of representation: 
for example, segmenting raw pixels into objects implicitly captures the fact that objects 
are relevant to the task. This agent is simply an example from the more task-specific end 
of the spectrum. Investigating learning of the state representation itself is an area for 
future work. 
A new motion model was necessary to model the monsters in this game: using the linear 
translation model was not accurate enough, as the monsters move quickly compared to 
Eddie and bounce of the edges of the screen, so in many cases a linear prediction would 
be wrong. The new model accounted for this bouncing behavior. Similar to the previous 
tasks, the agent was provided with background knowledge in a motion model so that 
Eddie’s movement could be reliably simulated. 
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 This is a different dimension of task-specificity than that added by imagery, where the given state 




Experimental data was gathered in 24 trials of 1000 episodes, and is shown in Figure 21, 
with average reward binned across groups of 100 adjacent episodes and all trials. 
Parameters were  = 0.01,  = 0.1,  = 0.9. These are the same parameters as used in 
all other experiments, except the learning rate: a much lower rate (.01 vs. .3) was 
necessary since there are so few abstract states in the problem. To inspect final 
performance, 720 instances of the task were run using the 24 final policies without 
exploration. Here, ReLAI earned an average reward of 234, where direct abstraction 
earned -92. The ReLAI agent won (collected all nine hearts) in 44% of these instances. 
A baseline was also determined by testing a random-action agent in 1,000 instances of 
the task. As the data indicate, again, in this task, ReLAI is able to perform much better 
than direct abstraction with the same state information and the random agent. 
5.3.4 Summary of Video Game Experiments 
Overall, these three video game agents all serve to demonstrate that ReLAI can be 
empirically useful even when theoretical requirements are not met, and that state 
representations that meet the theoretical requirements of neither direct abstraction nor 
ReLAI can perform much better with ReLAI. The predicates used in the state 
representations of these agents also demonstrate some of the variety of complex, task-




























specific predicates that can be derived using SVS. In addition, the set of data as a whole 
reflects the fact that the theory and implementation of SVS is complete enough that 
imagery can be beneficially used in complex tasks that were not originally designed as 
evaluation domains for that purpose. 
These agents further demonstrate the benefits listed in Chapter III. With ReLAI, the 
agent predicts a set of future abstract states in order to gather enough information to 
make a decision. In that way, an inference of the value of a predicate in a predicted 
future state is really an inference of a property of the current situation
25
 that the agent 
is in. When the prediction process involves motion, then, simulative imagery is being 
used to capture movement in terms of abstract symbolic information (B1). When the 
Frogger II ReLAI agent does a one-step lookahead to infer that moving up will cause it to 
collide with a fish, it has inferred symbolic information that takes into account the 
precise movement of both the frog and the fish.  
In addition, since the simulative imagery process differs in each agent based on the 
details of how the environment of that particular game evolves at each step and how 
the agent’s actions cause movement, the properties of the current situation being 
inferred through imagery lookahead are task-specific (B2). 
As was explained above, the ReLAI algorithm implicitly captures the action modeling 
aspect of simulative imagery (B3) where other techniques such as imagery-augmented 
direct state abstraction do not. Therefore, the ReLAI agents here demonstrate that 
benefit. 
The ReLAI agents here are also strong examples of the ability simulative imagery affords 
of allowing decisions to be made with abstract information while predictions are made 
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 I’m using the term “situation” rather than “state” to avoid confusion with the states that play a direct 
role in the learning algorithm. For example, a ReLAI agent in pedestal blocks world might infer that 
moving A to pedestal1 would cause a collision, which is a property of the current situation, but does not 
add collision_if_moved(A,pedestal1) to its RL state representation as a direct state abstraction 
agent would. 
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with concrete information (B4). The movement of objects in all three of these games is 
easily predictable in concrete, quantitative terms. If an object moved three pixels to the 
right in the last frame, it is likely to be another three pixels to the right in the next 
frame. This is a simple regularity in all of these tasks that makes the environments very 
predictable. However, including information at that level of detail in the state 
representation used by the RL algorithm would create far too many states for efficient 
learning. Using multiple levels of abstraction and imagery allows the agents to leverage 
low-level predictability in the environment while still maintaining a compact 
representation suitable for efficient learning at the decision-making level.  
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Chapter VI – Motion Planning in Soar/SVS 
As discussed in Section 2.2, motion planning 
for a car-like vehicle is a challenging 
problem. Recall that motion planning in this 
case is the problem of determining a control 
sequence such that a robot can drive 
through its environment to a goal location 
(Figure 22).  
The difficulty here is due to the need for 
precise control, where the output of the 
agent must be sensitive to minute variations in its input. This aspect makes the problem 
fundamentally irreducible, as it cannot be adequately solved by choosing actions based 
solely on abstract states. Moreover, the most straightforward approach to handling 
irreducibility, the use of encapsulated controllers, is insufficient, as nonholonomic 
constraints make that form of abstraction very difficult. 
In this chapter, an agent instantiated in Soar/SVS to address this task is introduced. This 
agent implements an existing sampling-based motion planning algorithm, where 
imagery is used to simulate the effects of a low-level controller in the current situation. 
This agent provides a demonstration of the benefits in Section 3.3, most importantly, 
those benefits related to irreducibility, a difficulty that is not as prominent in the arcade 
game tasks of the previous chapter. The motion processing system of SVS is important 
here, as it was in the arcade game tasks, however, here the model used is much more 
complex, and is (theoretically) used for external control in addition to imagery. 
Figure 22: A nonholonomic car motion 
planning problem. 
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Additionally, the algorithm used here is more complex than the reinforcement learning 
techniques in the previous chapter. This agent therefore provides a more 
comprehensive example of how high-level processing in Soar and lower-level processing 
in SVS can be integrated in a complete agent.  
6.1 The RRT Algorithm 
In response to the difficulty of abstraction in motion planning, a family of motion 
planning algorithms has been developed based on the principle of sampling possible 
trajectories through simulation. RRT (Rapidly-exploring Random Trees, LaValle & Kuffner 
Jr, 2001) is a sampling-based motion planning algorithm that works by constructing a 
tree of reachable states of the robot, rooted at the initial state, and adding nodes until 
that tree reaches the goal. Nodes are generated by extending the tree in random 
directions, in such a way that it will eventually reach the goal, given enough time. Each 
path from the root of the tree to a leaf represents a path that the robot could take, 
constantly obeying all constraints on its motion.  
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The tree is constructed by the algorithm in Figure 23, and Figure 24 shows an example 
of one iteration of the algorithm applied to a car planning problem. 
In the example, the car’s current configuration is node ./, while previous iterations 
have uncovered other reachable configurations . − .1. These configurations are linked 
in a tree, where each configuration is reachable from its parent via a known control. In 
this case, a “control” at the level of RRT is a selection of a low-level controller to use, for 
example, a controller that greedily steers the car toward a particular goal. The path 
followed by this controller between each connected configuration in the tree is shown 
in the figure. To add to this tree, a target configuration .2 is randomly generated, as 
represented in the left half of the Figure. The algorithm then attempts to extend its tree 
of reachable configurations to that configuration. 
make tree rooted at initial configuration 
while tree does not reach goal 
  generate random configuration -> Xr 
  or use goal configuration -> Xr  
  with some probability 
  get closest existing state to Xr -> Xc 
  extend Xc towards Xr -> Xn 
  if no collision occurred 
    add Xn to the tree, connected to Xc  
Figure 23: The RRT Algorithm. 
Figure 24: An example of RRT applied to car motion planning. 
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To extend the tree, the closest known configuration to .2 must be determined. To do 
this, some metric must be used that can approximate the “distance” between 
configurations—that is, the metric must approximate the distance of the shortest path 
the car could follow to move from one configuration to another. In the case of car path 
planning, a simple metric is the Euclidian distance between the position of the car in the 
two states, with the condition that the distance is infinite if the target state is not in 
front of the source. On the left of Figure 24, configuration .1 is the closest to .2 given 
Euclidean distance alone, but since .2 is not in front of .1, actually driving from .1 to .2 
would be difficult, since the car cannot turn in place to face .2. .3 is then the closest 
configuration to .2 once the front constraint is taken into account, and .4 in the 
algorithm takes on the value of .3. 
The next step in the algorithm is to extend the chosen node towards .2, while detecting 
collisions along the path. This is shown on the right of Figure 24.  A typical approach is to 
numerically integrate differential equations that describe the vehicle dynamics to 
simulate motion, resulting in a sequence of states parameterized by time. This 
simulation must occur within a system capable of detecting collisions. In the right frame 
of Figure 24, the controller is invoked starting at the configuration of .3, and the car’s 
motion is simulated driving towards .2 for some amount of time. Since no collision 
occurred, the new node .5 is added to the tree of reachable configurations. The 
algorithm then continues until the tree reaches the goal. 
6.2 RRT in Soar/SVS 
A version of the RRT algorithm has been instantiated in a Soar/SVS agent (Wintermute, 
2009b). The problem considered is that of planning to drive a car from an initial state to 
a goal region, while avoiding obstacles in a known environment (the agent only 
determines a plan, it is not connected to an actual robot).  
A complete car configuration in the version of the problem considered here consists of a 
position where the car is located, the steering angle, the steering velocity (since the 
steering angle cannot be instantaneously changed), and the angle of the car body. The 
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car motion model takes as input the identity of a car in the scene, and the location of a 
goal. By accessing the spatial scene, the model can identify the position and body angle 
of the car, and the other configuration aspects are initially assumed to be 0. 
Inside the model, a system of differential equations describe the configuration of the car 
as a function of the time and goal location. When integrated, these equations can yield 
a sequence of configurations parameterized by time, allowing for simulation. The 
equations used here were determined by combining a model of human movement and 
obstacle avoidance (Fajen & Warren, 2003) with a simple car model (LaValle, 2006). No 
human modeling claims are being made with this choice of controller, rather, the 
particular controller was chosen as a simple demonstration of how techniques and 
results based on the dynamical systems approach to cognitive science can be tightly 
integrated with a symbolic AI framework. In addition, it performs well.
26
 
The human model controls the intended steering angle of the car, and this steering 
angle determines the next position of the car. A constant speed is assumed. The model 
locally avoids obstacles: each obstacle affects the steering of the car, with nearer 
obstacles located towards the front of the car having the most influence. This reactive 
obstacle avoidance alone can solve simple problems, but more complicated problems 
cannot be solved this way, as a solution needs to be composed out of several distinct 
movement subgoals. 
The controller simulates motion towards a goal, while maintaining the nonholonomic 
constraints of the vehicle. Along with geometric models of the car and world in the LTM 
of SVS, it is the low-level knowledge that was added to the existing SVS system to 
implement this planner. 
Symbolic Soar rules were written to perform the algorithm in Figure 23. As a metric for 
node distance, Euclidean distance was used, with the condition that the distance is 
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 The local obstacle-avoiding controller here was directly compared (with favorable results) to a similar 
controller that simply steers towards the goal in (Wintermute, 2009a). 
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infinite where the goal is not in front of the node.
27
 SVS predicate extraction 
mechanisms were used to extract distances, and to query for an in-front relationship. 
The motion model described above enables simulation, and SVS supports querying for 
intersections between objects in the scene, enabling collision detection. The only new 
mechanism needed in SVS to support this algorithm was a predicate projection method 
to generate random goal points in the scene, which was a simple addition. 
Examples of the SVS scene during RRT planning are shown in Figure 25. Soar stores, as a 
symbolic structure in working memory, the RRT tree. The nodes in that tree are 
perceptual pointers into SVS—they point to specific objects in the scene, which can be 
seen in the figure. Soar proceeds by adding a new random point object to the scene, and 
querying for the distance from each node to that object. These distances are then 
compared to find the closest. A motion model-based simulation is instantiated with that 
node as the initial condition
28
 (creating a new car object in the scene), and this 
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 This means that the steering aspects and the body angle of randomly-generated configurations (and the 
goal configuration) are ignored when computing the distance metric. This allows random configurations 
and goals to be represented by points, rather than complete configurations. 
28
 In the implemented system, motion model instantiations are not maintained after nodes are added to 
the tree, only the object in spatial scene remains. Since steering angle and velocity are maintained in the 
model (and not the scene), these quantities are assumed to reset to zero between nodes. Minor 
enhancements to the architecture would be necessary to allow motion model instantiations to be 
preserved. 
Figure 25: States of SVS Spatial Scene during RRT planning. The problem is to drive a car 
from lower-left to upper-right. Left: RRT tree, just before a solution is found. Right: 
Sequence of car positions that solve the problem. 
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simulation is stepped until a certain time is 
reached, the goal is reached, or Soar detects a 
collision with an obstacle. In all but the last case, 
the termination of the simulation results in a new 
tree node being added. In addition to moving 
towards random points, with a certain probability 
the agent instead tries to extend the tree directly 
towards the overall goal, biasing the growth of the 
tree in that direction. 
The agent has been tested on the problem in 
Figure 25 and other similar scenarios. For the 
problem in the figure, 100 trials were run, and a 
solution was found after an average of 12 tree 
expansions. However, the primary purpose of this 
agent is to serve as an existence proof that the 
algorithm can be implemented in Soar/SVS, and as 
a demonstration of the architecture applied to this 
task. For those purposes, experimental data 
beyond stating that the implementation functions 
as described is largely redundant. 
6.3 Symbolic Soar Processing in RRT 
To provide an example of how higher-level Soar 
processing interacts with SVS, Figure 26 shows a 
trace of Soar’s behavior during RRT planning. 
Symbolic Soar processing is mediated through a 
large declarative symbolic structure, the working memory. Reasoning in Soar is 
accomplished through a sequence of decisions, where an operator, representing a 
specific choice of an internal or external action, is selected. Symbolic rules control which 
Figure 26: A trace of a Soar/SVS 
agent executing RRT planning. 
Initialization is shown in blue, 
iterations of the algorithm are 
shown in alternating font styles. 
 1: O: O22 (svs-build-world) 
    ... 
 9: O: O291 (rrt-plan) 
10: ==>S: S10 (operator no-change) 
11:    O: O293 (init-tss) 
12:    O: O294 (generate-projection) 
13:    O: O300 (wait-for-svs) 
14:    O: O301 (rrt-extend) 
15:    O: O303 (run-svs-simulation) 
16:    ==>S: S12 (operator no-change) 
17:       O: O343 (svs-step) 
          ... 
37:       O: O363 (svs-step) 
38:    O: O365 (register-node) 
39:    O: O366 (generate-projection) 
40:    O: O371 (wait-for-svs) 
41:    O: O372 (rrt-extend) 
42:    O: O374 (run-svs-simulation) 
43:    ==>S: S14 (operator no-change) 
44:       O: O414 (svs-step) 
          ... 
59:       O: O429 (svs-step) 
60:    O: O431 (remove-failed-sim) 
61:    O: O432 (generate-projection) 
62:    O: O437 (wait-for-svs) 
63:    O: O438 (behind-all) 
64:    O: O439 (generate-projection) 
65:    O: O444 (wait-for-svs) 
66:    O: O445 (rrt-extend) 
67:    O: O447 (run-svs-simulation) 
68:    ==>S: S16 (operator no-change) 
69:       O: O487 (svs-step) 
          ... 
82:       O: O500 (svs-step) 
83:    O: O502 (register-node) 
84:    O: O503 (generate-projection) 
85:    O: O508 (wait-for-svs) 
86:    O: O509 (rrt-extend) 
87:    O: O511 (run-svs-simulation) 
88:    ==>S: S18 (operator no-change) 
89:       O: O551 (svs-step) 
          ... 
99:       O: O561 (svs-step) 
100:   O: O563 (remove-failed-sim) 
101:   O: O567 (choose-goal) 
102:   O: O569 (rrt-extend) 
103:   O: O571 (run-svs-simulation) 
104:   ==>S: S20 (operator no-change) 
105:      O: O611 (svs-step) 
106:   O: O613 (remove-failed-sim) 
107:   ... etc. 
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operators are available at what time, choose particular operators when there are 
multiple possibilities, and change the state of working memory based on the selected 
operator. Subgoaling in Soar is achieved via impasses, which arise whenever there is 
insufficient knowledge to immediately choose an operator. 
Each line in the figure shows the name of the operator chosen at that decision, or that 
an impasse was entered (indicated by a ==>). More details about symbolic Soar 
processing can be found in (Lehman et al., 2006), and more detail about how SVS 
interacts with Soar’s working memory can be found in (Wintermute, 2009b). 
Each iteration of the algorithm starts with a decision to either generate a random point 
to use as a goal (seen as a generate-projection decision), or a decision to try and 
extend the tree towards the overall goal (seen as a choose-goal decision in the last 
iteration). After deciding on the location to extend towards (a target), the agent must 
determine which existing state (which node in the tree) should be extended toward that 
state. This involves predicate extraction queries: orientation queries are set up so that 
the in-front-of relationship is checked between each node in the tree (which is a 
pointer to an actual car object in the scene) and the target object, along with distance 
queries between those. From Soar’s perspective, these queries are performed in parallel 
for all objects. Of all of the nodes for which the orientation query matches, that with the 
shortest distance is chosen. If a random point is generated that is not in front of any 
node, it is rejected, this is the behind-all operator in the third iteration. The wait-
for-svs operator selected at several points in the trace is an artifact of the way the 
current implementation of SVS interfaces to working memory and is unimportant for 
this discussion. 
After finding a node to extend, the agent uses a motion model to simulate the car 
driving towards the target. This is set up through the rrt-extend operator. SVS 
includes task-independent library rules to allow easy creation of motion simulations. 
Here, the agent specifies to simulate moving the car towards the target, until either a 
maximum time is reached (the common case for a successful extension), or a predicate 
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extraction query matches, detecting that the car has collided with an obstacle or 
reached the goal. As the motion model used avoids obstacles, the perceptual pointers to 
the obstacles in the problem must also be provided to the SVS motion simulation 
process. After the relevant queries are set up, the operators run-svs-simulation 
and svs-step (part of the SVS library) take over. Based on the results of the 
simulation, the image of the car at its new location is either added as a new node (if the 
extension was successful), or removed from the scene (if a collision occurred). This 
continues until the overall goal is reached, at which point the agent removes all of the 
non-solution nodes in the tree (as seen on the right of Figure 25). The agent halts at this 
point. In a more complete agent, the plan would then be executed by moving the robot 
towards these locations. 
6.4 Perceptual Abstraction and Irreducibility in Motion Planning 
Now that the agent has been described, it is worth revisiting the principles introduced 
the earlier chapters, to see how this system demonstrates the benefits of the theory. 
First, it is important to note that the algorithm here was developed by other 
researchers, completely independent of any broad architectural theories, but instead to 
solve a practical engineering need. That indicates that the approach is fundamentally 
valuable, its utility is not, for example, an artifact of the symbolic assumption in Chapter 
II, nor of any shortcomings of the Soar architecture. While the algorithm was not 
originally described in terms of multiple representations and imagery, it easily maps on 
to those concepts. Any system implementing RRT in problems such as this requires both 
the means to simulate action in terms of low-level information, and to make abstract 
judgments about the outcome of that simulation, such as “collided with an obstacle” or 
“reached the goal”. In addition, information about the state of the search needs to be 
maintained at multiple levels of abstraction: the agent needs to maintain the exact 
quantitative values for each configuration in its tree, but also the abstract knowledge 
about the topology of the tree itself (which configurations are reachable from which 
others).  
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This agent serves as a demonstration of the particular benefits outlined in Section 3.3. 
Most prominently, it demonstrates the benefits related to irreducibility. Motion 
planning, in general, is an irreducibly large problem. If the problem were to be 
addressed by a purely-symbolic system, where raw perceptions were abstracted into 
states and mapped to raw actions, even for simple robots, the maximally abstract state 
space would be extremely large. However, a concrete controller is used in this 
approach, allowing the action space of the symbolic part of the agent to be simplified, 
and working to mitigate irreducibility (B5). 
Concrete control alone is insufficient to mitigate irreducibility in this situation, though. 
The task cannot be reduced to abstract symbolic reasoning about concrete control (the 
encapsulated controller approach), as may be possible in simpler motion planning 
problems. For the nonholonomic motion here, there is no simple geometrical property 
of the obstacles that could be calculated to determine a small set of reachable locations 
and paths a controller could follow that could be searched over, as may be possible 
when planning the motion of simpler robots (e.g., a visibility graph (Lozano-Pérez & 
Wesley, 1979)). It is possible to build a conservative abstract map of the world, if there 
are regions that are clearly traversable, but solution quality would be lost. 
Instead, simulative imagery is used in this agent to allow reasoning about the controller 
in terms of symbolic information, but without requiring a complete symbolic 
characterization of the controller (B6). This allows for a controller that entails a complex 
interaction with the world—steering that continuously varies with the exact positions of 
the obstacles and goal—to be reasoned about in terms of extremely simple abstract 
information: whether or not the car collides with an obstacle.  
The system can also be viewed in terms of the perceptual abstraction related benefits. 
The use of simulative imagery allows motion to captured symbolically (B1), allows task-
specific abstract properties to be captured (B2, for example, “if the controller is used to 
seek towards the goal from this state, it will succeed”), and allows action modeling (B3), 
since the agent knows that the result of a particular simulation is a property of a 
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particular action choice (controller selection) in the current state, rather than just 
another property of the current state. 
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Chapter VII - Related Work 
This thesis touches on many areas of research in artificial intelligence, cognitive science, 
and robotics. This chapter contains a survey of related work, with an emphasis on 
systems that have influenced the theory and broad architectural design, rather than 
prior work related to particular aspects of the implementation or experiments (some of 
which has been noted in previous chapters). 
Related work is divided into rough categories; however, some of the approaches 
described here could fit in multiple categories.  
7.1 Qualitative Spatial Reasoning 
Much work in the past has focused on attempts to build useful abstract representations 
of spatial information. Researchers in Qualitative Spatial Reasoning study this problem. 
An influential system here is the MD/PV model of Forbus (1983). A major result of this 
line of work, the poverty conjecture, was discussed earlier. Beyond this, the model itself 
provides some useful insights. It consists of a Metric Diagram (MD) and Place 
Vocabulary (PV). The metric diagram is similar to the spatial representation in SVS, it 
typically contains a set of labeled objects represented quantitatively. This diagram is 
used to build a task-specific place vocabulary, which consists of “contiguous regions of 
space where some important property (e.g., in contact with a gear, inside a well) is 
constant”. Systems can be studied by looking at their dynamics in terms of the place 
vocabulary, for example determining if two balls moving through space could possibly 
collide by looking at their trajectories through the places. In a large project, the 
framework was successfully used to model the mechanisms of a clock (Forbus et al., 
1991).  
A place vocabulary can be viewed as an abstract state space, and since the metric 
diagram is used to generate the place vocabulary, the approach is very similar to the 
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imagery agents used here. However, the MD/PV model has been applied in very 
different tasks than those addressed here. In general, qualitative reasoning work has 
focused on tasks like understanding a large system: for example, predicting that a 
bouncing ball could eventually wind up in a pit. These are very different from the spatial 
control tasks addressed here.  In addition, MD/PV is not proposed in detailed 
architectural terms: there is no comprehensive proposal for what task-independent 
representations and mechanisms are necessary for an agent to use the MD/PV approach 
in arbitrary tasks it may encounter. 
In spite of the poverty conjecture, work in qualitative representations of space that can 
be used in a task-independent manner has progressed. Useful systems have been 
developed, even if they cannot capture every important interaction in every domain. As 
discussed in Section 4.4, the direction relationships that can be queried in SVS are based 
on the “acceptance area” approach of Hernandez (1994). Previous versions of the 
system (Wintermute & Laird, 2007) have allowed the agent to extract topological 
relationships based on the Region Connecting Calculus (Cohn et al., 1997); the current 
version does not support a complete set of relationships, but this is something likely to 
be added in the future. Qualitative representations like these are usually discussed in 
the context of formal methods for reasoning with that information, which are not used 
in any of the SVS agents developed so far (although they could be implemented as 
knowledge in Soar). 
7.2 Cognitive Architectures 
There have been several previous cognitive architecture approaches toward addressing 
spatial tasks. 
7.2.1 Other Soar Extensions 
The most relevant existing system to SVS is SVI (Lathrop, 2008; Lathrop & Laird, 2009). 
SVS inherits much of its design and code from SVI, so it is difficult to say precisely 
whether or not they are different systems. All of the agents developed for SVI could 
theoretically be adapted to SVS, but this has not been done, as the interface to symbolic 
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working memory has changed substantially. The motivation behind the design of SVI is 
to “…explore the utility of general-purpose, intelligent systems supporting mechanisms 
to encode, compose, manipulate, and retrieve symbolic and perceptual-based 
representations” (Lathrop, 2008).  The basic structure of the system is the same as SVS: 
it has short-term and long-term memories for visual and spatial information, and means 
by which symbolic processing can use them. In general, SVI was more directly inspired 
by psychological theories of imagery (Kosslyn et al., 2006), while SVS emphasizes 
increasing functionality, but both systems are concerned with both areas to some 
degree. Work in SVI also emphasized computational efficiencies of depictive 
representations for visual imagery, while work in SVS has addressed the broader 
interaction between abstract and concrete (typically spatial) representations. 
Architecturally, the chief differences between the systems are in the interface between 
perceptual and working memory. SVI’s equivalents to the predicate extraction, 
predicate projection, and memory retrieval systems in SVS are simpler, and SVI has no 
direct equivalent to the motion processing system in SVS, either for imagery or control. 
SVI also has a different approach to interfacing with Soar’s working memory, which is 
elaborated in a technical report (Wintermute, 2009b). 
SVS also inherits substantially from SRS (Wintermute and Laird, 2007, 2008). Again, the 
chief theoretical components of the system remain intact, although some older agents 
would need to be rewritten due to interface changes. SVS is more directly simply a 
newer version of SRS, so it will not be covered in more detail here. 
Another extension to Soar for spatial processing, BiSoar, has been created by 
Chandrasekaran and Kurup (Chandrasekaran, 2006; Chandrasekaran & Kurup, 2007), 
augmenting Soar with the functionality of a diagrammatic reasoning system, DRS 
(Chandrasekaran et al., 2004). This system is similar to Soar/SVS in many ways. BiSoar 
focuses on processing with two-dimensional diagrams, which are a similar 
representation to the spatial scene of SVS, consisting of labeled objects in a quantitative 
representation. In BiSoar, the state of the diagram is conceptually an extension of 
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working memory, as in SVS (although, in both cases, the systems are external to Soar 
and connected over the i/o links). The integration of spatial and symbolic state 
conceptually differs in BiSoar, though, as it has been proposed to include matching 
against spatial objects in rules, a capability which remains unimplemented. SVS instead 
commits to matching of qualitative properties of spatial objects, rather than the objects 
themselves. BiSoar has been used to model simplification effects (loss of detail) in the 
storage and recall of spatial memories, a capability SVS lacks (as it currently lacks means 
to store new long-term perceptual memories) (Kurup & Chandrasekaran, 2007).  
The equivalents to SVS’s predicate extraction and projection processes in DRS (and 
presumably also in BiSoar) are also notably different. In DRS, routines can be defined by 
providing a logical description of the desired property or diagram object. For example, 
an image of a region behind a curve object c relative to a point object p can be created 
by the system, based on a formal definition of the region similar to “the region contains 
all points q such that there is a point a which is on c between q and p”. This statement 
can be broken down to primitives and automatically solved, allowing the system to 
compute the region (Banerjee & Chandrasekaran, 2007). Extraction predicates can be 
similarly described, which simply return true or false instead of creating a new object in 
the diagram. In contrast, in SVS, the focus has been on providing a small library of useful 
predicate extraction and projection routines, and allowing the agent itself to compose 
them together to get more complex properties, if needed. 
BiSoar also has no direct equivalent to the motion processing system of SVS, and does 
not include three-dimensional processing. 
ADAPT (Adaptive Dynamics and Active Perception for Thought) is a robotics architecture 
based in part on Soar that includes specialized spatial processing (Benjamin et al., 2004, 
2006). This processing is chiefly used in the aide of comprehending sensor input. A 
world model, similar to the spatial scene in SVS, is used, where the agent builds a 
representation of its current hypothesis about the contents of the world. For example, if 
it has evidence from sensors that it is in front of a chair, it will imagine a chair. This 
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model is used to confirm or rule out hypotheses about the world, by checking if further 
sensor input is consistent or inconsistent with the current imagined scene. Interestingly, 
this spatial representation is not connected to sensors (as has been proposed for SVS), 
but rather is connected only to Soar, which mediates all sensor data and chooses what 
to imagine in the world model, reflecting the designers strong commitment to active 
perception. The world model is also proposed to be used for “comprehension through 
generation”, where potential future states of the world are simulated in order to 
comprehend the current state. This is essentially simulative imagery, but it is unclear 
precisely how and to what degree the capability is implemented.  
7.2.2 ACT-R 
The ACT-R cognitive architecture includes visual processing in its current form 
(Anderson et al., 2004). In addition, two proposals have been put forth to augment ACT-
R with spatial representations (Gunzelmann & Lyon, 2006; Harrison & Schunn, 2003). In 
general, research in ACT-R emphasizes precise predictions in terms of human 
performance and timing, and the architecture reflects this. Where Soar has a symbolic 
working memory of unbounded size, ACT-R allows only a relatively small amount of 
information to be accessed by the central production system, contained in a few buffers 
specific to particular cognitive processes: for example, memories retrieved from long-
term memory are placed in the declarative retrieval buffer, and only one such memory 
can be there at a time. These limitations often drive timing predictions. 
ACT-R includes an “imaginal” buffer; however, this buffer is not used for imagery as 
defined here (i.e., aspect A3 in Chapter III). Rather, this buffer is used to store temporary 
problem state information (Anderson, 2005). Like all buffers in ACT-R, the information 
stored there is propositional, and typically abstract. While the argument for the use of 
imagery here has focused on the bimodal aspects of imagery, given constraints on the 
capacity of working memory, the use of the memories in SVS as temporary scratchpads 
could also become valuable, reflecting use similar to ACT-R’s imaginal buffer. 
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The ACT-R visual system provides a simple symbolic interface to the central production 
system representing ‘where’ (through a visual location buffer) and ‘what’ information 
(through a visual object buffer). These modules mimic the timing of human perception, 
and are based on the EPIC cognitive architecture (Kieras & Meyer, 1997). This emphasis 
on timing results in a visual system that is not directly similar to that in SVS, which has 
no attention mechanisms, and instead focuses on the internal representation of visual 
data. 
ACT-R/S (Harrison & Schunn, 2003) adds two more systems to ACT-R’s visual processing, 
the manipulative and configural systems. The manipulative system represents detailed 
3d information about the objects near the agent (which it could potentially manipulate), 
while the configural system represents the approximate positions of objects in space 
relative to the agent. Roughly, the configural and manipulative systems here correspond 
to the object and transformation information encoded in the spatial scene of SVS.  At 
least the configural system of ACT-R/S has been demonstrated to perform a version of 
imagery; however, nothing published about the system has discussed imagery in the 
manipulative system, which would be closer to the type of imagery used by SVS. 
The proposed extension of Gunzelmann and Lyon (2006) similarly defines a number of 
new modules: a visual egocentric buffer, which encodes information about objects 
relative to the position of the agent, a visual environmental buffer, which encodes 
locations of object relative to environmental landmarks, a spatial buffer and associated 
module which supports querying processes similar to predicate extraction, and an 
episodic buffer, which captures cohesive memories of the agent visual experiences. This 
proposed system would support imagery. In the theory, memories can be retrieved in 
the episodic buffer, and spatial imagery transformations are possible: production rules 
can manipulate the egocentric buffer, and the spatial module will propagate those 
changes to the visual object and location buffers. These processes are roughly 
analogous to the memory retrieval and predicate projection systems in SVS. However, 
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the architecture here does not have a clear distinction between concrete and abstract 
representations, so it is difficult to draw a deep comparison between the systems. 
7.3 Robotic Systems 
Systems developed to support intelligent robotics often address many of the issues 
discussed in this thesis. For example, the system developed for MIT’s entry in the DARPA 
Urban Challenge (Leonard et al., 2008) was referred to earlier as an example of real-
world use of the RRT motion planning algorithm discussed in Chapter VI. This system can 
be viewed as having most of the aspects listed in Chapter III. It represents the state of 
the world at multiple levels of abstraction (A1): a Navigator module choose routes based 
on lanes, intersections, and road segments, while a Motion Planner module takes goal 
locations from the Navigator and performs RRT planning over a more concrete 
“drivability map” representation. As explained above, RRT planning can be viewed as a 
form of simulative imagery (A4). The system included low-level controllers for driving 
the car (A5), and the system uses those same controllers offline during motion planning 
(A8). While this system, like many others, implements aspects of the theory, it not 
proposed nor implemented as a general-purpose architecture, and these aspects are 
considered engineering details rather than theoretical commitments. The remainder of 
the related work here will focus on robotics systems that are posed more generally. 
The Spatial Semantic Hierarchy (Kuipers, 2000) presents a comprehensive theoretical 
treatment (and implementation) of robot navigation, with a focus on mapping. In its 
most recent incarnation (Beeson et al., 2010), the system includes four main 
representational levels, containing both metrical and topological information about 
both small-scale space (space within the range of the agent’s sensors) and large-scale 
space, all of which are algorithmically constructed from sensor data. In this system, the 
connections between low-level control and high-level representation are explored in 
detail. Control laws are used which can reliably transition the robot between distinctive 
states, and, at higher levels of the hierarchy, the control laws are abstracted away and 
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the agent only considers moving between distinctive states: this is the encapsulated 
controller approach discussed in Chapter II.  
 Conceptually, the metrical representations of space could be mapped onto SVS’s spatial 
scene, and topological spatial information could be incorporated in Soar’s symbolic 
working memory. More study would be needed to determine what would be needed for 
Soar/SVS to implement the details of the higher levels of SSH, though. While the SSH 
does not use imagery in the sense defined here, it does share a commitment to 
representation at multiple levels of abstraction and hierarchical control, corresponding 
to aspects A1 and A5 of the theory here. 
Other robotic systems have previously implemented capabilities that can be considered 
simulative imagery. MetaToto (Stein, 1994) was a robot designed based on Brooks’ 
subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1986), which used simulation in order to derive 
abstract information about the structure of the world. These simulations were at a very 
low level, the actual sensor readings of the robot were simulated (in contrast to SVS, 
which simulates in a higher-level spatial representation). The robot represented the 
world in terms of landmarks corresponding to distinctive sensor readings, and by 
simulating sensor readings based on a map of the world, it could build this 
representation without actually exploring. 
The robot here represents the world at multiple levels of abstraction (in terms of sensor 
data and a “landmark graph”) (A1), and has controllers that operate over the lowest-
level sensor data (A5). The agent is able to derive the abstract consequences of using 
these controllers (landmarks reached) through low-level simulation (A6). There is also a 
strong commitment to the reuse of the perception and action systems for real and 
imagined situations (A8). 
The theory behind MetaToto is also interesting. Stein claims “our view suggests that 
cognition is simply the robotic architecture applied to imagined stimuli”. Certainly, this 
form of reasoning is powerful, but in SVS cognition is by no means “simply” reduced to 
simulation: abstract knowledge and processes also play prominent roles. 
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Two general-purpose robotics architectures, 4D/RCS (Madhavan et al., 2006) and 
Polyscheme (Cassimatis et al., 2004) include the capability for functionality like 
simulative imagery. In both cases, though, the architecture is considered in very 
different terms than that presented here, as a set of many interconnected specialized 
modules. There are fixed commitments to the way modules connect, and to some 
degree, the internal processing. But there are not commitments at the level of, for 
example, a common task-independent language to communicate between spatial and 
symbolic information, as in Soar/SVS. In addition, simulative imagery is not heavily 
analyzed in the context of these architectures as a distinct process. Rather, it is 
considered one of many ways that predictions about the consequences of actions can 
be generated. 
7.4 Reinforcement Learning 
Previous work in the area of reinforcement learning has often examined the problem of 
learning and control in problems with large state spaces. As was discussed previously, 
spatial information is inherently continuous, often entailing very large state spaces. One 
approach to this issue is to use qualitative abstractions of the low-level spatial state and 
induce an abstract state space. This approach is used in Chapter V and in other work 
(e.g., Stober & Kuipers, 2008). 
However, other approaches to dealing with large spatial state spaces have been 
investigated. Often, continuous information is not abstracted from the states of the 
agent, and rather than learning unique action or state values, the agent instead tries to 
learn a function over the state elements which approximates the values
29
. In the 
resulting system, an agent experiencing a completely new state can essentially leverage 
knowledge learned in other states that are “nearby” in terms of the values of the state.  
                                                      
29
 Formally, state abstraction and state-action abstraction can be viewed as special cases of function 
approximation, following the definition in (Sutton & Barto, 1998). However, we will treat the approaches 
as separate here, since these abstractions have interesting properties missing from general function 
approximation (such as the ability to generate a reduced MDP in the case of state abstraction, as 
discussed in Chapter V). 
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A common approach to function approximation is to use sparse coding mechanisms, 
such as CMAC (Sutton, 1996). CMAC overlays different tilings (discretizations) over 
space, where any particular location will match multiple tiles. Values are learned in 
terms of the tiles matched at the time of the update, so reward information learned 
about a given concrete state (e.g., one represented in continuous coordinates) will 
influence the values of states around it. Function approximation methods like tile coding  
can be integrated with reinforcement learning in Soar (e.g., Wang & Laird, 2010), and 
SVS could be used to obtain qualitative tiling information; for example, “the agent is to 
the right of object X and in front of object Y” describes a location in two tilings.  
Other approaches to function approximation use more complex means of learning a 
value function, rather than simply combining values associated with sets of overlapping 
features. For example, a neural network can be used to learn a complicated relationship 
between state variables and values, as has been used in a successful agent for the game 
backgammon, TD-Gammon (Tesauro, 1995, see also Sutton & Barto, 1998 ch. 11). 
There is a concern here, since the motivation of the architectural design presented here 
has to do with the perceptual abstraction problem. If function approximation schemes 
successfully deal with large state spaces without the need for explicit abstraction, it may 
be that good function approximation supersedes the benefits of imagery for dealing 
with large state spaces. 
This does not seem to be the case, however. For example, the TD-Gammon agent cited 
above uses processes that can be viewed as simulative imagery in conjunction with 
function approximation. In that agent, when considering each move, the agent first 
determines the consequences of that move in terms of a low-level game board 
representation. Then, for the resulting state, abstract features of the game board are 
calculated. These features (along with the board state) are the inputs of the neural 
network that approximates the value of the state. This behavior fits the description in 
Chapter III of bimodality (A1) and simulative imagery (A4), but also incorporates 
function approximation. As TD-Gammon is the result of a long line of research, 
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presumably all of these aspects are important for its performance, and it can be 
concluded that simulative imagery and function approximation are at least partially 
complementary. 
7.5 Grounded Cognition 
A source of influence in the design of the architecture has been theories of grounded 
cognition. Barsalou (2008) states: 
“Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on 
amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain’s modal systems 
for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, grounded cognition proposes 
that modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition.” 
Of course, this point of view is not completely reflected in the architecture here. Indeed, 
the architecture is rooted in Soar, which is a prominent example of the amodal symbolic 
view of cognition that is “rejected” by these theories (e.g., Newell, 1990). However, the 
system retains and uses perceptual-level information during cognition, with the 
perception and action systems internally used in this process. In that way, the system 
bears a resemblance to theories such as Barsalou’s (1999) proposal for a perceptual 
symbol system and Grush’s (2004) emulation theory of representation.  
The implementation has shown that the existing symbolic Soar architecture is 
compatible with non-symbolic processing in SVS. This is because Soar is largely a theory 
of high-level decision making, complementary to the processing in SVS that identifies 
properties and makes inferences but does not choose actions or control high-level 
processing. From this point of view, information in Soar’s working memory can be 
considered as symbolic aspects of underlying representations in the memories of SVS. 
Specifically, perceptual pointers can be viewed directly in this way: a perceptual pointer 
can be manipulated like any other symbol, but retains its underlying non-symbolic 
structure. However, other symbols are used in the system that are not grounded in 
perceptual representations (amodal symbols).  
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For example, the pedestal blocks world agent discussed in Section 5.1 makes a series of 
imagery-based predictions about whether or not each action will result in a collision 
between blocks (e.g., collision_if_moved(B,pedestal2)). As implemented, for 
each possible action, the agent imagines the state resulting from a block movement, 
and constructs a symbolic structure to store the results of the simulation (encoding 
whether or not a collision occurred). Importantly, after storing this symbolic result, the 
underlying perceptual-level representation is no longer necessary, and is removed. As 
no equivalent perceptual-level structure exists, the symbolic prediction is now amodal, 
and does not meet Barsalou’s (1999) description of a perceptual symbol structure. Once 
predictions for all actions are computed (up to six of them), the agent uses this set of 
symbolic information as the basis to choose an action. This is a relatively small set of 
symbolic structures, encoding only the relevant aspects of the situation.  
However, if all symbolic structures were required to be perceptually grounded at all 
times, the agent would need to retain, until the action is chosen, the complete 
perceptual-level detail that caused each abstract symbolic prediction result to occur. 
This agent would then be required to represent all possible action outcomes 
simultaneously in imagery. In general, as they lack in unnecessary detail, amodal 
(ungrounded) symbols are more efficient means of representing information. While this 
agent benefits from representing some information at the perceptual level (supporting 
the main claims of this thesis), requiring all information to have grounding at that level 
would be a hindrance. 
There is then a substantial functional benefit to avoiding the use of perceptual-level 
representations when amodal symbolic structures are sufficient to capture all of the 
necessary details of the situation. In Soar/SVS, the processing necessary to manipulate 
and use amodal symbolic structures is a subset of that needed to manipulate and use 
grounded structures, so a compelling argument would be needed to eliminate this 
capability. 
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Related to discussions of the role of amodal versus grounded representations, 
connections between this work and the imagery debate in psychology will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter VIII - Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter, the claims put forth in earlier chapters are revisited and discussed in 
light of the overall collection of experimental results. Then, connections between this 
work and psychological research are discussed. Future directions for research are 
indicated, and the main body of the dissertation is concluded. 
8.1 Claims Revisited 
The overall goal of this thesis has been to work towards a task-independent cognitive 
architecture to support intelligent behavior in spatial tasks. Starting from an assumption 
that abstract symbolic information is used to choose actions, in Chapter II, two meta-
problems were defined that the architecture must address: the problem of creating 
appropriate abstract symbolic structures which can serve as the basis for intelligent 
action choices (perceptual abstraction), and the problem of dealing with tasks where 
abstract, purely-symbolic representation is impossible (irreducibility). 
To mitigate these problems, a comprehensive theory was proposed in Chapter III. Three 
high-level claims were made about this theory: that it allows for improved performance 
in individual spatial tasks, that it allows for improved generality, and that it can be 
practically implemented and used. The theory was mapped to eight specific functional 
benefits, each of which supports one or more of the claims, and relies upon a particular 
architectural aspect. Performance or generality improvement was claimed compared to 
a hypothetical similar architecture lacking that aspect. 
The Soar/SVS architecture, which follows the theory, was introduced in Chapter IV. 
Several agents running in this architecture were introduced. In Chapter V, reinforcement 
learning agents were presented which were applied to a simple blocks world problem 
and three arcade games, and in Chapter VI, a motion planning agent was covered. 
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In this section, the claims and benefits are re-examined in the light of the collection of 
experimental results presented since their introduction. 
B1. Concrete routines allow movement and nonlocal interaction to be captured in 
terms of abstract symbolic information, mitigating the perceptual abstraction 
problem. 
This benefit is demonstrated in all of the agents. In the pedestal blocks world, nonlocal 
interactions (block collisions in future states) are captured explicitly as predicates in the 
imagery-augmented direct abstraction agent, and implicitly in the predictions of the 
ReLAI agent for the same task. In the arcade game agents, in all cases, movement of 
multiple objects is captured by the ReLAI agents, again, implicitly via the predictions of 
future states. In the RRT planning agent, the movement of the car under the influence of 
the low-level controller is captured symbolically, as the tree of configurations only 
includes those that a reachable without collision, a property deriving from the details of 
that movement. 
The imagery-augmented abstraction and ReLAI agents, in their comparison to the direct 
state abstraction agents, also provide direct evidence that capturing movement truly is a 
benefit. When the same state information is used, but movement is not captured via 
either technique, the agents perform much worse. 
This benefit is attributed to concrete routines in the architecture: the ability for a 
concrete representation to be locally manipulated. Here, these concrete routines are 
invoked through imagery, although that aspect is not strictly necessary for the benefit. 
These agents provide good examples of properties that would be very difficult to 
capture without this aspect. For instance, the reachability of two configurations in the 
RRT planning agent is determined here through a long concrete simulation process. If 
there was no coherent concrete representation that could be locally manipulated in this 
way, it is difficult to see how the agent could infer this long-term reachability 
information. 
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B2. Imagery allows task-specific abstract properties to be encoded by a fixed, task-
independent high-level perception system, mitigating the general perceptual 
abstraction problem.   
This benefit is demonstrated by the set of examples, both individually and collectively. 
The SVS architecture in Chapter IV includes a fixed, task-independent high-level 
perception system, which all of the agents presented use to capture task-specific 
abstract properties. In each case, the imagery system is dynamically combined with the 
high-level perception system to generate properties that take into account the spatial 
details of the actions available in the particular task. 
In addition, the theoretical examination of ReLAI provides further evidence that this 
capability truly works to mitigate the general perceptual abstraction problem. A high-
level perception system that cannot induce an abstraction function to meet the formal 
requirements of direct state abstraction might be able to induce such a function that 
works with ReLAI. For example, SVS’s predicate extraction system cannot induce an 
abstraction of pedestal blocks world that allows optimal performance with direct state 
abstraction, but can induce an abstraction that works with ReLAI. Imagery capability has 
thus increased the coverage, in terms of number of tasks, of a particular high-level 
perception system, achieving progress towards general perceptual abstraction. 
This benefit is attributed to imagery, rather than concrete routines alone, since, as was 
stated in Section 3.3, “the full reasoning power of the agent must be brought to bear to 
select which concrete routines to apply and how to interpret or further manipulate the 
results”. This is demonstrated by all of the agents. In each case, symbolic Soar rules have 
been created which specify exactly how the agent should manipulate the spatial scene 
via imagery, and how the results should be interpreted, via predicate extraction, into 
abstract properties. If concrete routines alone were to be used for similar capability, 
task-specific knowledge would need to be present somewhere within the perception 
system of the agent, so the agent could apply different sequences of routines as 
appropriate in different tasks. 
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Even if such a scheme could be created to allow task-specific sets of concrete routines 
to be used, learning would be a problem.  Since the rules that specify these operations 
in the approach here are essentially no different than other Soar rules, potentially, they 
could be learned by Soar’s symbolic learning mechanisms. While much more research is 
needed to make an agent that can learn to compose its own state representations via 
imagery and perception, the path for this research is much clearer than the alternative, 
where this composition must be handled in an isolated module in the perception 
system. 
B3. Simulative imagery provides the agent with the ability to abstractly model actions 
that are non-deterministic at the abstract level. 
This benefit is demonstrated by the ReLAI and RRT agents, all of which use imagery 
predictions as non-deterministic action models. That is, they utilize the knowledge that 
an imagery prediction is a prediction of a future state resulting from a particular action, 
rather than simply an inference about the current state. In particular, the comparison of 
ReLAI to imagery-augment direct state abstraction in the pedestal blocks world (Figure 
13) clearly shows this difference, and demonstrates that action modeling provides a 
separate benefit beyond B1. 
Simulative imagery is necessary for this benefit. These agents all take advantage of the 
non-deterministic nature of the model predictions, and non-deterministic prediction 
would not be possible in a system that only represented the problem at one level of 
abstraction. In extreme cases, agents use abstract state representations that are almost 
completely worthless for serving as the basis of an action model, and rely entirely on 
imagery for that capability. The backward-looking state predicates in the Fast Eddie 
agent are an example of this, and the RRT agent has a similar character. That agent uses 
an abstract state representation, but essentially the only properties encoded are 
whether or not certain configurations are reachable or not from other configurations. 
An abstract action model in terms of that information would not work well at all, since 
nothing in that state representation can be used to predict future state transitions. 
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The RRT agent also provides the clearest demonstration of why simulative imagery, 
rather than concrete routines alone, is necessary to fully achieve this benefit. Simulative 
imagery creates persistent changes in the concrete representation, and without that 
capability, imagery-based action modeling steps cannot be chained together. The RRT 
agent needs to model actions many steps in the future, so it needs the concrete results 
of previous action modeling operations—the car objects stored in the spatial scene 
during planning—to be persistent. If each car object was transient, and the changes to 
the scene disappeared once the agent inferred that a particular configuration was 
reachable, it would be impossible for that agent to create plans requiring intermediate 
configurations. 
B4. Simulative imagery allows decisions to be made using an abstract representation 
while predictions are made using a concrete representation, allowing each process to 
use the representation that allows the most efficiency. 
This benefit is demonstrated by all of the agents here that make predictions: the ReLAI 
and RRT agents. The benefit of abstraction for decision-making, if not apparent, is 
demonstrated in tasks like the pedestal blocks world. As shown in Figure 12, if a 
concrete representation is used for decision making in tasks like this, no learning is 
possible, since repeated concrete states are never encountered. This is an extreme 
example of the inefficiency of making decisions based on concrete information. 
For making predictions, all of the ReLAI arcade game agents benefit from the fact that 
many aspects of the dynamics in those games can be easily approximated by linear 
translation of objects through space at a constant speed. With concrete information, it 
is simple to track and project forward this type of motion, but more abstract 
representations would lose this regularity. For example, consider using probabilistic 
abstract action models in those tasks. Leaving aside the issue of lost accuracy inherent 
in that approach (compared to precise imagery predictions), creating or learning 
abstract action models would be very difficult compared to what is necessary for the 
concrete models used here. The agent (or programmer) would have to observe many 
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abstract state transitions to determine, for example, the probability that the frog in 
Frogger II will collide with an obstacle in the next state if there is an obstacle above it in 
the current state and it issues an “up” action. In contrast, for a concrete action model, it 
is suitable simply to monitor the speeds of the objects in question and project them 
forward, an approach that requires very little learning or programming. 
The RRT agent similarly demonstrates this. Since the motion in question is the result of a 
control process over concrete information, it is simple to predict the motion in terms of 
that same information.  
B5. Concrete control allows continuous control processes to be used in conjunction 
with abstract symbolic reasoning, mitigating the irreducibility problem. 
and B6. Simulative imagery of concrete control allows symbolic reasoning over 
continuous processes, eliminating the need for symbolic characterization of controller 
performance, further mitigating the irreducibility problem. 
Both of these benefits were demonstrated by the RRT agent exclusively, since the other 
agents did not address precise control. As is discussed more fully in Section 6.4, the 
motion planning task here is fundamentally irreducible. Concrete controllers simplify the 
action space of the agent, and simulative imagery of concrete control allows the agent 
to use a controller that entails a complex interaction with the environment, as it locally 
steers toward a goal while being biased away from obstacles. 
B7. Architectural representation conversion encapsulates complex, common 
processes, rather than requiring task-specific knowledge. 
This benefit is demonstrated through the collection of agents presented here. The SVS 
architecture includes processes that are used by every agent. For example, every agent 
requires object collisions and distances to be detected, capabilities supported by the 
predicate extraction system of SVS. For arbitrarily-shaped convex polyhedrons, as SVS 
supports, these calculations entail solving fairly complex computational geometry 
problems. However, the predicate extraction system encapsulates the processes, and 
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each agent does not need task knowledge for how to calculate intersections or 
distances between objects. 
For shared imagery operations, all of the arcade game ReLAI agents use the same basic 
linear-translation motion model, which does not need to be reprogrammed for each 
task. It does need parameters for each object, which can be either provided directly or 
learned as the agent observes the motion, but the processing beyond setting 
parameters is architectural and does not need to be provided by task knowledge. The 
car controller used by the RRT agent can be considered task knowledge; however, its 
operation is supported by architectural mechanisms in SVS that interface motion models 
to working memory and the spatial scene. The predicate projection system in SVS is also 
task-independent and architectural; however, it was demonstrated in only a single task 
here (the pedestal blocks world). 
B8. Perception/action reuse provides for a parsimonious set of architectural 
processes. 
The implementation of the architecture itself demonstrates this benefit. It would be 
possible to come up with a functionally identical system that does not use common 
architectural elements when dealing with the outside world and when dealing with 
imagery, but the implementation here indicates that this is unnecessary. The predicate 
extraction system does not consider whether the objects it operates over are real or 
imagined, allowing exactly the same high-level perception mechanisms to operate in 
real or imagined scenes. For instance, determining the state in the ReLAI and direct 
abstraction arcade game agents often involves the exact same predicate extraction 
processes in the architecture, but operating over perception in the direct abstraction 
case and imagery in the ReLAI case. 
If the RRT agent were to be hooked up to an actual robot, it would similarly 
demonstrate reuse in the action system. As implemented, the agent simulated a 
controller that could (theoretically) be used for real actions, mimicking an approach 
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used by other systems (e.g., Leonard et al., 2008) which do reuse controllers for external 
action and imagery. 
Taken as a whole, the set of theoretical aspects (A1-A8) leads to a set of benefits (B1-
B8). Some of these aspects, via the benefits, lead to improvements in task performance, 
and some lead to improvements in generality. An architecture including all of the 
aspects has been implemented, and has been used to solve spatial problems while 
demonstrating each of the benefits. 
8.2 Perceptual Abstraction, Irreducibility, and the Imagery Debate 
A long-standing debate in psychology has been over the nature of mental imagery. To 
some, this is a debate over whether mental imagery is supported by propositional 
(symbolic) or depictive (picture-like) representations (Kosslyn et al., 2006). Others have 
posed the question as whether or not experimental data can disprove that “the process 
of imagistic reasoning involves the same mechanisms and the same forms of 
representation as are involved in general reasoning, though with different content or 
subject matter” (Pylyshyn, 2003), with the implication that those mechanisms are likely 
propositional. 
This has been a difficult issue to resolve, since, in principle, both formats are able to 
represent the same information, and equivalent propositional and depictive accounts 
can be formulated to account for any behavioral data. However, other constraints can 
be taken into account, such as brain data, theoretical parsimony, or efficiency, to aid in 
identifying the underlying mechanisms (Anderson, 1978). 
An abundance of brain data has been collected, largely supporting the hypothesis that 
imagery is a distinct process involving depictive representations (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 
2006). Computational experiments have also examined efficiency characteristics of 
reasoning with different representational formats (e.g., Funt, 1980; Glasgow & 
Papadias, 1992; Huffman & Laird, 1992; Kurup & Chandrasekaran, 2006; Larkin & Simon, 
1987; Lathrop, 2008; Shimojima, 1996; Tabachneck-Schijf et al., 1997). While not all of 
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these works directly addressed the imagery debate, all achieved results indicating that 
different representational formats afford different functional benefits, supporting the 
hypothesis of depictive imagery. 
The architecture here also demonstrates an efficiency benefit of processing with 
different representations (B4). Beyond this, though, the examination of the perceptual 
abstraction and irreducibility problems can add to the imagery debate. As stated above, 
in principle, both abstract propositional and concrete depictive representations are able 
encode the same information. However, if the poverty conjecture is true, the proposal 
that an agent could behave intelligently using solely an abstract propositional 
representation becomes difficult to support.  
If there exists no task-independent qualitative (abstract propositional) representation of 
space, an intelligent agent will need to encode different task-specific properties as new 
spatial tasks are encountered. This is what makes perceptual abstraction difficult. 
However, as demonstrated above, imagery within a concrete representation can 
mitigate this aspect of the perceptual abstraction problem (B2). This is then an 
argument supporting the hypothesis that imagery does not use an abstract 
propositional format, since the functional benefits of using imagery in this case derive 
from the fact that it is not abstract.
30
 As stated by Forbus (1993), in reference to the 
MD/PV model discussed in Section 7.1, 
“If true, what does [the poverty conjecture] tell us about mental imagery? It 
suggests that there exists a set of commonplace tasks, such as understanding 
mechanical systems and reasoning about motion through space, that require 
representations that are richer than sparse propositional descriptions, whether 
performed by person or machine. Thus the question of whether or not imagery 
can be accounted for by sparse propositional representations comes down to 
whether or not the poverty conjecture is true.” 
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 This argument does not directly support imagery using a depictive representation, only a concrete 
representation (one that encodes many details). Depictive representations are concrete, but more 
properties are needed for a representation to be depictive (see Kosslyn et al., 2006). Typically, depictive 
representations in a computer are array-based (e.g., a bitmap), where concrete representations, such as 
the spatial scene in SVS, may not be. 
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The irreducibility problem, along with its proposed solution in the form of concrete 
control and simulative imagery, similarly indicates a need for imagery in a concrete 
representation. In this case, in order to issue actions that are contingent on precise 
details of the environment, a concrete representation which captures all of those details 
is functionally useful. Strictly speaking, a concrete representation isn’t necessary for this 
capability, as control processes can be reactive to details of perception without 
constructing a coherent representation (Brooks, 1991). However, as has been argued 
above, intelligent reasoning about control processes may not always be possible 
without the ability to simulate the results of those control processes in the particular 
situation within a concrete representation. Again, this indicates a functional benefit for 
imagery based in a concrete (and not abstract propositional) representation. 
In both of these cases, intelligent reasoning in terms of abstract propositions is made 
possible only through the use of imagery in a concrete representation. The chief reason 
for the use of imagery is not that the imagery representation allows for more efficiency, 
but rather that the problem cannot be represented well in terms of abstract information 
alone. This is either because a task-independent architecture without imagery would 
not be able to make the relevant abstract distinctions, or because the problem is 
fundamentally irreducible to a form where it can be reasoned about in terms of abstract 
propositional information alone. 
Essentially, creating a detailed, task-independent theory capable of addressing complex 
problems leads to functional arguments, beyond efficiency of processing in particular 
representational formats, that provide support for the hypothesis that imagery is not 
supported by an abstract propositional representation. While the analysis here supports 
the use of a concrete representation in general, rather than specifically a concrete 
depictive representation, given the evidence from brain imaging studies, depictive 
representation is a good hypothesis for how concrete representation might be 
manifested in the brain. 
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8.3 Soar/SVS as a Cognitive Model 
Beyond the connection to the imagery debate, the work here could also be applied 
more directly to investigate cognitive modeling in spatial tasks. The Soar/SVS 
architecture has been presented as an AI system, but it could be adapted for use as a 
more precise cognitive model. 
The architecture here does not include the timing, attention, capacity, imagery 
accuracy, or imagery maintenance constraints that would be needed for precise 
modeling. In addition, most of the agents presented here do not capture human-like 
reasoning in their tasks. A human playing an Atari game likely would be unable to 
imagine the consequences of each action four times per second, and a person would not 
use an algorithm like RRT to plan motions. 
However, the purpose of these agents has been to provide straightforward 
demonstrations of the underlying functional benefits of the mechanisms of the 
architecture. When constraints are added, the approaches used in these 
demonstrations become infeasible, but the essential underlying benefits will remain. An 
agent using symbolic representations to make decisions encounters the perceptual 
abstraction and irreducibility problems regardless of what additional timing constraints, 
memory capacity constraints, etc., are present. If the architecture includes some version 
(however limited) of the aspects discussed here, the agent can likely get a functional 
benefit from using them. 
For example, if the human cognitive architecture is roughly similar to a constrained 
version of what is presented here, it is reasonable to predict that a human attempting to 
achieve optimal behavior in the pedestal blocks world task would imagine the 
consequences of actions in order to avoid collisions. This is a prediction that arises from 
a few very basic premises: 
(1) actions are chosen on the basis of some representation that can be 
approximated by abstract  symbolic structures 
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(2) the human visual system cannot infer future block collisions in a bottom-up 
manner 
(3) some representation that can be approximated by a concrete spatial 
representation is present 
(4) imagery capability is present, and can be used to infer future block collisions to a 
useful degree of accuracy 
(5) the subject is suitably motivated to perform well, and has a reasonable amount 
of time to choose each action 
Similar predictions about the use of imagery in control tasks based on this work have 
been published elsewhere (Laird et al., 2010; Wintermute & Laird, 2009), however, to 
date, no experimental data has been collected. A line of research collecting human data 
in tasks like this could be useful not only to test the basic hypothesis that imagery will be 
used in problems where abstraction is difficult, but a rich collection of data could also 
constrain and help refine the details of the underlying architecture. 
It should be noted that predictions here define “imagery” as it is defined in Chapter III, 
in terms of processing within a concrete representation. This contrasts with other 
definitions of imagery, such as imagery involving processing in a depictive 
representation (which is a specific form of concrete representation), or imagery as 
defined by subjective reports of “imagining” something. Imagery processing as defined 
here could be manifested in behavior independently of whether or not “imagining” is 
reported or brain activation indicating a depictive representation is present. For 
example, reaction time should be slower for action choices that require an intervening 
imagery operation than those that do not (which choices fall into which category being a 
prediction emerging from the details of the architecture). More experimental work is 
needed to determine the degree to which these definitions of imagery, and the data 





The main contributions of this thesis include the following: 
The identification of meta-problems inherent in designing symbolic decision-making 
architectures 
The veridical perception, perceptual abstraction, and irreducibility problems provide a 
useful decomposition of some of the issues behind creating a symbolic architecture 
capable of general intelligence. The problem of architecture design has not been 
decomposed this way in prior work. 
The identification of imagery as a means to mitigate the perceptual abstraction 
problem 
While previous systems have used imagery, its primary functional role has been as a 
more efficient means of inferring certain spatial properties compared to an equivalent 
symbolic representation. Here, instead, the use of imagery as a means to infer symbolic 
properties that the perception system of the agent would otherwise be unable to 
encode is demonstrated. 
The identification of continuous control and imagery as means to mitigate the 
irreducibility problem 
The existing technique of integrating symbolic reasoning with encapsulated continuous 
controllers is analyzed here with respect to the irreducibility problem. In addition, the 
existing technique of motion planning through control simulation is analyzed with 
respect to the irreducibility problem and the concept of simulative imagery. 
In both of these cases, the analysis allows the prior work to be understood as means of 
mitigating the irreducibility problem in a general architecture. In addition, the analysis 
allows the potential for the principles behind the prior approaches to be generalized to 
apply outside of particular tasks. 
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A comprehensive, generally-stated, theory for integrating imagery and control in a 
symbolic cognitive architecture 
Chapter III outlines the essential aspects of a theory incorporating imagery and 
continuous control into an architecture in such a way that perceptual abstraction and 
irreducibility can be mitigated.  
This theory also serves to precisely define what is meant by “imagery”. The definition of 
imagery here emphasizes the relationship between processing in terms of 
representations at different levels of abstraction as the defining characteristic of 
imagery. This way of defining imagery differs from previous accounts, which typically 
instead emphasize either human subjective experience, the type of content in the 
representation (e.g., visual or spatial information), or the “depictiveness” of the 
representation as defining characteristics of imagery. 
An analysis of specific functional benefits afforded by the architectural theory 
The theory has been mapped onto eight specific functional benefits. These benefits 
more precisely describe how the theory works to mitigate the perceptual abstraction 
and irreducibility problems, but also motivate why the particular integration scheme of 
the theory is appropriate. 
An implemented, functional architecture embodying the general theory 
Actually implementing the general theory requires a large number of details to be 
worked out that are left unspecified in the theory. The architecture presented here, 
Soar/SVS, outlines a candidate implementation of the theory that specifies all details. 
While the description here only outlines the broad construction of Soar/SVS, the fact 
that a running system exists demonstrates that all of those details can be (and have 
been) worked out. 
The symbolic reasoning components of the implementation are directly inherited from 
the Soar architecture. The design of the SVS extension to Soar is in many ways a 
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refinement of Scott Lathrop’s SVI system. However, SVS has important components that 
are completely novel, such as the motion processing system, and others that are 
substantial elaborations of SVI, such as the predicate projection system. 
An integration of reinforcement learning and imagery, including theoretical analysis 
and a working implementation 
The ReLAI algorithm represents a novel integration of reinforcement learning and 
imagery. Outside of architectural concerns, the algorithm is useful in cases where 
abstraction is difficult, but concrete, short-term predictions can be made. ReLAI has 
been theoretically analyzed in order to better understand the conditions under which it 
can result in convergence to the optimal policy. In addition to the algorithm itself, this 
work includes an analysis connecting the architectural principles presented earlier (e.g., 
perceptual abstraction) to related theoretical work describing Markov Decision 
Processes. 
The ReLAI algorithm has also been implemented in the Soar/SVS architecture, and 
positive results are shown for its application in four different problems. 
Demonstrations of imagery agents for complex problems, instantiated in a task-
independent architecture and analyzed with reference to the functional benefits of 
the theory 
The Soar/SVS architecture, using the ReLAI algorithm, has been applied to three 
different arcade game tasks. These agents demonstrate that simulative imagery is 
usable and useful in complex tasks that were not designed as imagery evaluation 
domains. More specifically, they demonstrate that the ReLAI algorithm works in those 
tasks, and even more specifically, they demonstrate that the Soar/SVS architecture is 
complete enough that agents for those tasks can be instantiated within it. These agents 
were also analyzed to provide case studies of the particular benefits of the underlying 
architectural theory. 
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A demonstration of sampling-based motion planning instantiated in a task-
independent architecture, analyzed with reference to the functional benefits of the 
theory 
Motion planning algorithms have typically been developed and used outside of cognitive 
architectures. The implementation of the RRT algorithm here maps some aspects of the 
algorithm onto Soar/SVS architectural processes, while some aspects are embodied as 
knowledge. This demonstrates that an agent instantiated in Soar/SVS can use this 
algorithm, or the principles behind it (simulation of control), in order to aid in planning 
its actions. Moreover, the agent provides a case study which demonstrates the benefits 
of the underlying architectural theory, particularly those benefits related to handling 
irreducibility. 
An analysis of the implications of the work here as applied to cognitive modeling and 
the imagery debate 
Psychological research on mental imagery served as a source of inspiration in this work, 
and, through the above contributions, led to advancements in the functionality of 
symbolic cognitive architectures. To reflect this progress back to psychology, the results 
here were analyzed to determine how they might inform future cognitive models and 
the imagery debate.  
8.5 Future Work 
This research indicates many directions for future work, some of which have been 
indicated as they have come up in prior sections. Here, a few of these directions will be 
discussed in detail.  
Continuing the direction of prior work analyzing the processes of predicate projection 
and motion simulation in isolation (Wintermute & Laird, 2008, 2007), the memory 
retrieval and image composition process described in Section 4.5.2 could be further 
elaborated and enhanced. A technical report (Wintermute, 2009b) covers some of the 
open questions in this area. Particularly, the question of how inter-object 
134 
transformations are used and stored could use further study, along with the interaction 
of mental imagery and episodic memory (Nuxoll & Laird, 2007). This interaction should 
provide functional benefits, as the agent can compactly store the symbolic structure of 
the scene, and later recall it to derive further information not originally encoded. In 
addition, it will move Soar towards a comprehensive theory about the role of imagery 
and object prototypes (Posner & Keele, 1968) in memory. 
Other means of interaction between spatial memory in SVS and symbolic memory and 
Soar also need to be investigated. Currently, the system has no good way of reasoning 
about spatial information that is not object-based. For example, places and gateways 
are not “objects”, but can be usefully used to allow reasoning about empty space in the 
environment (Beeson et al., 2010). Similarly, an agent may find it useful to recognize 
locations in space that allow for interaction, such as the location on a  door handle 
where it can be gripped to open the door (Klingbeil et al., 2008): roughly, these are 
similar to affordances (Greeno, 1994). It is currently unclear if this sort of entities 
(places, gateways, affordances) should be represented in the system differently than 
objects currently are, or if they could somehow emerge from the system without being 
explicitly represented. These entities seem to relate to properties of how multiple 
objects in space relate to each other, so it is possible they could be algorithmically 
calculated based on the objects in the scene.  
Outside of the implementation in Soar/SVS, this work has introduced a broader 
theoretical architecture to account for the perceptual abstraction and irreducibility 
problems. An important (but difficult) direction for future work is to extend this theory 
to cover the remaining meta-problem, the veridical perceptual problem. This would 
involve proposing further architectural aspects
31
 to support processes such as 
identifying what objects exist along with their spatial details, and instantiating that 
theory in an implemented architecture, such as a future version of SVS. 
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 Lathrop has proposed a rough sketch for these aspects as part of his work with SVI (Lathrop, 2008). 
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Progress is being made in robotic perception, enough that robots using internal spatial 
representations are becoming common in research environments. However, recognizing 
objects (beyond walls and obstacles) remains a challenge. Ideally, SVS would be able to 
internally retrieve the previously-learned complete 3d structure of an object based only 
on vision from one direction, but that remains at the fringe of (if not beyond) what is 
currently possible. However, it is possible that defining higher-level parts of the system 
can provide guidance on how low-level perception could be improved. For example, 
knowledge could play a strong role in disambiguating perception, or adjusting behavior 
to better handle inadequate perception. This is an interaction that may not be 
adequately present in systems that study perception in isolation from cognition. 
Studying this interaction is a focus of the ADAPT project (Benjamin et al., 2004) 
discussed in Section 7.2. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis has been to investigate cognitive architectural structures to 
support intelligence in spatial tasks. This has led to a general-purpose architecture, 
extending Soar to support processing at multiple levels of abstraction through spatial 
imagery and continuous control. Theoretically, this work has addressed two 
fundamental issues in creating a general-purpose cognitive architecture: the perceptual 
abstraction and irreducibility problems. More practically, it has increased the breadth of 
problems Soar is able to address, and the performance it is able to achieve in those 
tasks. While it is difficult to predict the trajectory of future research, I hope that this 
work is a step on the path toward a solid computational understanding of human-level 
intelligent behavior. 
136 
Appendix: Quantities and Symbolic Representation 
From the perspective of the development of the Soar architecture, a broad theme in this 
work has been the investigation of how Soar can handle problems where quantitative 
information is important. Soar has had long-standing support for quantitative numerical 
processing within working memory; however, this sort of processing has often been 
considered a programming convenience, rather than a theoretically important aspect of 
the architecture. In this appendix, the work here with imagery is used to inform a 
discussion of how the theory and implementation of quantitative processing in Soar 
might be progressed in future work. In addition, the current integration of quantitative 




Soar supports the use of integers and floating-point numbers in its working memory. 
These quantities can be compared on the left hand side of rules, for example, a rule can 
be written to match only when some quantity A is greater than B. Soar can also 
mathematically manipulate quantities on the right hand side of rules, for example, a rule 
can be written to add a number C to working memory which is the result of A multiplied 
by B. This processing can be viewed very simply, as a useful but theoretically unfounded 
means for Soar agents to solve math problems, providing architectural processing that 
can replace the symbol manipulation. For example, a purely-symbolic model of multi-
column subtraction (e.g., Rosenbloom et al., 1991) could be replaced by a single rule 
that calls the subtraction function on its right-hand side.  
However, quantitative processing is also useful for tasks where the agent is not 
externally dealing with literal numbers. For example, an agent might use quantities in 
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 This appendix assumes some level of familiarity with the details of the Soar architecture beyond what is 
presented in this document. 
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working memory to encode distances to objects it can perceive, which are then 
compared to find the closest object to the agent. Taking a broader perspective, then, 
this processing can instead be viewed as a generic means of handling quantitative 
information, which is not necessarily connected with the external symbols (words and 
characters) people use to represent quantities. 
It is informative to compare imagery processing in Soar/SVS to the existing quantitative 
processing in Soar. In SVS, quantitative information describing spatial properties, rather 
than being explicitly represented in symbolic working memory, is instead represented 
there by perceptual pointers. When perceptual pointers are processed by the symbolic 
aspects of Soar, they are treated as any other symbolic structure. However, symbolic 
processing can compose queries and imagery commands for SVS that include perceptual 
pointers. When a query is processed by SVS, the underlying quantitative information is 
accessed, the relevant property is calculated, and (typically) a qualitative symbolic result 
is created in working memory. When an imagery command is processed, similarly, the 
underlying quantitative information associated with the perceptual pointer(s) is 
accessed, a new object is added to the scene, and a perceptual pointer for that result is 
added to working memory, which can then serve as the basis for further processing.  
With some caveats (outlined below), the quantitative numerical processing existing in 
Soar can be viewed in a similar light, as “mathematical imagery”. In this conception, 
“number pointers” exist in working memory. These are arbitrary symbolic structures 
that are processed like any other such structure. Number pointers as implemented 
happen to have human-readable string representations like “1.342”, but that is as 
arbitrary as symbol3511 from the perspective of the symbolic processing system. 
Mathematical predicate extraction is possible, allowing symbolic structures to be 
created describing qualitative relationships between number pointers (e.g., greater-
than, less-than, equal-to). Comparisons on the left-hand sides of rules support 
this. Mathematical imagery is possible, where specialized processing accesses the 
underlying representations associated with a set of number pointers, and creates a new 
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number pointer in working memory associated with the result of the specified 
“imagery” operation. This capability is supported via the mathematical right-hand side 
functions in Soar. Mathematical imagery operations supported by Soar then include 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. 
From this perspective, there are four differences between the implementation of 
mathematical imagery and spatial imagery. 
(1) The underlying quantitative information differs. Mathematical imagery involves 
single numbers, where spatial imagery primarily involves polyhedrons in 3d space. 
(2) The integration of quantitative processing with Soar’s decision cycle differs. 
Mathematical predicate extraction is implicitly invoked as rules are matched, such as if a 
rule includes a less-than condition, and mathematical imagery is captured through right-
hand side functions. Spatial predicate extraction and imagery are instead mediated 
through working memory: rules set up declarative predicate extraction query or imagery 
command structures, and the results are added to working memory by SVS. 
(3) The integration of quantitative content with Soar’s symbolic memories differs. For 
mathematical imagery, these memories store the actual underlying quantities, rather 
than simply number pointers. If the agent computes that the result of multiplying 3.2 
times 8.1 is 25.92, working memory will store that exact value (meaning rules could 
match against it), and a chunk, semantic memory, or episodic memory created for this 
event will store the exact quantities involved. In the spatial imagery case, though, if the 
agent imagines the convex hull of two shapes, resulting in a new shape, the symbolic 
memories will only encode the string values of the perceptual pointers, not the 
underlying quantitative structures involved. 
The storage of complete quantitative content in working memory also results in an 
imperfection in the analogy of quantities in working memory as similar to perceptual 
pointers. A perceptual pointer can track an object whose quantitative details change 
over time (e.g., a moving object), where the identity of the “number pointer” would 
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necessarily change as the underlying quantity changes. However, this is not a great 
difficulty, as it is easily remediated through a level of symbolic indirection. For example, 
the following structure might be used in working memory: 
(number N1) 
(N1 ^id addend ^value 12.5) 
In this case, the id augmentation, rather than the value itself, fulfills a role similar to 
an SVS perceptual pointer. If the value is later changed, it can still be accessed via the 
associated id, which stays constant.  
 (4) Quantities resulting from mathematical imagery can be directly output (reported) by 
the agent, while it would be much more difficult to create an agent that can report the 
quantitative details of objects resulting from spatial imagery. For example, it is trivial to 
make an agent that uses right-hand side functions to calculate, for example, that 1.23 
times 51.67 is 63.551, and adds a string to its output asserting so. There is no 
straightforward equivalent to this capability for spatial imagery. 
This analysis leads to five questions that could be addressed in further work: 
Should imagery be integrated at the rule level, rather than mediated through working 
memory? 
The integration of quantitative numerical processing at the rule level works well, and 
results in simpler agent development, as knowledge is not needed to set up queries and 
to parse responses. Spatial imagery could be similarly set up in this way, where 
predicate extractions are evaluated as part of matching the left-hand side of a rule, and 
imagery operations are set up as right-hand side functions that return a perceptual 
pointer to the result. 
However, predicate extraction and imagery operations can take much more time to 
execute than it takes to compare numbers or perform basic arithmetic. This integration 
could then substantially slow down the rule-matching phases of Soar’s decision cycle. At 
a higher level, though, the total number of operations the agent needs to perform may 
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not necessarily change, but might simply be moved into a different part of the decision 
cycle. Much like it is possible to create symbolic rules that are difficult for Soar to match, 
it is possible to set up predicate extraction operations that take a long time to process. 
This would remain true whether those operations were invoked by a query built in 
working memory or were directly encoded in the left-hand side of a rule. 
Future development of SVS may change this, though. The current memory-mediated 
integration of SVS could easily be adapted for asynchronous processing, where complex 
operations would occur over multiple decisions, allowing the agent to remain reactive 
during those operations. Rule-level integration could not as easily support asynchronous 
processing. 
In addition, a flaw in the scheme used for quantitative numerical processing in Soar is 
that rules involving comparisons and mathematical functions cannot be learned by the 
architecture. Soar’s chunking mechanism, which learns new rules, cannot create rules 
with these features. In contrast, rules used to build declarative command and query 
structures are (in principle) learnable by the architecture. In that way, the SVS interface 
scheme is more in line with that aspect of the Soar theory, indicating that it should be 
retained. 
How should imagery structures be integrated with symbolic structures? 
In principle, there is no reason the architecture could not be modified to store 
quantitative spatial structures with its symbolic memories, as is currently done with 
numbers. However, this does not seem to be a worthwhile approach. To completely 
mimic the numeric scheme, every detail of every object (including its shape and position 
in space) in the spatial scene would have to be stored every time an episodic memory is 
stored. In addition, if a rule was learned through chunking, it might test one or more 
complete spatial structures in its conditions and produce one in its actions. 
Since there are so many details in the spatial representation, it would be unlikely that 
any real object would reappear with the same quantitative details. This means that the 
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amount of information stored in episodic memory would grow much faster than it does 
now. In addition, chunks would be created that match against complete quantitative 
structures. These chunks would only very rarely match (outside of situations where an 
episodic memory has been retrieved of the situation that resulted in the chunk). 
SVS currently includes a perceptual LTM independent of Soar’s long-term symbolic 
memories. This LTM currently has no theory for learning, but does store complete 
quantitative structures. These structures are considered to be prototypes 
representative of object classes, though, rather than instances. Objects in the spatial 
scene are labeled with perceptual pointers to associated long-term memory prototypes. 
While much further work is needed to fully integrate SVS with symbolic learning in Soar, 
a proposed scheme is as follows: 
- Perceptual LTM should be considered an extension of Soar’s symbolic semantic 
memory, but augmented with spatial details 
- Soar’s episodic memory should capture perceptual pointers only, and not spatial 
structures 
- Agents should deliberately recall spatial aspects of episodic memories by using 
imagery to compose a scene, retrieving its components as prototypes from 
perceptual LTM 
- Imagery processing should not be reduced to rules via chunking  
In this scheme, only limited learning over spatial information is possible, but it has the 
advantage of requiring much less storage space than alternatives. 
Should quantitative numerical processing gain theoretical status?  
As was mentioned, quantitative processing in Soar is often regarded as a programming 
convenience rather than an important part of the theory. A useful research direction to 
consider is to bring quantitative processing into the Soar theory, possibly substantially 
changing the implementation along the way. Newell  (1988, 1990) argued that a “basic 
quantitative code” is necessary to represent quantities in working memory to account 
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for phenomena such as perceptual judgments (which are often modeled as evidence 
accumulating to meet a threshold), and since perceptual and motor interfaces likely deal 
with quantitative information: 
“It is easy to show that an architectural mechanism is required [for the basic 
quantitative code], since the issue is the transduction from perceptual signals, 
which are clearly quantitative (intensity, direction), to symbols in Soar's 
representation, and from such symbols to motor signals, which again are clearly 
quantitative (force, direction).” (Newell, 1990, p. 437) 
However, these particular needs might be superseded with SVS, since the quantitative 
connections between perception and action can be mediated through SVS, rather than 
working memory, and since the predicate extraction system might internally handle 
accumulation of evidence, only adding the result to working memory once a threshold is 
reached.  
Regardless of this, the use of quantities in working memory certainly seems to provide a 
functional benefit in some cases, and a detailed investigation into the subject would be 
valuable. One possible avenue for this is to expand on the analogy above, and consider 
quantitative numerical processing as another form of imagery. Others have suggested 
that amodal imagery operating on individual quantities might be a useful addition to 
Soar (Hines, 2010). This research could lead to, for example, an investigation of what 
operations lead to improved performance and generality, as this thesis presents for 
spatial imagery. If this approach were taken, it would make sense to consider handling 
mathematical and spatial imagery in similar ways. That is, the answers to the above 
questions might also apply to mathematical imagery in addition to spatial imagery. 
Should quantitative processing in Soar be eliminated in favor of SVS? 
Finally, as mentioned above, much of the value of mathematical processing in Soar has 
been superseded by SVS processing. Previous agents utilized this processing for 
capabilities now supported by SVS, for example, determining distances between points 
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in space. In addition, other mathematical problems could likely be solved via analogies 
to spatial problems. As mentioned in Section 4.4, though, even when SVS is used, it is 
still useful to represent some information quantitatively in working memory so that 
comparisons can later be made (in that case,  between distances). However, a minor 
change to the architecture could provide equivalent functionality in SVS without the 
need for quantities in working memory. Therefore, a detailed examination of whether 




Agre, P. E., & Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: An implementation of a theory of activity. In 
Proceedings of the Sixth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 
Anderson, J. R. (1978). Arguments concerning representations for mental imagery. 
Psychological Review, 85(4), 249–277.  
Anderson, J. R. (2005). Human Symbol Manipulation Within an Integrated Cognitive 
Architecture. Cognitive Science, 29(3), 313-341. 
Anderson, J. R., Bothell, D., Byrne, M. D., Douglass, S., Lebiere, C., & Qin, Y. (2004). 
An integrated theory of the mind. Psychological Review, 111(4), 1036-1060.  
Banerjee, B., & Chandrasekaran, B. (2007). Representatio s and Strategies for Solving 
Spatial Problems with Diagrams. In Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Visual 
Languages and Human-Centric Computing (pp. 183-188).  
Barkowsky, T. (2002). Mental Representation and Processing of Geographic 
Knowledge: A Computational Approach. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 
(Vol. 2541). Springer. 
Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
22(04), 577-660. 
Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617-645. 
Beeson, P., Modayil, J., & Kuipers, B. (2010). Factoring the mapping problem: Mobile 
robot map-building in the Hybrid Spatial Semantic Hierarchy. International 
Journal of Robotics Research, 29(4), 428-459. 
Benjamin, D. P., Lyons, D., & Lonsdale, D. (2004). ADAPT: A Cognitive Architecture 
for Robotics. In Proceedings of ICCM-2004.  
Benjamin, D. P., Lyons, D., & Lonsdale, D. (2006). Embodying a cognitive model in a 
mobile robot. In Proceedings of SPIE (Vol. 6384, p. 638407). Presented at 
Intelligent Robots and Computer Vision XXIV: Algorithms, Techniques, and 
Active Vision, Boston, MA. 
Brooks, R. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of 
145 
Robotics and Automation, 2(1), 14-23. 
Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence, 47, 139-
159. 
Cassimatis, N. L., Trafton, J. G., Bugajska, M. D.,& Schultz, A. C. (2004). Integrating 
cognition, perception and action through mental simulation in robots. Robotics 
and Autonomous Systems, 49(1-2), 13-23. 
Chandrasekaran, B. (1997). Diagrammatic representatio  and reasoning: some 
distinctions. In Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposium on Diagrammatic 
Reasoning.  
Chandrasekaran, B. (2006). Multimodal Cognitive Architecture: Making Perception 
More Central to Intelligent Behavior. Proceedings of the AAAI National 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1508-1512. 
Chandrasekaran, B., & Kurup, U. (2007). A Bimodal Cognitive Architecture: 
Explorations in Architectural Explanation of Spatial Reasoning. In Proceedings of 
the AAAI Spring Symposium on Control Mechanisms for Spatial Knowledge 
Processing in Cognitive / Intelligent Systems.  
Chandrasekaran, B., Kurup, U., Banerjee, B., Josephson, J. R., & Winkler, R. (2004). An 
Architecture for Problem Solving with Diagrams. In Diagrammatic Reasoning 
and Inference, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Vol. 2980, pp. 151-165). 
Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Cohn, A. G., Bennett, B., Gooday, J., & Gotts, N. M(1997). Qualitative Spatial 
Representation and Reasoning with the Region Connectio  Calculus. 
GeoInformatica, 1(3), 275-316. 
Diuk, C., Cohen, A., & Littman, M. L. (2008). An object-oriented representation for 
efficient reinforcement learning. In Proceedings of the 25th International 
Conference on Machine Learning (pp. 240-247). New York: ACM. 
Fajen, B. R., & Warren, W. H. (2003). Behavioral dynamics of steering, obstacle 
avoidance, and route selection. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 29(2), 343-362. 
Forbus, K. D. (1983). Qualitative reasoning about space and motion. In Mental Models 
(pp. 53-73). Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
146 
Forbus, K. D. (1993). Image and substance. Computational Intelligence, 9(4), 377-378. 
Forbus, K. D., Nielsen, P., & Faltings, B. (1991). Qualitative spatial reasoning: the 
CLOCK project. Artificial Intelligence, 51(1-3), 417-471. 
Funt, B. V. (1980). Problem-solving with diagrammatic representations. Artificial 
Intelligence, 13, 201–230. 
Gelernter, H. (1963). Realization of a Geometry-Theorem Proving Machine. In 
Computers and Thought (pp. 134-152). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Givan, R., Dean, T., & Greig, M. (2003). Equivalenc notions and model minimization in 
Markov decision processes. Artificial Intelligence, 147(1), 163–224. 
Glasgow, J., & Papadias, D. (1992). Computational imagery. Cognitive Science, 16(3), 
355-394. 
Glasgow, J. (1995). A formalism for model-based spatial planning. In Spatial 
Information Theory: A Theoretical Basis for GIS (pp. 501-518).  
Goetschalckx, R. U. (2009). On the Use of Domain Knowledge in Reinforcement 
Learning (PhD Thesis). Leuven, Belgium: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. 
Greeno, J. G. (1994). Gibson's Affordances. Psychological Review, 101(2). 
Grush, R. (2004). The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and 
perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(03), 377-396. 
Gunzelmann, G., & Lyon, D. R. (2006). Mechanisms for Human Spatial Competence. In 
Proceedings of Spatial Cognition V. 
Harrison, A. M., & Schunn, C. D. (2003). ACT-R/S: Look Ma, no "cognitive-map"! In 
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Cognitive Modeling (pp. 
129-134). 
Hernández, D. (1994). Qualitative Representation of Spatial Knowledge. Lecture Notes 
in Artificial Intelligence (Vol. 804). Springer-Verlag. 
Hines, J. (2010). ODE imagery?. Message to the soar-group mailing list. Retrieved from 
http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_name=AANLkTilul7KhCux
-ga_gBmEEcIN4upc0ETV90Sm-DUlR%40mail.gmail.com 
Huffman, S., & Laird, J. E. (1992). Using Concrete, P rceptually-Based Representations 
to Avoid the Frame Problem. In Proceedings of the AAAI Spring Symposium on 
Reasoning with Diagrammatic Representations. 
147 
Kieras, D. E., & Meyer, D. E. (1997). An Overview of the EPIC Architecture for 
Cognition and Performance with Application to Human-Computer Interaction. 
Human-Computer Interaction, 12, 391-438. 
Klingbeil, E., Saxena, A., & Ng, A. Y. (2008). Learning to Open New Doors. In 
Proceedings of the AAAI 17th Annual Robot Workshop and Exhibition. 
Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W., & Ganis, G. (2006). The Case for Mental Imagery. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Kuipers, B. (2000). The Spatial Semantic Hierarchy. Artificial Intelligence, 119(1-2), 
191-233. 
Kurup, U., & Chandrasekaran, B. (2006). Multi-modal Cognitive Architectures: A Partial 
Solution to the Frame Problem. In Proceedings of The 28th Annual Conference  of 
the Cognitive Science Society.  
Kurup, U., & Chandrasekaran, B. (2007). Modeling Memories of Large-scale Space 
Using a Bimodal Cognitive Architecture. In Proceedings of the Eighth 
International Conference on Cognitive Modeling (pp. 267-272). 
Laird, J. E. (2008). Extending the Soar Cognitive Architecture. In Proceedings of the 
First Conference on Artificial General Intelligence. 
Laird, J. E., Xu, J., & Wintermute, S. (2010). Using Diverse Cognitive Mechanisms for 
Action Modeling. In Proceedings of ICCM-2010.  
Laird, J. E., Yager, E. S., Hucka, M., & Tuck, C. M(1991). Robo-Soar: An integration 
of external interaction, planning, and learning using Soar. Robotics and 
Autonomous Systems, 8(1-2), 113-129.  
Larkin, J. H., & Simon, H. A. (1987). Why a Diagram is (Sometimes) Worth Ten 
Thousand Words. Cognitive Science, 11(1), 65-100. 
Lathrop, S. D. (2008). Extending Cognitive Architectures with Spatial and Visual 
Imagery Mechanisms (PhD Thesis). University of Michigan. 
Lathrop, S. D., & Laird, J. E. (2007). Towards Incorp rating Visual Imagery into a 
Cognitive Architecture. In Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on 
Cognitive Modeling. 
Lathrop, S. D., & Laird, J. E. (2009). Extending Cognitive Architectures with Mental 
Imagery. In Proceedings of the Second Conference on Artificial General 
148 
Intelligence. 
LaValle, S. M. (2006). Planning Algorithms. Cambridge University Press. 
LaValle, S. M., & Kuffner Jr, J. J. (2001). Randomized Kinodynamic Planning. The 
International Journal of Robotics Research, 20(5), 378. 
Lehman, J. F., Laird, J., & Rosenbloom, P. (2006). A Gentle Introduction to Soar: 2006 
Update. Retrieved from 
http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/soar/sitemaker/docs/misc/GentleIntroduction-2006.pdf 
Leonard, J., How, J., Teller, S., Berger, M., Campbell, S., Fiore, G., Fletcher, L., et al. 
(2008). A perception-driven autonomous urban vehicl. Journal of Field 
Robotics, 25(10).  
Li, L., Walsh, T. J., & Littman, M. L. (2006). Towards a unified theory of state 
abstraction for MDPs. In Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on 
Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics (pp. 531–539). 
Lindemann, S. R., & LaValle, S. M. (2003). Current issues in sampling-based motion 
planning. In Proceedings of the International Symposium of Robotics Research. 
Springer. 
Lozano-Pérez, T., & Wesley, M. A. (1979). An algorithm for planning collision-free 
paths among polyhedral obstacles. Communications of the ACM, 22(10), 560-570. 
Madhavan, R., Messina, E., & Albus, D. J. (2006). Intelligent Vehicle Systems: A 
4D/RCS Approach. New York: Nova Science Publishers. 
Nason, S., & Laird, J. E. (2005). Soar-RL: integrating reinforcement learning with Soar. 
Cognitive Systems Research, 6(1), 51-59.  
Newell, A. (1988). The Basic Quantitative Code: Statement of the Problem. Retrieved 
from http://shelf1.library.cmu.edu/cgi-
bin/tiff2pdf/newell/box00009/fld00552/bdl0001/doc0001/newell.pdf 
Newell, A. (1990). Unified theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Nuxoll, A., & Laird, J. E. (2007). Extending cognitive architecture with episodic 
memory. Proceedings of the AAAI National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 
1001. 
Pinker, S. (1984). Visual cognition: an introduction. Cognition, 18(1-3). 
149 
Posner, M. I., & Keele, S. W. (1968). On the genesis of abstract ideas. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 77(3), 353-363. 
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2003). Mental imagery: In search of a theory. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 25(02), 157-182. 
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2001). Visual indexes, preconceptual objects, and situated vision. 
Cognition, 80(1-2), 127-158.  
Ravindran, B., & Barto, A. G. (2002). Model minimization in hierarchical reinforcement 
learning. In Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Abstraction, 
Reformulation and Approximation (pp. 196–211). 
Rosenbloom, P. S., Laird, J. E., Newell, A., & McCarl, R. (1991). A preliminary analysis 
of the Soar architecture as a basis for general intelligence. Artificial Intelligence, 
47(1-3), 289-325. 
Shimojima, A. (1996). On the efficacy of representation (PhD Thesis). Indiana 
University. 
Stein, L. A. (1994). Imagination and situated cognitio . Journal of Experimental and 
Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 6(4), 393-407.  
Stober, J., & Kuipers, B. (2008). From pixels to policies: A bootstrapping agent. In 
Proceedings of the 7th IEEE International Conference on Development and 
Learning (pp. 103-108). 
Sutton, R. S. (1996). Generalization in reinforcement learning: Successful examples 
using sparse coarse coding. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 
8, 1038-1044.  
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT 
Press. 
Tabachneck-Schijf, H. J. M., Leonardo, A. M., & Simon, H. A. (1997). CaMeRa: A 
computational model of multiple representations. Cognitive Science, 21(3), 305-
350.  
Tenenbaum, J. B., Griffiths, T. L., & Kemp, C. (2006). Theory-based Bayesian models of 
inductive learning and reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(7), 309–318. 
Tesauro, G. (1995). Temporal difference learning and TD-Gammon. Communications of 
the ACM, 38(3), 58-68.  
150 
Ullman, S. (1984). Visual routines. Cognition, 18(1-3), 97. 
Wang, Y., & Laird, J. E. (2010). Efficient Value Function Approximation with 
Unsupervised Hierarchical Categorization for a Reinforcement Learning Agent. 
In Proceedings of  the 2010 International Conference on Intelligent Agent 
Technology.  
Wintermute, S. (2009a). Integrating Reasoning and Action through Simulation. In 
Proceedings of the Second Conference on Artificial General Intelligence.  
Wintermute, S. (2009b). An Overview of Spatial Processing in Soar/SVS (Technical 
Report No. CCA-TR-2009-01). University of Michigan Center for Cognitive 
Architecture. 
Wintermute, S. (2010). Using Imagery to Simplify Perceptual Abstraction in 
Reinforcement Learning Agents. In Proceedings of the the Twenty-Fourth AAAI 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 
Wintermute, S., & Laird, J. E. (2007). Predicate Projection in a Bimodal Spatial 
Reasoning System. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second AAAI Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence.  
Wintermute, S., & Laird, J. E. (2008). Bimodal Spatial Reasoning with Continuous 
Motion. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence. 
Wintermute, S., & Laird, J. E. (2009). Imagery as Compensation for an Imperfect 
Abstract Problem Representation. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference 
of the Cognitive Science Society. 
 
 
 
